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ABSTRACT
The thesis explores concepts of alienation and commodification in relation to public and
private themes of identity, in contemporary Australia. It is argued that as labour
conditions have intensified and the social safety net has eroded the emphasis on private
themes of identity have increased. These themes emphasise sexuality and gender, and
down-grade the issue of work and labour. The Australian Labor Party helped create the
conditions for postmodernist identity politics weakening their commitment to working
class improvement in favour of emphasising “hypercapitalism” and “hyperliberal”
gender discourses. This approach favours the inclusion of marginal groups that have
been traditionally outside of labourist concerns (women, homosexuals, Aborigines) at
the expense of civilising capitalism, labour alienation and commodification as the
central concern for workers. In short, the abandonment of Marxism, labourism and
Social democracy: and their replacement by identity issues.
The backlash to a post-welfare state social democracy designed to ameliorate
conditions for marginal groups, become a key feature in the election of the Howard
government in 1996, with “Howard’s battlers” consisting of former Labor voters
disenfranchised by “political correctness”. This produced an attack on “welfare cheats,”
high taxation, and “trendy” concerns such as Aboriginality – and reinforced Hansonism.
In this context, the Australian and American relationship and the frontier tradition is
stressed as a pivotal factor in determining the role of identity in the neo-liberal political
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economy, with the pressures created by neo-liberalism and globalisation.
Australian mythology based on Anzac symbolism and ‘personality’ creates a
vacuous phenomenon for genuine themes of Australian national identity to survive the
homogenous nature of “hyper-capitalism”. The drift towards the power of American
capitalism and political cosmologies can then been seen as a natural evolution of
Australian political mythology. It is here that the thesis argues that hyper capitalist
themes can have an implicit relationship to concepts of “hyper-liberalism” found in
gender discourses and moreover, ironically evocative of the individualism Weber
argued existed in American Protestant religious sects.
Subsequently the ‘de-construction’ of masculinity that has been characteristic of
feminist and gay theory, that reflects a social psychological perspective rather than one
based in Marx’s historical materialism that places ‘man’ within social history. Social
theory therefore unfairly constructs the heterosexual masculine personality in relation to
working class elite occupations such as coalmining or as a reflection of a corporate
dominance, to create polemic ‘avenues’ for marginal groups.
The focus upon heterosexuality within the thesis links its relationship to the
characteristics demanded by industrial capitalism such as the Fordist mode of
production, and in Marxist terms, the complete enslavement and alienation that existed
between “social man” and the capitalist mode of production. This approach emphasises
the experience of wage labour, culminating with the high levels of unemployment that
has risen concomitantly with de-industrialisation, globalisation and neo-liberalism. The
disciplining of the unemployed in the post-welfare state exists alongside hyper-liberal
themes of sexual and social identity, indicating a general shift to a “social fascism”, or
two- tiered form of democracy that resides alongside, and is often in competition with

vii

conservative advocates for the nuclear family and heterosexuality. The development of
“Howard’s battlers” reflects a conservative appropriation of the original Australian
legend that was based on labourism and mateship and now exists in a nationalist
paradigm evocative of frontiersmen and Anzacs rather than one based on class. A
framing issue for the thesis subsequently is what role does gender and sexuality have in
the function of the industrial capitalist society?
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INTRODUCTION

Chapter one (Australian masculinities, nationalism and cultural egalitarianism)
explores the unique banality of Australian politics explained by its reliance on frontier,
New World political and religious traditions. In this context, White’s (1981) notion of
“national inventions” is used describe the idiosyncratic and ephemeral differences
which evade the reality of Australia’s ‘Americanisation’. The chapter contests the
secular legend of Australian culture by arguing the existence of an increasing link
between Weber’s notion of the Protestant individual in capitalism and that of the
distinctive Protestant culture of America. Previously,
In so far as gold brought more people to the bush and led to the
growth of country towns, it may be said to have brought the
bushmen into closer touch with organised religion, but this was
a long-term process. (Ward, 1958:123)
The romance of the bush and the Australian ‘personality’ are revealed as the key
features separating the frontier experiences of the two countries. The durability of the
Anzac mythology, (where much of the conceptualisations of the personality originate)
has evolved into a right-wing phenomenon in the neo-liberal economy that negates
nationalistic divisions of substance due to the homogeneous nature of the globalised
phase of late capitalism. National identity is seen increasingly from a perspective that
focuses on consumption rather than work, as representations of identity are only useful
in terms of marketing and advertising projections. Otherwise Russel Ward’s “mates” are
only referred to in the context of nationalist and imperialist wars. The ‘apoliticality’ of
Ward’s thesis that had appeal as a naturally evolving leftist bias was too easily turned
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into a right-wing interpretation that involved soldiers that fought for Empire.
Capitalism has always had a ‘global’ perspective, and thereby played a central role in
defining nationalism and “nation-building”. Globalisation then creates unique pressures
on nations with small populations, and perceived nebulous or borrowed national
identities. As Turner suggests (in Sterne), Australia’s economic base is inexorably
linked to its nationalism that can appear increasingly contrary as globalised capital
buffets the economy and sense of identity. An ‘incomplete’ capture of the state that
does not incorporate the emotional and hegemonic concepts of nationhood, can unlock
the hegemony of Anzac, appropriated to reflect a single nationalism in the maelstrom of
neo-liberalism and globalisation.
Australian cultural policy is shaped by the fact that Australia is a
“small and economically weak nation…torn between adjusting
what it does in order to compete internationally…or
alternatively maintaining a close relation between its activities
and a sense of national identity – even when this incurs
economic penalties”. (Sterne, 2003:104)
The Australian experience which is otherwise deliberately secular is based upon the
Anzac iconography which resonates with mythology of battle, survival and the loss and
sacrifice of neophyte masculinity. In the Australian experience, the Anzac soldier
incorporates elements of the “noble worker”, through its portrayal of action, versus
caricatured middle class corruption, inaction, and ‘flabbiness’. The Anzac mythology
also serves as Australia’s pseudo fight for independence and a reminder of its
vulnerability as a European country in Asia. As Kapferer argues,
Military symbolism in Anzac has little import outside Australian
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egalitarian individualism, and the apparent stress on military
symbolism in Australian nationalism is fashioned to the service
of egalitarian ideals that may be even counter-military in spirit.
(Kapferer, 1988:160).
The central discussion of this chapter is how masculinity and capitalism are related and
defined in frontier societies. Furthermore, the commodification of a residual masculinity
transformed by de-industrialisation, economic rationalism and neo-liberalism, and how
elements of frontier masculinity have survived and transmogrified, is also the key focus
of the thesis. Metaphoric and actual deaths, including the celebration of the Anzacs in
Australian mythology, can be seen as a partial manifestation of the ‘death’ of the
labourer in Marx’s theory of alienation. In nationalism, these ‘deaths’ are manifested in
ritualised and innovative ways to punish the unemployed, to the enslavement of the
Protestant ‘individual’ in Armageddon cults, and reinforce the concepts of domination
and alienation in mainstream and marginal sexualities. Furthermore, the association of
death and danger and the consumption of illegal drugs are juxtaposed with the use of
legal drugs and the perpetuation of the Protestant-inspired work ethic.
The particularly American tradition of Protestantism and capitalism is revealed in the
new Protestant sects such as Adventists, who practice extreme discipline and asceticism
while awaiting and proclaiming the second coming of Christ. Their prominence in
missionary work in Australasia denotes their cultural and religious influence, and their
largely unconscious contributions to the neo-liberal political culture emphasising selfreliance and an apolitical work ethic. The analysis of fringe capitalist groups such as
Amway suggest that they are pivotal in supporting liberal myths about opportunity
irrespective of the endemic problems of the capitalist economy. These discrete
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conceptualisations of autonomous individuals freed from the constraints of ‘society’
(and socialism), is contrasted with Marx’s secular morality that concentrated on
recognising the ‘realness’ and inherent social value of labour. The rational Protestant
individual evolved as such; as Weber argues,
For though the development of economic rationalism is partly
dependent on rational technique and law, it is at the same time
determined by the ability and disposition of men to adopt certain
types of practical rational conduct. When these types have been
obstructed by spiritual obstacles, the development of rational
economic conduct has also met serious inner resistance. The
magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas of duty based
upon them, have in the past always been among the most
important formative influences on conduct. (Weber, 1930:2627)
Drugs, masculinity, the work ethic and Aboriginality, become part of a nationalist
obsession in uniting disparate Australian labourist traditions and ‘Aboriginal’ symbols
that generate both failure and confusion. The phenomenon of the Australian state
existing before the nation assisted in the desire for unification and it is argued that
Aboriginality is a white appropriation that joins a queue for amelioration under a
nationalist and reflexive state. As a manifestation of an imperialism/colonisation ‘guilt,’
‘Aboriginality’ is granted a limited space within the liberal capitalist state. This
however creates tension between the dynamics of original Aboriginal oppression due to
colonisation and the problems of an Anglo working and underclass. Its central status in
multi-cultural debates is part of a broader dynamic of the need to include outsiders
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within liberal capitalism, and the expansionary nature of Australian capitalism in the
post-World War Two era. This includes the successful assimilation of European
migrants versus the influx of Asian migration during the 1970s, which was often linked
to the importation of illegal drugs and dissolution of the work ethic.
Themes of postmodern identities therefore do not originate pressures from ‘below’
as such, but are stimulated by the hegemony of the Western middle class who by virtue
of global capitalism, encroach on ethnicities that do not belong traditionally to this new
social and economic order. The search for autonomous and authentic identities can then
be increased by those ethnicities that that may ostensibly live a Western lifestyle, but
seek to locate ‘indigenous’ loyalties and origins.
Chapter two (Social democracy and economic rationalism)
Tensions are explored between the rise of the state, (secular morality), and the
arrogation of religious definitions of morality, to the “high point” of secular morality;
Australian post-welfare state social democracy. The question for this chapter is; does
social democracy unite the disparate forces in social analysis and generate a sustained
critique of capitalism? This chapter continues the emphasis that amorphous concepts
such as nationalism have had in the gestation of secular morality. The postmodern
Australian state largely defined by the Labor Party in government shifted attention from
problems in late capitalism such as unemployment and the diminishing role of working
class politics and the proletarianisation of the middle class to a multitude of issues that
could be caterogised as “second string” issues. In Marxist terms, they are issues relating
to the superstructure, and as such, vulnerable to control and manipulation by the middle
class.
The development of an alternate form of populism colloquially known as “political
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correctness” emanated from institutions such as universities and changes within the
parliamentary Labor Party. The Whitlam government of 1972-75 first used this
approach in the great political and social ‘modernisation’ of Australia that was a
response to the radicalism of the 1960s. This approach was supported by academics that
used modernity and then post-modernity, to outline their autonomy through the use of
non-mainstream perspectives. However due to the economic crises during the 1970s and
the shift away from labour intensive work practices, this ultimately came at the expense
of traditional working class politics. Therefore while the promotion of women’s rights
appeared to evoke Australian traditions of egalitarianism, it also broke the malecentered-ness of Australian egalitarianism. As Frankel asks,
Can the egalitarian ethos – even though it was never very radical
in the Australian context – survive postmodern individualism
and consumerism? Or is the ‘old Australia’ being threatened
more

by

modernist

economic

rationalisation

than

by

postmodernist cultural values? (Frankel, 1992:177)
The emergence of socially conservative policies that matched the economic
objectives, also reasserted traditional concepts of populism based upon the “hip pocket
nerve”. The electoral success of the concept of “Howard’s battlers” re-creates the myth
of the ‘worker’ in the Australian context into a non-unionised generic battler in the
global marketplace. The dominance of populism in political discourse generally relates
to the social underpinnings of the Fordist-labour intensive capitalist society, argues
Harvey.
What was special about Ford (and what ultimately separates
Fordism from Taylorism), was his vision, his explicit
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recognition that mass production means mass consumption, a
new system of reproduction of labour power, a new politics of
labour control and management, a new aesthetics and
psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalised modernist, and
populist democratic society. (Harvey, 1989:126)
The chapter consequently draws an analogous relationship between the decline of
Whitlam’s broad based social democracy and the rise of a selective welfare state that
has reflected economic rationalist perspectives. The essential problem with defining
groups that fall within designation for amelioration is that capitalism demands the
appropriate distribution of intellectual and economic resources within an increasing
paradigm of efficiency. With labour parties adopting traditional liberal themes such as
citizenship rights, it has pushed, particularly in the Australian context, the Liberal party
towards a perceived neo-fascism. The current government’s pernicious reaction to
seemingly disparate economic and social issues such as “boat people”, a restrictive
work culture, and the treatment of the unemployed, are linked to its requirement to
project a distinctive nationalism despite the homogenising effect of globalisation. This
ontology reveals that the celebration of nationalism invariably draws upon hegemonic
concepts relating to race and political foundations.
Subsequently a more obvious form of social fascism results when conservative or
‘liberal’ governments rescind excessive “political correctness”, and emphasise a
distinctly traditional social order that then flows into the desired economic paradigm. At
a state level “law and order” elections dominate, with the ever escalating theme of the
police, “on the beat”, aimed at those most affected by poverty and employment
vulnerability. This is encouraged through talk-back radio and tabloid media, where

7

overt forms of discipline are encouraged to deal with society’s malcontents. A twotiered democracy now operates, with freedoms promoted for the wealthy and the
upwardly mobile, (the so-called aspirational voter), and punishment for the underclass
or permanently poor. Such anomalies exist in democracy due to capitalism’s appeal to
individual consumption and gratification to emancipated ‘individuals’, who “work
hard”. “Hard work” taken in this context, attempts to de-politicise the actual work, in
favour of what the “hard work’ can bring – a stronger identity as a consumer to
‘possess’ and to ‘have’. Advertising, through the promotion of various consumer goods,
may use humour or pathos to state its message, but the reference point is always the
product that remains untouched by society’s foibles. Capitalism itself then remains
similarly unaffected.
The consumers are the workers and employees, the farmers and
lower middle class. Capitalist production so confines them, body
and soul, that they fall helpless victims to what is offered them.
As naturally as the ruled always took the morality imposed on
them more seriously than the rulers themselves, the deceived
masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more
the successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology
which enslaves them. The misplaced love of the common people
for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the
cunning of the authorities. (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1988:133134)
A paradigmatic shift in “social democracy” marks a deliberate drift away from
politics focused on class towards an inevitable “politics of the personal”. These are
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characterised by broader gender issues that argue that the politics of work can be
defeated and superseded by the pursuit of private themes of sexual activity and identity.
Alternatively the politics of work can be associated with placing women in the
workforce, (affirmative action). They have the effect of negating an analysis of
structural economic issues, with the goal of an “atomisation of the workers so that they
turn to non-class issues: women’s liberation, consumerism, home ownership, education
reform.”(Catley&McFarlane, 1974:37). However fundamental issues relating generally
to work satisfaction (alienation), the need for an income to operate in the consumer
society and non-work, (underemployment and unemployment) remain as significant as
in any other time in the history of the capitalist society.
The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in
his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not
working, and when he is working he does feel at home. His
labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced
labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely
a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character
emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other
compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External
labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of
self-sacrifice, of mortification. (Marx, 1844: “Estranged
Labour”)
Chapter three (Competing ‘welfarism’)
The “death of the labourer” in the Marxist ontology is intensified by virtue of the
domination of alienating work and unemployment in the neo-liberal economy. The
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question for the chapter is how does post-welfare state social democracy impact on the
welfare state that if not in funding, but in terms of philosophical support and rhetoric is
in decline? The original marginal group, (the capitalist ‘reserve army’ of the
unemployed), are ignored due to the focus on social groups based in ‘identity’ politics.
While Cassidy suggests that Marx’s “mathematical model of the economy, which
depended on the idea that labour is the source of all value, was riven with internal
inconsistencies and is rarely studied theses days” (Cassidy, 2003:268), the theory could
still form a significant bulwark against an economy that holds no specific value to
labour.
The original impetus behind Marx’s theories, that of harnessing the productive
capacities of the industrial society by focusing on the mechanics of labour rather than its
exploitation, could be still realised in a humanist if not ‘economic’ context. For
Jakubowski, Marx never renounced the “humanism” of his thesis, even when later on he
abandoned the term itself. This needs to be remembered, for it represents the essence of
marxist theory (Jakubowski, 1990:20). Welfare reliance would ostensibly occur through
consistent problems in how capitalism operates, particularly its inability to distribute
and sustain labour. However, as Considine demonstrates, the philosophical perspectives
are fixed in claims that welfare mismanagement and abuse at an individual and
bureaucratic level, is to satisfy the demands of business that caused the unemployment
in the first instance.
At all points of the political spectrum there is a litany of
complaints

coming

from

social

democrats,

liberals,

postmodernists and neo-conservatives – the state has become
too big, too costly, too rigid, too standardised, and too
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insensitive to individual identities. This remarkable consensus
appears to be a consequence both of actual deficiencies and the
emergence of anti-government ideologies associated with the
new cultural power of business. (Considine, 2001:5)
As a consequence, the post-welfare state produces regimes of punishment, and in
particular, apocryphal legends of “welfare abuse”. This approach inverts the philosophy
on which the modern welfare state was built, on principles of inclusion and trust, rather
than one that emphasises ‘bludging’. The consumer welfare state however, has always
remained in conflict with Protestant concepts of the work ethic, and this is reflected in
the fact that government benefits for the unemployed barely reach a subsistence level.
The solidification of moral themes in welfare provision by the Howard government,
with the encouragement of church-based groups joining the Job Network, creates a
return to a form of pre-statism, where religious groups dominated welfare provision and
the emphasis on correcting the erroneous individual. Subsequently the ethos of Mutual
Obligation is to facilitate work-like accountability on the unemployed to be “work
ready” and appreciative of tax-payer support. However as Jamrozik points out;
In Australia, already in the late 1960s, there were indicators of
emerging trends which at that time were ignored. For example,
the disappearance of jobs for young people without specific
educational or occupational qualifications was already in
evidence early in the 1970s. In the time-honoured way,
explanations of unemployment among certain population strata
or in certain occupations were always sought in suspected
negative character traits located in the affected population, not
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in the changing conditions in industry and economy. (Jamrozik,
2001:138)
Furthermore, an analysis of the aggregate unemployment rate between 1861-2000
demonstrated that the labour market “was highly unstable with the unemployment rate
rarely below 5 per cent” (Mitchell, 2001:1951), indicating that the stability produced in
the post-war years was highly unusual in the history of Australian capitalism, and/or a
product of interventionist economic policies, (Keynesianism). In the time following
June 1974, there has been an average of unemployment-unfilled vacancies ratio of 11.1
per unfilled vacancy. (Mitchell, 2001:902)
The undermining of the welfare state is also felt significantly in public housing
policy, which has traditionally struggled for broad acceptance in Australia due to the
emphasis on home ownership. Public housing’s previous role in securing a foothold for
those saving for their own home has also been dramatically undermined by the politics
of post-welfare state social democracy. Recognition of various marginal groups in
gaining public housing tenancy reveals the economic reality that underpins postmodern
imperatives, and competition for recognition in the post-welfare state. The shift towards
“welfare” or “social housing” sees public housing existing only for the long-term
unemployed or those with various disabilities as a reflection of the responsible use of
‘scarce’ public resources. Gramsci’s, concept of community based hegemony can be
employed to include those who are marginalised, but fall outside of conventionally
defined social groups that require epistemological and ameliorative change.
One cannot make politics-history without this passion, without
this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people1
2

Full employment abandoned – the role of the public sector.
The unemployed cannot find jobs that are not there!
12

nation. In absence of such a nexus the relations between the
intellectual and the people-nation are, or are reduced to,
relationships of a purely bureaucratic and formal order; the
intellectuals become a caste, or a priesthood (so-called organic
centralism). (Gramsci, 1971:418)
Chapter four (The formation of sexuality in industrial capitalism) is where the
epistemological discussion of gender begins in greater emphasis. The question for this
chapter is: how is heterosexuality defined as a result of its dominance in the
anthropological construction of modernity and the industrial capitalist society? The
unusual relationship between Christianity and science, also defined the moral and
sexual asceticism required in capitalist production, with the advent of the “science of
sex” attempting to define the procreation values of the industrial society that was
restricted by Victorian morality. Subsequently this chapter focuses on the ‘mechanics’
of heterosexuality – a feature obscured by gender theorists who consider
heterosexuality’s hegemony negates the requirement for analysis – particularly when
compared to the marginalisation and stigmitisation of homosexuality. As Halperin
forcefully argues,
Heterosexuality defines itself without problematising itself, it
evaluates itself as a privileged and unmarked term, by abjecting
and problematising homosexuality. Heterosexuality, then,
depends on homosexuality to lend it substance – and to enable
to acquire by default its status as a default, as a lack of
difference or an absence of abnormality. (Halperin, 1995:44).
The focus on sexual practice whether it is heterosexual or homosexual conforms to a
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general postmodern perspective of themes of consumption rather than work. Work as
the central product of identity is mirrored however, by the dominance of heterosexuality
in capitalist social formation. Despite claims of a residual Fordist economy and a postFordism, the procreation values that were imitated by the sexological culture of
penetration and orgasm are still pre-dominant in late capitalist values. Re-definitions of
the family through delayed parenting or limiting the number of children can be seen in
the context of an ad-hoc response to the pressures of late capitalism and neo-liberalism.
Features that negate family life may see the neo-liberal labour market move into its
post-Fordist phase lessening armies of reserve labour, yet precipitating a labour
shortage or wages explosion. The attempt to modify social relationships according to
the continual evolving nature of capitalism in its “post-capitalist” phase ignores for
Hennessy that commodity production and exchange constitute;
A “phenomenological matrix,” a form of consciousness or a
cultural logic that alienates many aspects of human life from the
network of social relations that makes them possible. This
atomizing perspective comprises the very scaffolding of
bourgeois visibility and is played out in a host of strategies that
fragment components of social life: in the separation of
consumption from production, private from public life, market
from household, individual from collective, and culture from
political economy. (Hennessy, 2000:95)
The concentration on women’s sexual freedom is suggested as a manifestation of the
reduction of male dominated industries in the “post industrial society” and that late
capitalism creates the opportunity for a focus on women’s sexuality separate from men.
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Marx’s materialist view of history is salutary when viewed against the banal human to
nature analogies of sexology that had defined sexuality as a utilitarian function of the
capitalist society.
Marx regards man not merely as the product of nature but as the
product of social, human labour. It is not only consciousness
that distinguishes men from animals but the fact that they
produce their own means of existence. “They themselves
indirectly produce their own life….World history is simply the
production of man through human labour. Social laws,
therefore, overtake the natural laws on which they are founded.
(Jakubowski, 1990:25)
The imitation of male heterosexual normalisations has also seen a focus the postfeminist activity of phallus humiliation. A liberal discussion of relative phallus efficacy
via an appropriation of the “gay gaze” has turned what was an issue “amongst men” to
one that has the potential to intensify anxiety and increase the competition between men
for women’s attention. Phallus critiques then alludes to either/or the eternal search for
the vaginal orgasm, (not long enough to achieve pleasure), or a general satire of
masculine normalisations. Previously, Playboy ‘morality’ represented the ascendant
position of post-war capitalism headed by male middle class heterosexuality. Playboy’s
sexualisation of the breast emphasised the connection between sex and maternity, and
women who possess prominent breasts seemingly extending invitations to be ‘fucked’
and by implication, impregnated
The advent of industrialisation provided the vehicle for the transformation of the
related issues of private property and labour alienation. The centrality of sexuality of
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post-modernism, reveals Marx’s principle that the commodification of this “final
frontier”, the commodification of an individual’s sexual identity, may indicate this is the
last great form of private property to be ‘valued’ before the collapse of capitalism. The
problematic enjoyment/repressive phenomenon of bourgeois and Protestant sexuality
will also be transformed.
human life required private property for its realisation” because
“only through developed industry - ie through the medium of
private property-does the ontological essence of human passion
come to be both in its totality and in its humanity. (Meszaros,
1970:112)
The use of what were once considered private themes of identity, have become a
significant feature of public discourse, rivaling the politics of labour, while also
becoming a part of the commodification of all things non-labour. In post-modern terms,
the accumulative ‘worth’ of endured alienation can be compared with the valourised
activity of sex and the shunned activity of work. In Marxist terms,
The intensification of the social antagonism between private
property and labour demonstrates the innermost contradiction of
the given productive system and greatly contributes to its
disintegration. Thus human self-objectification in the form of
self-alienation loses its relative historical justification and
becomes an indefensible social anachronism. (Meszaros,
1970:113)
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Chapter five (Women’s roles and sexuality in capitalism)
The chapter poses the question, how are feminist social groups defined, and how they
relate to work in the neo-liberal economy? As Hartmann famously asserted, “the
“marriage” of marxism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife
depicted in English common law: marxism and feminism are one, and that one is
marxism” (Hartmann, 1981:2). In post-modernism masculinity is isolated and is
sacrificed, commensurate with the alienation of the male worker, on which the physical
infrastructure of the mode of production was constructed. A sacrificial maternity in the
private sphere was likewise necessary in supporting the social and physical
infrastructure. Positions in the public sphere reflect the capitalist standardisation of
women’s economic roles to that of service and sublimation as nurse, domestic servant,
bar-maid or prostitute. However ascetic sexual behaviour underpinned the difference
between public and private roles and women’s position within the nuclear family. In
what Elshtain refers to as the “Aristotelian power-politics paradigm”, (Elshtain,
1982:65) she argues that the suffragists and later feminists underestimated the link
between women and public/private definition of politics and responsibilities. These
definitions were outlined in Greek society and philosophy, and increased through the
articulation of woman in Christianity, and then of capitalism that placed the earning
capacity in the public sphere.
Aristotle splits the public (political) from the private
(nonpolitical) realm. There are greater (public) associations and
lesser (private) associations. Fully realised moral goodness and
reason are attainable only through participation in public life,
and this involvement is reserved for free, adult males. Women
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share in goodness and rationality in the limited sense
appropriate to their confinement in a lesser association, the
household. Their relationship to the public realm is that of one
of its “necessary” conditions rather than its “integral parts”.
(Elshtain, 1982:53)
What is understated in traditional analyses of patriarchy is that the low status of
women is a manifestation of the universal sublimation of wage labourer. A vague and
ill-defined “middle class” feminism dominates as a result, exacerbating conflict
between men and women in the shrinking job market. The influence of liberal
egalitarianism that seeks to ameliorate women’s oppression within the public/private
split dichotomy is ultimately limited by the capitalist social and economic order. The
proletarianisation of the workforce when linked with a critique of ‘patriarchy’
intensifies such proletarianism, as class based commodification is de-emphasised in
favour of an inclusion into the capitalist market-place. Seeking flaws in the post-modern
argument that Marxism is ‘reductive’, Stabile argues,
Isn’t it reductive to suggest that the oppression I ostensibly
suffer as an educated, middle class woman should be accorded
primacy over the oppression of working class men? It may well
be the case that some working class men are sexist, but to what
extent does a focus on “their” sexism work to erase my class
privilege, as well as the fact that the most powerful and
oppressive forms of sexism are wielded by capitalists rather than
disempowered workers? (Stabile, 1997:143)
Continuing the exposition on heterosexual normalisations, the legacy of women’s
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relationship to romantic love in the capitalist social order is discussed. The notion of
‘having’ and ‘possessing’ someone through ‘relationships’ is indicative of the
consumption ethos of the postmodern society. The eroticism of the denied, a feature
discussed in chapter four in relation to sexuality, (the attraction lies in the opposition to
Christian sexual asceticism), connects directly with capitalist imperatives which favour
the delayed gratification of consumption. Female heterosexual normalisations of
romantic love suggest the ritualised denial of men’s sexual needs and despite intentions
to make women more sexually assertive, romantic love operates largely in opposition to
sex and a male defined sexuality. Romantic love ‘individualises’ sexuality for women,
yet takes the sexual out of sex, to promote procreation and monogamous values that
even in the post-Fordist phase is still apparent. Love ideology optimistically promotes a
discourse that is an antithesis of the pornographic gaze, and alternatively and ‘love
hysteria’ exists as a manifestation of the failure of the failed ideologies, allowing
‘emancipated’ women to pursue promiscuous relationships while pursuing ‘love’. The
mythology of love is that it should be difficult to obtain, but to be occasionally
experienced vicariously which alludes to its egalitarian nature.
Popular literature and magazines encourage the notion of love’s ethereality, through
role models such as Princess Diana, whose combination of an image of a dedicated
mother linked with her pursuit of love, metamorphisised into the ideal popular postfeminist heroine. The Princess Diana phenomenon can be measured in part, through a
disparate link between the dominance of the bourgeois culture and royalty’s medieval
association. This suggests her quest for love and the reality of her wealthy existence
was unsullied by the traditional bourgeois appropriation of the working class’s surplus
value. In a general sense, love becomes the ultimate individual sacrifice of concern for
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others in contrast to the ruthless application of individuality required for survival in the
neo-liberal capitalist society. The marriage or relationship furthermore, that is sustained
for reasons other than love or fidelity, where the appearance of normality is all-with the
notion of ‘working’ at relationships, (replacing initial feelings based on spontaneity and
enjoyment), creating stable environments for the raising of children turning romantic
love into a largely vicarious experience.
Conversely, the purity associated with romantic love and the role of
commodification can also be measured by the promotion of instruments of shame and
secrecy, such as women’s sanitary devices. Once advertisers were able to broach this
controversial issue, women were then immersed fully in the commercial culture.
Women could be promoted as autonomous consumers with sexual asceticism a mere
illusion, although women’s placement within the family is still given pre-eminence.
This contrary matrix of images is driven by the fact that “television channels desire
women as audiences not in their own right, but for their attraction to advertisers”
(Nightingale, 1990:30). ‘Openness’ as in the sexological definition of the term often
translates as ‘freedom’, however the practice of “prick teasing” reveals the tension
between women’s projected sexual growth and women’s often tenuous relationship to
heterosexuality as defined by penetration. This is reminiscent of advertising’s ‘promise’
of satisfaction, versus what the products usually deliver. Obviously, ownership and
consumption of the product advertised provides the missing link and this relationship is
rarely presented in any self-depreciating or ironic fashion. Women as new and gullible
consumers (for themselves, instead of their families), will ensure this tradition
continues.
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Chapter six (Men’s roles and sexuality in capitalism) focuses on the public
construction of masculinity compared to women’s private themes that have related to
sexual asceticism and romantic love. Consequently, how do workplace roles impact on
definitions of gender and sexuality? The reification of masculinity has become a class
identifier, and a substitute for class action, and this has been exemplified by the
particular codes of masculinity expressed in trade unionism. Masculine codes however,
are also used by capitalism and symptomatic of a capability and willingness to perform
arduous tasks such as coal mining. The capitalist class reliance on expendable
masculine labour preceded attempts at communism, and as such, communist reification
of masculinity is explicable, (such as Stalinism) and held as indicative of its failure to
resonate in the increasingly gender pluralistic West.
‘Masculinity’ has been used as a negatively reified symbol to assert the dominance
of broadly defined social groups in high unemployment late capitalist society. Within
social theory, working class heterosexual masculinity has been actively ‘deconstructed’, and masculinity consequently has been positioned between corporate
conceptions and a working class ‘elite’ (‘wharfies’, coal miners). What has suffered is a
dearth of representation of the great mass of wage work carried out by men, and the
exclusion of unemployed men following the economic reconstructions of the economy
during the last thirty years.
Masculine dominance in industrial capitalist society is characterised by the reference
to patriarchy, constructed through the heterosexualisation of culture via the nuclear
family. However as Gramsci argues in his theory of hegemony, everything but the real
reason, namely capitalism, is blamed and assessed for contributing to inequality.
In a certain sense it may be said that this division is created by
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the division of labour, is merely a technical fact, and those who
see everything purely in terms of “technique”, “technical”
necessity, etc., speculate on this coexistence of different causes
in order to avoid the fundamental problem. (Gramsci, 1971:144145)
The mutation of masculinity to suit the requirements of post-modernism and
consumerism is evidenced by the changing character of Rugby League. Originally a
working class sport with close local community links it has now been repackaged as a
form of heterosexual masculinity attractive for families, but using the “gay gaze”, in its
promotion to women. The game’s relationship with working class communities has
become tenuous, with its players amongst the highest paid sports-people in Australia.
The irony of this situation is discussed in relation to the re-admission of the South
Sydney Rugby League Club, (a foundation member of the first-grade competition),
following a two year hiatus as the club’s successful campaign for re-admission evoked
traditional class politics, themes of community. Within other prominent national male
sports such as cricket, heterosexual masculinity continues to exist strongly despite the
deconstruction of male heterosexuality. Elite sportsmen then, are able by the virtue of
large salaries and sponsorship to portray traditional relationships with spouses and
children, demonstrating the central role heterosexuality has to capitalism and formalised
patterns of consumption.
Remnants of masculinity can subsequently be found in criminal and “dangerous
masculinities” that seek danger and pseudo or suicidal experiences that constitute the
“death of the labourer.” Para-military and military forces are also seen as the last
bastions of male authority in their role to protect the state and private property from the
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high numbers of disenfranchised underclass males. As the public are usually dissatisfied
with psychological and social explanations for crime yet social fascism produces
seemingly endless claims for more police, security guards and prisons, to contain a
dangerous lumpenproletariat form of masculinity - with little recognition how they are
formed from a sociological perspective. The neo-liberal definitions of a good
masculinity (expressed in nationalism and sport) and a bad masculinity that produces
the majority of domestic violence and crime, mirrors the elitist social discourse that
defines it in a self-producing prophecy. The ignorance of the growth of a socially
produced lumpenproletariat is linked to postmodernism’s tendency to equate Marxism
with heterosexual masculinity, implies Stabile.
“Twentieth-century Marxism,” maintains Linda Nicholson, “has
used the generalising categories of production and class to
delegitimise demands of women, black people, gays, lesbians,
and others whose oppression cannot be reduced to economics.”
This kind of judgement dramatically displays yet another feature
of postmodernism: its historical amnesia. An argument like
Nicholson’s not only represses a rich history of democratic class
politics, it is remarkably insensitive to the simple fact that
Marxism and socialist organisations in general have been
repeatedly marginalised and delegitimised by capitalism.
(Stabile, 1997:136)
Chapter seven (Homosexuality and postmodernism)
While Marx’s secular morality was based in work, forms of secular morality that
revolve around ‘identity’ and rejections of traditional Christian morality, are vulnerable
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to the consumption ethos – we are what we have the potential to consume. In this
context, marginal sexualities are non-confrontational to the hegemonic position of the
worker/consumer. Therefore the social constructionist argument for homosexuality
places it back within an anthropological context, and gives a materialist account for the
gestation of gender identity.
It is subsequently considered that the ‘gay’ personality is a manifestation of a
characterisation of its oppressors, and a reaction to the overt asceticism of heterosexual
women. Binary aspects of the male heterosexual identity such as the “heterosexual
wimp” and the “hyper masculine” gaol personality are contrasted with connotations of
the homosexual male ‘personality’. In frontier societies particularly, there lies the
requirement to project and display a physical and sexual competency and confidence
with the inverse celebration of such social phenomena via Sydney’s Gay and Lesbian
Mardi Gra. Subsequently, “the aim of queer visibility actions is not to include queers in
the cultural dominant but to continually pressure and disclose the heteronormative”
(Hennessy, 2000:114). Moreover, the argument in relation to homosexuality in the
chapter is consistent therefore with Freud’s theory of “polymorphous perversity”, that
hints at the social construction of heterosexuality and homosexuality, with ‘bi-sexuality’
the only biologically determined sexuality.
The underlying assumption (of Freudian theory) is that children
are not born with a social and cultural identity, but that this
comes to be formed as a direct consequence of their contact with
others, in particular parents. As infants, boys and girls are
neither naturally heterosexual nor homosexual; rather, they are
in a stage of ‘polymorphous perversity’ and open to numerous
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forms of gratification. (Whitehead, 2002: 24)
The chapter asks how do failures in heterosexuality and homosexuality produce
nihilist, hyper-liberal discourses (such as sadomasochism and paedophilia) that promote
individual agency over broader ‘moral’ concerns. A secular ‘morality’ presides over a
Christian perspective, which is seen as restrictive and pernicious, (if not generally
ignorant of humanist claims for social diversity). However the favoured postmodern
perspective of moral relativism can also become the central conundrum in liberal
discourse - where to demarcate moral, philosophic and capitalist principles? As Radin
points out,
Saying that some things simply are not property is one way for a
liberal to be a compartmentaliser. Then the social world is
divided into a “pure” property realm, in which the laissez-faire
market is inherent in the concept of property, and a non-property
realm, in which things people value must belong to another
category or categories. (Radin, 1996:33)
Hyper-liberal discourses pursue heuristic approaches that arguably do not offer
realistic alternatives, but suggest potential for epistemological alteration. As Foucault
argues in respect of the archaeology of discourses, it “is not an interpretative discipline:
it does not seek another, better-hidden discourse. It refuses to be allegorical” (Foucault,
1972:139). However the approach must be speaking or knowing something, as any
broad-based discussion is a starting point that has been arrived at arbitrarily. For Sterne,
Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ thesis at one level offers potential for social
transformation, however its deliberately unclear boundaries provokes epistemological
questions relating to its intention.
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As Amanda Anderson argues, Foucault’s work appeals “at some
level to a vision of unalienated relations and undamaged forms
of social life”. Otherwise, why make a critique of prison reform
or so-called sexual liberation? In both cases, his criticism is that
they did not do what they said they were doing. There is, then,
some residual promise of liberation in Foucault’s work even as
he declares the “death of man” and offers a genealogy of
subjectivity. This contradiction between holding on to the
possibility of some form of social and subjective transformation
and the desubstantialisation of subjectivity is perhaps one of the
most productive tensions in Foucault’s work. (Sterne, 2003:103)
In relation to discourses that discuss marginal sexual practices and the politics of “the
body” there is the risk that the abandonment of traditional forms and concepts of
morality based on body denial, will result in an unrestricted practice of ‘sexuality’. This
ultimately impacts on the most vulnerable to problematic discourses that are trapped
within cultural history’s theoretical and practical limitations. However for Butler, “In
the face of the prospective silencing or erasure of gender, race or sexual minority
identities by reactionary political forces, it is important to articulate them, and to insist
on these identities as sites of valuable cultural contest” (Butler, 1995:129). This battle
for cultural identity is illusory when compared with a materialist account that recognises
labour as ‘real’ versus identities that are awaiting full membership of liberal capitalism.
Materialism, in short, is a historical praxis and a structure of
conflicts that determines other practices. Unlike the Foucauldian
and ludic inert non-discursive, it does not simply exist side by
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side with the discursive: it makes the discursive possible; it
“explains” the discursive. (Ebert, 1995:125)
The radical discourse of lesbian sadomasochism is endemic of the feature of
sexological discourse where truth is sought through extreme bodily experiences. This is
represented as a type of erotic blasphemy, and more generally characterised by
sexology’s culture of openness. Issues such as phallicism, orgasm and rape allude to the
institution of hegemonic masculinity and with a particularly sexual and broader
symbolic power. Masculinity’s hegemony however, is revealed in the desire to imitate
its associative themes, such as lesbian sadomasochism. Its major themes of domination
and humiliation are therefore perceived in a naturalistic fashion, ignoring their possible
connection with the economic and social punishment of capitalism.
Sado-masochism becomes a theatre of sex, where the consenting
partners freely engage in extreme activities, from bondage to fist
fucking, mixing ‘shit, and cum and spit and piss with earthiness,
all on the borderlines of endurance, to attain an intensified sense
of release and pleasure. The political advocates of S/M take
many of the beliefs of the early sexologists – that courtship,
power, power and pleasure are intimately connected, as
Havelock Ellis for one suggested – and attempt to transform
them by taking them from the penumbra of individual pathology
and placing them in the glare of publicity as daring acts of
transgressive sex. (Weeks, 1985:237)
Traditional forms of lesbianism or bi-sexuality that are based in a profound antiphallicism also indicate a basic inversion of masculine themes, rather than creating, or
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testing epistemologies. Lesbian sadomasochism’s essential masochism lies in its
reification of a cultural stereotype, masculinity, which has already been ‘killed’ by
economic forces. It is argued therefore that Foucault’s multi-dimensional “queer
theory” does not exist as an evolution of gay politics, but is produced as a result of the
broader marginalisation of heterosexual men, and in one example, hebophilia acts as
dialectic for paedophilia. As Dunaigre argues from a psychoanalytical viewpoint it is
also a phenomenon of family and social re-orientation in the West.
The child thus ‘naturally’ becomes the focal point on which to
base any analysis of the questions at issue in the social debate
encompassing not only the crisis in parental authority;
transmission of knowledge; reconstituted families; ‘new
couples’; misgivings surrounding medically assisted procreation
techniques; recognition of homosexuality as an accepted
component of society; and abortion rights, but also the
possibility of children’s access to sex education and the spread
of AIDS. (Dunaigre, 2001:43)
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CHAPTER ONE:
AUSTRALIAN

MASCULINITIES,

NATIONALISM

and

CULTURAL

EGALITARIANISM

Cultural symbols that underpin conceptualisations of national identity can be shifted to
accommodate changing economic traditions. The shift towards economic rationalism
and neo-liberalism during the 1970s saw that the traditional Australian mythology that
was focused on class based egalitarianism, was altered to include marginalised groups
such as Aborigines and women. It also had the effect of marginalising those who were
buffeted by economic ‘reform’ such as those affected by the consistent growth in
unemployment levels since the 1970s. In this context, Australian nationalism that is
built upon cultural symbolism, overarched by a hegemonic recognition of male sacrifice
in war, can then be used to punish those who reject, or suffer the consequence of
economic reform. In following chapters it is argued that claims of welfare abuse, leads
to cultural symbols of the nation used against the ‘abusers’ to justify national economic
and social policies.
The use of Weberian theory in the chapter establishes ‘individualism’ within
capitalism and assists in the association of anti-liberalism with Marxism. The “inner
rationalisation of the personality in the direction of unrelenting work and methodical selfcontrol, Weber argues “provided a decisive impetus to the development of modern
industrial capitalism” (Brubaker, 1984:24). Frontier societies such as Australia that place
a special character to masculinity or use it to denote labourism or mate-ship perhaps offer
hope for a worker’s paradise where none exists. Revealing the ephemeral nature of this
mythology shifts the national capitalist character inevitably to that of dominant frontier
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society of America. However the attempt to then include groups such Aborigines while
“Australian legend” mythology is diminished, but remnants of the legend continue to
constitute the notion of Aboriginality at the margins.
The advent of Protestantism, and Weber’s assertion that it was linked with the rise and
underlying spirit of capitalism, made it difficult for socialist theory to adhere to the
cultures of Western democracies with a strong Christian tradition. As Weber suggested,
Christianity was also profoundly capitalist, with the ethos of Protestant individualism
contributing significantly to the constant renewal of capital as an article, of ‘faith’. This
relates to the assertion that the various Adventist and capitalist sects now reflect the
dominant characteristics of the neo-liberal economy, and their claimed apoliticality
(Jehovah’s Witnesses practice abstinence from voting in countries where voting is
compulsory) actually assists in projection of neo-liberalism as seamless and linear.
This chapter suggests that America’s Protestant and capitalist values possess the
capacity to usurp all other formulations of Australia’s national identity and thereby
complete the process of homogenisation required for late capitalism’s phase of
globalisation. Due to Australia and America’s similar frontier experience, and the shift
towards conservative re-interpretations of Australian frontier mythology, the tension
between notions of collectivisation in the Australian experience and the individualism
inherent in Americanism has dissipated.
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New World masculinity and egalitarianism

The mythology of frontier masculinities in the New World, gave impetus to the search
for new markets, underpinned by the legend of conquering and settling lands far from
Euro-centric concepts of civilisation. The industrial capitalist form of masculinity was
re-invigorated by the politics and semantics of the frontier and despite Australia’s high
rate of urbanisation, the mythology of the frontier dominated the earliest
conceptualisations of Australian identity.
Australian shearers and squatters featured prominently in the
literature of the Empire. Like the seal-hunter of Canada and the
backwoodsman of the United States, they had been in the
vanguard of white settlement of new frontiers: they had entered
an alien landscape and made it profitable. (White, 1981:103)
The dominance of Anglo male heterosexuality was reflected in the representation of
women and Aborigines, with survival frontier survival a manifestation of a unique
collective will. Typical of frontier society, Russel Ward describes the Australian male as
“a ‘hard case’ skeptical about the value of religion and of intellectual and cultural
pursuits generally” (Ward, 1958:2). In the context of the focus on a “national type” that
celebrates the characteristics of a people rather than shaped through their work, or
waging a revolutionary war of independence, the military pastiche seems even more
ironic. However the growth of localised festivals that have cultural, religious and racial
connotations, form a bulwark against the homogenous nature of the global economy that
limits the actual expression of nationalism. Gallipoli was subsequently re-interpreted as
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a positive event for the emerging Australian nation.
The pre-eminent mate-ship mythology that began in colonial Australia was solidified
in World War One. This hints at a collectivist strain in the Australian national psyche,
and forms the central feature in demarcating Australian identity from the class-based
perception of English society, and the strident Protestant individualism of the United
States. Despite its centrality, there is little evidence to suggest that mate-ship extends
beyond an emotional perception or a shared bond, (shaped by war, friendship or sport).
The term has no more resonance than fraternal terms such as ‘buddy’, ‘pal’, or the
earlier term ‘cobber.’ If the post-World War One mythology and concept of mate-ship
can be seen as an expression of Australian modernity, then ‘cobber’ is evocative of a
general (and authentic) fraternity that existed before the ‘nation’. Ephemeral themes of
national identity can be interpreted as a thinly veiled attempt to address alienation, as
Marx suggests,
An immediate consequence of man’s estrangement from the
product of his labour, his life activity, his species being, is the
estrangement of man from man. When man confronts himself,
he also confronts other men. What is true of man’s relationship
to his labour, to the product of his labour, and to himself, is also
true of his relationship to other men, and to the labour and the
object of the labour of other men. (Marx, 1844: “Estranged
Labour”)
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Anzac nationalism

“working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got”
(Marx, 1848:“Proletarians and Communists”).

The notion of Australia as a social laboratory had significant appeal in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Located far from Europe, but also the
Americas, the linking of eugenics and a “national type” had its genesis on the frontier,
and reached its culmination on the shores of Gallipoli. As White argues, it was not until
the end of World War Two and the association with national types and “master-race”
conceptualisations that it was abandoned – with the heterogeneity of the post-war
American population also contributing to its decline (White, 1981:157).
The gestation of an ideal of the ‘pure’ Australian manhood was a combination of
frontier types, and was produced in some compensatory fashion from a large loss of life
in futile and foreign battles like the Gallipoli campaign. It contrasted honest and willing
men with the ‘corruptness’ of British leaders and their tawdry, class-ridden society – the
commanders who sent Australians to their untimely deaths. This corruptness was also
signified by aloofness and effete mannerisms, uncharacteristic of the hard-working
Australian frontiersman.
The Australian egalitarian ideal of mate-ship reached its zenith during World War
One according to war correspondent Charles Bean1. The battlefields of the Western
Front and Gallipoli, brought to the fore the personification of the egalitarian strain

1

1992, Making the Legend: The War Writings of C.E.W. Bean. Selected by D.Winter.
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represented by ‘mate-ship’. This was to be the young nation’s defining feature, exposed
through war and death and buried deep within the Australian ontology, the conscious
expression of apoliticality, which had begun with a left bias (the so-called socialism by
accident) to a right wing orientation that forged a jingoism evident in the oft repeated
refrain, “Australia is the best place to live in the world.” It suggested that that all
differences based on class, gender and ethnicity should be suspended, as the projected
naturalness of the social order incorporates and supersedes real and potential divisions.
Kapferer argues that,
The death of the Anzacs represented as sacrifice is a consciously
overt symbol of re-birth. This sacrifice is presented as one pure
and potent youth, a holy cosmologically regenerative sacrifice.
Kapferer, 188:135).
In death, men are rewarded by releasing them from the bonds that link them to their
sacrificial bravery. The valorised and ritualised remembrance of soldiers who served
and gave their lives in war, is difficult to reconcile and recompense, however it clearly
encodes ‘dead’ masculinity above reproach. John Masefield, drew a highly idealised
picture of the Anzacs argues Ward.
…the finest body of young men ever brought together in
modern times. For physical beauty and nobility of bearing they
surpassed any men I have seen; they walked and looked like
kings in old poems, and reminded me of a line in Shakespeare:
‘Baited like eagles having lately bathed.’
There was no thought of surrender in those marvelous
young men; they were the flower of the world’s manhood, and
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died as they had lived, owning no master on this earth. (Ward,
1958:229)
The propagation of the Anzac mythology ultimately served the purpose or usurping all
other allusions to the national identity - as the Australian soldier and male, was tested
through war. The myth of Anzac bridged the gap between servility, compliance and
rebellion that had previously characterised Australian colonial history. As Lohrey states,
“the legend of the bushman and its post - war transmission into the Anzac myth is one
of the most enduring strains in Australian culture, a veritable Lazarus of the national
psyche” (Lohrey, 1982:29).
In the neo-liberal context, the recognition of masculinity expressed through
remembrance rituals, can have the impact of denying the “living male”, who has
suffered the restructuring of economy and the postmodern de-construction of
masculinity. In a youth-obsessed commercial culture it is the pivotal connection in
recognising the old and the father, with its right wing symbolism grounded in the
observance of institutions beyond the individual such as government, country and God.
A Marxist perspective on Anzac reveals that the forging of heroes from death is the
closest appropriation of a masculine sacrifice to a larger ‘machine’ within a nationalist
and right-wing discourse. From this perspective, alienation serves to keep the labourer
ready for battle and the “ultimate sacrifice”, as ‘freedom’ comes in its destruction2 in
war, rather than in the historical materialist dialectic. Consequently its use is restricted
to lying dormant in the national consciousness, until another traumatic event3, with its
reified nature making it impractical for use on a consistent basis. As Marx and Engels
2

Themes of masochism are explored in chapters six and seven, relating to extreme and appropriated
masculinities. These discourses deliberately pursue risk and danger, mimicking death rituals.
3
The bombings in Bali in 2002 that killed eighty-eight Australians evoked similarities with the sacrifice
of Australian youth during World War One
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argued,
Generally speaking big industry created everywhere the same
relations between the classes of society, and thus destroyed the
peculiar individuality of the various nationalities. And finally,
while the bourgeoisie of each nation still retained separate
national interests, big industry created a class, which in all
nations has the same interest and with which nationality is
already dead; a class which is really rid of all the old world and
at the same time stands pitted against it. Big industry makes for
the worker not only the relation to the capitalist, but labour
itself, unbearable. (Marx & Engels, 1845: “Real Basis of
Ideology”)
Countries such as Australia that focus on cultural symbolism in defining their
nationalism, in contrast with nations that have defined their borders through war or
revolution, arguably require “pseudo sites” of rebellion. Codes of informality that in the
Anzac context are interpreted as indiscipline constitute a distinctively cultural ‘Aussieness.’ As Kapferer argues, “the celebrated indiscipline of the Australian soldier is
actually a metaphor of his autonomy and his resistance to an order imposed artificially
from outside the individual” (Kapferer, 1988:170). Celebrated Australian characteristics
such as ‘larrikinism’ have a resonance with convict and bushranger mythology, with
self-effacing humour underpinning further the egalitarian ideal. “To underplay ones
identity in the face of other’s awareness of distinction is to become a “good bloke”, for
it constitutes a manifestation of naturalness” (Kapferer, 1988:176). A good bloke has “a
beer”, (although this usually means several), loves sport, and has a compunction for
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various forms of gambling4. The mythology of a wealthy man gambling his “hard earnt”
next to a member of the working class, promoted the notion of a classless Australia.
This projects idealisations of liberal political culture, (opportunity and equality), against
that of the working class, where symbolic forms such as beer drinking are celebrated.
The Australian egalitarian ideal of the ‘underdog’ is a central feature in the
perpetuation of the “lucky country” mythology For Adorno however, “In the end,
glorification of splendid underdogs is nothing other than glorification of the splendid
system that makes them so”.5 Those who are considered to fail without ‘trying’ (have a
go ya mug) can be treated with outright contempt in an ontology that demarcates
between winners and losers in a seemingly subdued fashion. In the Australian cultural
iconography, there is the tendency to venerate the concept that Australians should play
“above their weight”, despite the odds. “Give it a Go”, becomes a literal and metaphoric
expression of national solidarity. This is underpinned by the assertion that success had
to be extremely hard won to be deserved – the combination of egalitarianism and
Enlightenment sourced frontierism, states that real talent will be rewarded and should be
‘natural’. As neo-liberalism and economic rationalism have altered the sense of
‘achievability’ of goals, such mythology can be applied more harshly and unfairly to
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An easily accessible form of vicarious “social orgasm” (reflecting dissatisfaction with sex) is constituted
in gambling, where the participant can have a minor role in the outcome. The use of money can be seen as
merely a means of exchange to engage in the activity. Sexological thought focused on orgasm, (and
orgastic like experiences), and openness, attempts at a sensory overload, which left un-sated, could also
manifest itself in alcohol and drug abuse. One area of gambling that has seen tremendous growth in recent
years, and has become a major social problem has been the growing popularity of poker machines. The
combining of a uniquely private function, (the player is essentially playing with ‘themselves’ against an
inanimate object), is carried out in the public sphere such as a club or hotel. This releases the onerous
manifestations of a restrictive sexuality that is to be practiced privately. Furthermore, to the addicted
player, it can become an extremely expensive habit due to the machines’ low returns particularly for the
habitual player. See chapter four.
5

www.ldb.org/adorno.htm. Quotes taken from “Minima moralia. Reflections of a damaged life”, 1974.
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those who are considered not trying hard enough to succeed like the unemployed6.
The egalitarian culture of the United States celebrates success and excess as a basis
for its egalitarianism. America’s liberal-egalitarianism is founded in the common man
mythology, best exemplified by the “log house to white house” legend. The
entertainment industry promotes this theme in numerous narratives, and it is often
signified by the “against all odds” success of the actor themselves. The growth of the
motion picture industry in Hollywood from the mid 1920s has seen it emerge as the
foremost means for the dispersal of political ideology, with apocryphal tales of
marginality to success. In the film, The King of Comedy7, a man is driven to become a
famous stand-up comedian, and sees himself as equal, if not better than, his idol a
famous television host and comedian. Subsequently he demands a spot on his television
show, without any previous experience as a comedian, (so ‘naturalistic’ is his ability, he
feels no compunction to gain experience in the traditional way). The sub-text explores
the tension and dynamics that exist between talent and delusion, determination for
success, opportunity and failure. He eventually achieves notoriety and ‘success’ by the
abduction of the host, demanding and achieving, a spot on the show as a guarantee of
his release. More recently, the plethora of ‘reality’ television programs capitalises on the
attraction of immediate fame, (that will also produce fortune) and Andy Warhol’s
observation that “in the future” everyone will be famous for fifteen minutes.

6

The formats of the American sourced reality television programs such as “Survivor” and “American
Idol”, turns “getting the sack” into an entertaining art form with the ritualised practice of humiliation and
rejection of contestants a core feature of the programs’ appeal.
7
1983, director M. Scorsese.
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Drugs and cultural identity

A more traditional form of celebrity was exemplified by the entertainer known as the
‘King of Rock and Roll’, Elvis Presley,8 who led a bizarre double life which was in
contrast with his projected image of success. Originating from the ‘South’ where white
manual labourers had close proximity to a large black population and were referred to as
“white trash”, Presley’s exemplified the log cabin to White House mythology. The
original controversy associated with his version of Rock and Roll, was balanced by a
stint in the US army, his devotion to family, particularly his mother, and his religiosity.
But, according to Goldman, in the later ‘Vegas’ stage of his career, “Elvis was a phony.
He impersonated masculinity, but he was at heart a frightened child. He feigned piety,
but his spirituals sound insincere or histrionic. He sought to portray the erotic but came
off resembling a male burlesque star”. (Goldman, 1991:188) In the last few years of his
life particularly, he was a prescription drug addict, in almost complete denial of his
addiction. To reflect his anti drug zeal, he became an official of the Federal Drug
Enforcement Bureau in 1971.9
8

See chapter six for reference to Presley as a romantic love ‘sacrifice’.
1977, S. Dunleavy. “Elvis: What Happened?” Told to Dunleavy by former long-time bodyguards of
Presley, and released two months before his death, it detailed extensive drug use, particularly powerful
prescription medications. The drugs that he became physically and psychologically dependent were used
primarily for ‘kicks’ the bodyguards alleged. Biographers Brown and Broeske, indicate that his drug use
had been long term and frequently chronic.
He was a connoisseur of opiates, of Dexedrine and Benzedrine, and of
powerful sleeping pills such as Seconal, Demerol, and Dilaudid. As early as
1962, when he was filming Girls! Girls! Girls! in Hawaii, Presley had an
attache case that he shared with other cast and crew members. It was, recalled
a co-star, “a potpourri of drugs,” filled with “old yellers, speed, and God
knows what else”. (Brown & Broeske, 1997:298-299)
This revelation dovetails the myth that Presley’s heavy use of drugs only occurred in the last few years of
his life. However, as with drug users generally, Presley at one point crossed the line between taking drugs
and the drugs taking him. While Presley’s interpretation of the fledging musical style of “Rock and Roll”
had left an indelible legacy, the musical and social transformations of the 1960s left him in their wake.
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It is his pre-dominance in the American cultural tradition that prevents many fans
accepting that either he is dead, or that drugs, if not the single cause, were the major
contributing factor to his death10. Moreover it reveals the deceit implicit in the
commodification of people within a commercial world – that Elvis’ foibles and
destructive habits were hidden as long as possible from his adoring public.11 In
reference to the capitalist “culture industry”, Adorno asserts that the ‘artist’ as a
commodity was exemplified by the twentieth century American entertainment system.
Its ideology above all makes use of the star system, borrowed
from individualistic art and its commercial exploitation. The
more de-humanised its methods of operation and content, the
more diligently and successfully the culture industry propagates
supposedly great personalities and operates with heart-throbs. It
is industrial more in a sociological sense, in the incorporation of
industrial forms of organisation even when nothing is
manufactured – as in the rationalisation of office work – rather
than in the sense of anything really and actually produced by
technological rationality. (Adorno, 1991:87)
The increasingly open use of drugs for recreation and inspiration ultimately marked the difference
between his musical generation and the present. According to John Lennon, who as part of the ‘Beatles’
phenomenon that equaled Presley’s fame, “Elvis died when he came out of the army. Everything else was
like a living death”. (Playboy, (interview), Dec. 1980). (This refers to Presley’s two year army stint at the
height of his fame, and his commercial re-packaging in the 1960s). The revelations contained in Elvis:
What Happened? was the first stage in the destruction, then re-mythologising of the Presley legend. The
Presley estate now makes significantly more money than when was alive.
10
According to Thompson and Cole who re-assessed Presley’s autopsy results, he most likely died from
‘poly-pharmacy’ – an allergic reaction to a combination of drugs, which preceded the official result of
heart attack.
11
1999, J. Marx. Sorry. The Wretched Tale of little Stevie Wright. Marx’s book was an unconventional
biography of the former lead singer of one of Australia’s best known rock groups the Easybeats. In direct
contrast with Presley, Marx details a life lived in the full public glare of drug addiction and various
attempts to conquer his addiction to drugs. Marx traces Wright’s fame to a life of an itinerant, now
resigned to the power of his addiction, in the most spectacular and prolonged fall from public grace in
Australian music history.
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The extent in which ‘Elvis’ was prepared to deceive him-self and others regarding his
drug addiction reveals the strongly defined demarcation between legal and illegal drugs.
The ‘war’ on illegal drugs, led by the United States, still asserts the “just say no” type of
campaign, despite evidence that it has little impact on teenagers experimenting with
illegal drugs, and or developing destructive drug habits. The role of alcohol in contrast,
is romanticised by its connection with the work ethic in Australian iconography. The
fictional character of ‘Nino Culotta’12 exemplifies the iconic status of alcohol in
Australian working class culture as he is sent to Australia by an Italian magazine, to
write articles about Australia and Australians to be published in Italy. In the process of
his research, he finds employment as a builder’s labourer, and in a telling feature of the
sub-narrative, abandons his career as a writer and eventually becomes a full-time
builder. His assimilation into the Australian culture is dependent upon having a “real
job”, based on physical labour with other men, and here Culotta learns the values of
mate-ship solidified by drinking copious amounts of beer, only after a long day’s hard
work. The process of becoming Australian is almost complete with building a home in
the suburbs and taking an Australian woman as a wife, pursuing his still conditional
‘Aussie-ness’.
The novel unashamedly promotes the Australian egalitarian experience as one that
deserves and requires the immigrant to assimilate into a post-war world where
employment and prosperity is always available to those who “work hard”. Consequently
Culotta’s problems with assimilation are almost entirely related to the gulf between his
textbook understanding of English and Australian linguistic and social customs, (the
source of much of the novel’s humour). Despite the egalitarian ideal of Australian

12

1957, J. O’Grady. They’re a weird mob: a novel by Nino Culotta.
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assimilation, he will unfortunately, always be a ‘wog’, who should be eternally grateful
that Australian egalitarianism gave him a chance to assimilate into its margins. This
wariness and long term punishment of outsiders is uniquely Australian, and refers to the
belief in Australian iconography that hard work and home ownership13 can partially
transport the immigrant from his lowly status. Furthermore, the immigrant can set out to
embarrass the Australian-born by making better use of Australia’s natural and cultural
resources. For Kapferer, “Australian egalitarianism often values the outsider within the
society positively as symbolic of the ultimate value of individuality” (Kapferer,
1988:15). However the Australian mythological standard of “giving someone a go” had
some resonance in the full employment post World War Two era. Possessing no
experience in the work of a builder’s labourer, Culotta compounds his appearance of
naiveté by arriving for his first day of work wearing the clothes of a dandy rather than a
labourer.
While post-war immigration consisted mainly of Europeans, the next major
immigration influx in the 1970s was from Asia, principally refugees displaced by the
war in Vietnam. Australia’s traditional view of Asia as a demographic and geographic
threat was compounded by the long held stereotype of the opium smoking Chinese, and
the effect that the type of structural and long-term unemployment that began in the early
1970s was having on the work ethic. When Vietnamese refugees became implicated
with the burgeoning heroin trade in Australia, the disparity between the assimilative
migrant versus the cultural manifestation of incompatible ‘multiculturalism’ occurred.
In the context of Italian immigrants like the apocryphal Culotta, alcohol consumption
was already a tradition, and he simply had to switch alliance from the ‘effete’ wine

13

See public housing in chapter three.
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culture, to the egalitarian culture of beer. The Asiatic incorporation of a ‘new’ drug,
tests the European allegiance to alcohol both culturally and economically. McQueen
argues that the compression between European cultural themes against geographic
realities defines the Australian nationalism.
Australia, was and largely is, a European frontier of capitalism.
Australia’s prosperity, based on wool and minerals, is the
prosperity of expanding capitalism. Geographically, Australia is
a frontier of European capitalism in Asia. The first of these
gives rise to the optimism which illuminates our radicalism; the
second produces the fear which tarnishes our nationalism.
(McQueen, 1975:17)
Drugs such as heroin resonate with the image of the undisciplined junkie, who could
not delay gratification until after a day’s work. This readily accepted belief that heroin
use cannot be ‘delayed’ has never been tested, nor its qualitative and quantitative effect
on the work ethic. Moreover, particularly in the neo-liberal work culture that creates
high levels of stress, hysteria, and depression, illegal drugs may actual reflect its needs
and characteristics better than alcohol. ‘Uppers’ such as amphetamine and cocaine
mirror intensity of effort while the heroin ‘drops’ the alienated worker in a deep
sedative state in readiness for the next sustained effort of work. A community of drug
users, conversely, may be seeking a previously work-sourced sense of fellowship,
united in the requirement to ‘score’.
last year, (2000), 18,200 people died because of cigarette related
illness in Australia. (less than 1000 people died from heroin
overdose in this period). One fifth of all deaths are drug related:
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tobacco 72%, alcohol 25%, illicit drugs 3%. For 15-34 year
olds, the corresponding figures are alcohol 62%, illicit drugs
34%. Over half of all heroin overdoses are, in fact, not due to
heroin alone; they are due to a mix of heroin and pills or
alcohol. (Community Campaign for Heroin Reform – fact
sheet:2001)
Furthermore, “about eight million people use heroin worldwide. Over two hundred
million use legal prescription drugs like barbiturates and benzodiazepines. 141 million
people smoke dope, whilst another thirty million use amphetamines and more than 13
millions use cocaine” (Community Campaign for Heroin Reform – fact sheet:2001).
In European culture, the high tolerance to alcohol that is often achieved at a young
age has to be interspersed by regular demonstrations of the work ethic. Large amounts
consumed at the “weeks-end” (weekend) or even during the week, is concealed and
justified that work activity is still adequately performed. Being able to withstand the
powerful affects of alcohol becomes a measure of a man’s ability to cope and withstand
pressure. Tales of excessive alcohol consumption are thereby considered socially
amusing despite evidence of alcohol’s physical damage and it’s pre-eminence in
causing car accidents.
The illegality, (and the amount of time required to raise funds, and then procure
drugs other than alcohol), contributes to an association with a dissolution of work habits
or ethic. Consequently the demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate drugs of
addiction plays a significant role in defining an active and inactive working class, with
cheap forms of alcohol such as beer and mass-produced cigarettes, previously acting as
a form of discipline (delayed gratification) for the working class. This is also where the
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stresses and strains that pre-ceded the addiction and originate in work alienation are
concealed. This then adds to the perception that consumers of illegal drugs are selfish
and undisciplined, and that the addiction remains principally their fault.
Working class culture is one of the last major bulwarks in projecting and producing,
overt masculine stereotypes.14 Such imagery is reflected back to them and to the broader
society by advertising images through products such as beer. A ‘beer’ is something that
is earned separate from a wage payment. It is the collective manifestation of a sweated
(or imagined) toil. Popular beer such as Victoria Bitter, uses a theme of a “hard earned
thirst”, and by purchasing the product, it is immediately assumed that you in fact
deserve this type of thirst. The notion of its consumption as a ‘reward’ an integral
feature in maintaining discipline for the working class. The use of wine, paradoxically,
is guided by sedate and limited use, with little reference to excessive consumption. It is
the alcoholic drink of the bourgeoisie, who collect wine, and hence value its maturity
through its storage. It is the actual and metaphoric drink associated with capitalist and
Protestant values.
Those who do not belong to a ‘class’ such as Aborigines, or the unemployed, break
the cultural understanding between delayed gratification and alcohol simply through
their status as Aborigines. A beer is ‘earnt’ and paid for through and because of hard
physical labour and is a symbol of (a man’s) contribution to his community and country.
In this context, the illicit use of alcohol through consumption that has not been ‘earnt’
can provoke a community backlash, evidenced by attitudes towards the legend of
Aboriginal alcohol abuse. Without the social codifications regarding legitimate alcohol
abuse, Aborigines can openly drink themselves to death, which is also a white

14

See chapter six and sport masculinity.
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masculine fantasy, where masculinity turns on itself, and literally dies through excessive
consumption.
Illegal drug use now competes with alcohol as the ‘drug’ of first choice for some
where at ‘rave’ parties, the amphetamine based drug ecstasy is followed up by large
quantities of water. The therapeutic attraction associated with self-administration of
substances, continues the tradition from the 1960’s, where popular culture and illegal
drug use, particularly the hallucinatory substance LSD, profoundly affected social
movements. The partial replacement of alcohol by various types of ‘drugs’ coincided
with the growth of youth movements, and although the use of marijuana had been
popularised in the Jazz era of the 1920s, the combination of rock music and youth
culture sustained its prolonged impact. The moral antagonistic position between legal
and illegal drugs became more apparent as rock and roll entrenched itself as an “anti
establishment”, commercial success. The Rolling Stones, with their song Mother’s
Little Helper,

15

explored the boundaries of drug use as defied by a female suburban

drudgery and anxiety. This was defined in part by their own drug use, and mocking the
conventionality of getting inebriated at the end of a day’s work by suggesting that they
too required drugs to alleviate stress and to enjoy themselves from their working lives.
This increasingly blurred the notion of having ‘fun’ all of the time, which was perhaps
more tolerated in the economically protected era of the ‘sixties’. The permanence of
unemployment on the landscape of Western democracies then requires a projection of
the individual being “work ready”, when they are unlikely to be required at any stage.
The commodification that underpinned the evolution of a “youth culture” and post war
relative affluence that evolved from lumpenproletariat Dickensonian England saw that;
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1965, M. Jagger and K. Richard.
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The new images are superimposed on the old images: youth as
trouble, youth as fun. During the 1950s, the distinction between
“respectable” and “criminal” classes were transmuted into the
distinction between “conformist” and “nonconformist” youth,
the workers and the workshy, “decent lads” and “inverts”,
“patriots” and “narcissists”. (Hebdige, 1988:30)

Protestantism and the New World

The impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of the
greatest possible amount of money, has in itself nothing to do
with capitalism. This impulse exists and has existed among
waiters, physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishonest
officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers, and beggars. One
may say that it has been common to all sorts and conditions of
men at all times and in all countries of the earth, wherever the
objective possibility of it is or has been given. It should be
taught in the kinder-garden of cultural history that this naïve
idea of capitalism must be given up once and for all. Unlimited
greed for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism, and
still less its spirit. Capitalism may even be identical with the
restraint, or at least a rational tempering, of this irrational
impulse. But capitalism is identical with the pursuit of profit,
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and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational,
capitalistic enterprise. For it must be so: in a wholly capitalistic
order of society, an individual capitalistic enterprise which did
not take advantage of its opportunities for profit-making would
be doomed to extinction. (Weber, 1930:17)
America’s more individualist strain of liberal/egalitarianism is underpinned by its
marginal capitalist and religious groups. In this context, the promotion of marginality as
a virtue becomes a hyper-individuality, indicating closeness with God. This perspective
personifies the conservative viewpoint (which has always relied upon the influence of
the religious-right), by asserting that ‘politics’ is the realm of leftist and revolutionary
activity, with conservatism thereby to be seen to reflect the will of God16. Ironically
however, God is perhaps not required when individualism is promoted as a separate
entity that uses inculcated themes of reliance on the ‘self’. Gramsci also relates the
unique American ethic to frontierism and a lack of tradition in their social classes.
The “vocation of work” was not a trait inherent only in the
working class but it was a specific quality of the ruling classes
as well. The fact that a millionaire continued to be practically
active until forced to retire by age or illness and that his activity
occupied a very considerable part of his day, is a typically
American phenomenon. This, for the average European, is the
weirdest American extravagance. This difference between
Americans and Europeans is determined by the absence of
16

A place for God formed a significant feature of early liberal philosophy that made the first tentative
steps in recognising the impact of science and Protestantism. This change was brought by the changing
demographics of industrialisation that necessitated the development of a state to regulate the population.
J. Weiss, 1977, Conservatism in Europe, 1770-1945.
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“tradition” in the United States, on the other hand, there is a
recent “tradition” of the pioneers, the tradition of strong
individual personalities in whom the vocation of work had
reached its greatest intensity and strength, men who entered
directly, not by means of some army of servants and slaves, into
energetic contact with the forces of nature in order to dominate
them and exploit them victoriously. (Gramsci, 1971:305)
The invention and manufacture of home appliances such as television, washing
machines, vacuum cleaners, and other household consumer products in the 1950s,
realised economic opportunity through large-scale retail operations. As Braverman
points out, “machinery comes into the world not as a servant of “humanity” but as the
instrument of those to whom the accumulation of capital gives the ownership of the
machines (Braverman, 1974:193). The ‘workers’ exist subsequently as adjuncts to the
machines as operators in a factory environment, domestic workers, or as salespeople of
the “labour saving” machines.
As an adjunct to large retail stores, Amway projected its marketing image to
incorporate elements of nineteenth century laissez-faire capitalism and to maximise the
opportunities presented by post-war consumerism. Highly motivated individual product
distributors affiliated with Amway marketed household products that were a
compliment to larger household goods bought at retail stores. Items such as dishwashing
detergent and other cleaning products become a niche in the booming household
consumer goods market. The cleaning products become a metaphor for a ‘clean’
asceticism, and a purposeful work ethic, which involved the aggressive selling of these
various cleaning products, without the benefit of a shop front.
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Am – way, coined from the ‘American way’, was the first company to fully develop
the concept of direct marketing in its most ruthless and saturated form, with its direct
marketing techniques imitated in many countries. The inverted model of Marx’s theory
of labour value operates on the principle that people are paid for results, not time spent
attempting to market the products or building the pyramid network system. The basic
pyramidal structure of capitalism is ruthlessly extrapolated to form an overt pyramid
structure that rewards those who were in the system first, and builds an expanding
‘network’. New distributors are encouraged to commercialise friendships and
acquaintances, based on the need to create your own dynasty, for the highest proportion
of sales made by those lowest in the pyramid go to those who occupy the highest
positions in the pyramid. The cannibalistic aspect of the system is hidden by a
promotion of Christian ethics, and the adherence to Protestant/capitalist values. The
shift to the notion of working hard for a limited period until a sustainable pyramid has
been built is a deliberate discontinuity with the romance of work and the values of
having the identity of a worker. This phenomenon is (or began the process) linked with
the individual who invests wisely and no longer needs to work, as the performance of
“work ethic” is reduced to those ‘failures’ that need to work.
The principle of delayed gratification is one of the cornerstones of both capitalist and
Protestant belief systems, and the worship of material possessions and private property
places it as a secular religion. Amway distributors rely heavily on evangelistic type
mass rallies, meetings, and other motivational material such as tapes and books, which
focus on unlocking individual potential to achieve their goals. Based in popular
psychology, a direct distributor concedes, “big motivation products are well deserved
even if they bring in more of a diamond’s (an up-line distributor) income than
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marketing Amway products”.17 The constant replenishing at the ‘well’ of inspiration
conceals the enormous task the distributors face in asking people to join them – and the
macroeconomic problems associated with hyper-capitalist schemes.
Capitalist sects such as Amway, represent the apocryphal core of capitalist
‘freedoms’. While the largest capitalists such as Kerry Packer and those of a similar ilk
operate somewhat independently from ideology, (for there is grudging acceptance that
this type of capitalism is inherently inequitable and not duplicable), small capitalists
provide the lifeblood of capitalist ideology. Particularly since the decline of the
traditional industries of the capitalist mode, there has been an increased emphasis on the
belief that new inventions or products will stimulate the economy and hence
employment. When a new product comes into the market, there is a “reserve army” of
entrepreneurs and salespeople ready to market the enterprises. Success is subsequently
built upon a multitude of failures and with the high level of failure justifying the few
that have succeeded it becomes mostly a permanently delayed form of gratification.
The Protestant concept of individualism and the closeness of God to the “fully
developed” individual, suggests that the accumulation of money, and indeed inordinate
amounts of money, are simply ‘scoreboards’ indicative of the individual’s completeness
to God18. This also becomes a privileged position to proselytize the ‘mutuality’ of such
a ruthless capitalist system, for only a select few are chosen to be God’s millionaires.
For, in conformity with the Old Testament and in analogy with
the ethical valuation of good works, asceticism looked upon the
pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as highly reprehensible; but

17

“An insider’s perspective” www.getfacts.com/amway/index. html
See reference to the punishment of the unemployed individual via a Christian dominated job network in
chapter three.
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the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a sign of
God’s blessing. And even more important: the religious
valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly
calling, as the highest means of asceticism, and at the same time
the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith,
must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the
expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called
the spirit of capitalism. (Weber, 1970:174)
With its foundation of Puritanism, America became the principal source of marginal
Christian religious groups throughout the late Enlightenment. The rise of the Adventist
churches during this period, distancing themselves from the hierarchical style of the
mainstream Catholic and Protestant churches, created new authoritarian structures.
However the roles of Deacons and Elders, leaders coming from within the ranks,
emphasised the democracy associated with the New World. This authoritarianism
emanating from frontier and industrial forms of masculinity, unconsciously imitated the
authoritarianism of Catholic mediaevalists, giving immediate church leaders greater
control and knowledge over the lives of its members. Conversely the bureaucracy can
appear to serve the needs of the community and its members, contrasting with the
grandeur of Catholic and mainstream Protestant traditions and churches. Consequently
Amway and the Adventist sect, Jehovah’s Witnesses, share many similar themes in their
social characteristics based upon New World democracy, and emancipation of the
individual through the exercise of a distinctive Protestant ‘spirit’. Adventists’ belief are
premised on the assumption that the aesthetic world is to be soon replaced by a new
order where current evils are annihilated by a Biblical Armageddon where a financial
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and material utopia exists for those who apply the ethos of Amway and succeed. This
dichotomous view originates from
The strong revivalist tradition in America doubtless contributed
to the tendency to see things in terms of simple antitheses. The
revivalist believed that the universe was divided into the realm
of God and the realm of Satan, the righteous and the
unrighteous. (Marsden, 1980:224)
Both groups consequently rely on the total appropriation of labour and revel in their
marginal status. This is supported further by the need to proselytize their beliefs and
way of life, and re-invent the concept of the nuclear family. The practice of themes of
exclusion against those uninitiated or hostile to them, sits uncomfortably with the
expressed desire to recruit more members. This has an obvious restriction on the flow of
outsiders or those with a casual or tentative interest, which may eventually restrict the
shift to a complete commitment. Overt criticism of these groups from the ‘outside’
reflects for the Witnesses, proof that they are following what the Bible prophesised for
God’s chosen people in the “last days” before Armageddon. The difficulty in obtaining
a favourable position in the Amway pyramid also proves that rewards will come to
those who truly deserve them. For Jehovah’s Witnesses this often involves shunning or
distancing oneself from previous ‘worldly’ associations, including family.
Membership in the Watchtower organisation frequently leads to
confusion, heartache, and family breakups, as the Society takes
the place of the member’s family. Association with persons
outside of the Watchtower is strongly discouraged, even among
relatives. The Watchtower organisation uses the fear tactics of
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“shunning” and “disfellowshipping” to maintain strict control
over members and warns that friends and relatives may try to
dissuade them from remaining with the Jehovah Witnesseses
(Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses, 2001).
To promote their beliefs, “Witnesses” engage in street ‘witnessing’, which involves
the knocking of doors in mainly urban environs. Similar to Amway, The Watchtower
and Tract Society (Jehovah’s Witnesses) relies upon the work of individual ‘workers’,
to commit to unpaid work called ‘witnessing’. “The Witnesses are very active in doorto-door proselytizing, and have a worldwide missionary outreach to gain new converts.
In 1995, they accrued over one billion hours in door-to-door work” (Jehovah’s Christian
Witnesses 2001).
Weber first analysed this extreme asceticism and social conservatism with the first
Protestant sects, such as the Methodists and Baptists. Their engagement with the world
was seen as temporary, necessary and fleeting. Adventists were originally known as the
Millerites, and from this, various Adventist groups formed, including the Seventh Day
Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons. At is most elemental, it is religious
fundamentalism promoted as something profound, proclaiming the “second-coming” of
Jesus Christ. Their apoliticality is expressed by not voting in elections and is a feature of
their contradictory stance to politics whilst awaiting Armageddon19. Weber thereby
implies that the drift to political conservatism is a product of mysticism.
Mysticism intends a state of ‘possession’, not action, and the
individual is not a tool but a ‘vessel’ of the divine. Action in the
world must thus appear as endangering the absolutely irrational
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and other-worldly religious state. Active asceticism operates
within the world; rationally active asceticism in mastering the
world, seeks to tame what is creatural and wicked through work
in a worldly ‘vocation’ (inner-worldly asceticism). Such
asceticism contrasts radically with mysticism, if the latter draws
the full conclusion of fleeing from the world (contemplative
flight from the world). (Weber, 1948:325)
Ironically, in the epoch when thinkers such as Nietzsche proclaimed that God was
‘dead’, the Adventist movement had also decided that God had prophesised the death of
the ‘world’, within the immediate timeframe of this epoch. Adventists consequently
struggle to maintain asceticism while they wait for Armageddon, and this freezing of
moral standards becomes more difficult as Armageddon is continually delayed.
Watchtower20 publications reveal a nuclear family dressed in clothes resembling
fashions and styles of the 1950s. The phenomenon of “cultural Adventism” sees that the
political and social construct of the ascetic individual, remains, even if a member
physically leaves an Adventist style group. If it can be assumed that Armageddon will
continue to be delayed there the opportunity remains for Adventists generally to become
more involved in politics for they are otherwise fully engaged in the worker-consumer
economy. The distinctly American and religious view of the modern capitalist society
can be traced to the anti-modern view of history compared to western European nations.
These assumptions were lacking the enlightened belief that history was an evolutionary
development, and that history could be understood by its past (Marsden, 1980:226).

19

As the secret ballot is a fundamental feature of democracy, people are not actually ‘forced’ to vote, but
simply “turn up” to have their names marked off the electoral role.
20
Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania.
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The Adventist sects of the late nineteenth century, and the overtly separatist sects
such as the Branch Davidians of Waco21, along with their direct historical links, share
the American tradition begun by the Puritans. It suggests the need for moral control
over the state, and is motivated by the belief that without constant vigilance, the state’s
secularism may begin to dominate the Protestant concept of individualism.
Subsequently due to the unique pressures on this version of the ‘individual’ there is a
symbolic form of suicide that manifests itself upon conversion, and this facilitates an
escape from a ‘system’ they despise. This cognitive dissonance drives all doubts inward,
focusing on control and discipline of the individual in response to negative perceptions
and actions carried out by the governing body of the cult.
A more immediate version is the phenomenon of faith healing. This is where
personal alienations such as an unhappy marriage or even an illness, will be cured by
God, as a product of faith. In fact the greater the alienation, the more one’s faith is
tested the more a denial of the temporal world is required, despite their inescapable
placement within the materialist conception of history. As Marx argued in respect of
Feuerbach’s incomplete materialism and the practice of human labour,
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of
Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is
conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but
not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.
Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was
developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not

21

“The thirty-three-year-old self-styled Messiah, christened Vernon Howell, but since 1991 calling
himself David Koresh, had become disillusioned with the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, defected,
joined the off-shoot Branch Davidians in 1980 and became their leader in 1984 (Lane, 1996:61).
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know real, sensuous activity as such. (Marx, 1845: “Theses on
Feuerbach”)
Financial or ‘spiritual’ poverty subsequently requires a deeper level of trust in a
religious or capitalist sect as an expression of the non-material and material idealism.
This is despite the omnipresence of failure or difficulty in maintaining the faith that is
overseen by an authoritarian ethos or structure. Religious and capitalist fundamentalism
when combined with the literal characteristics of frontier folk wisdom gives “no way
out” in either an intellectual or practical sense. This is why despite high levels of failure
in Amway and other types of Protestant sects they remain relatively un-scrutinised –
failure is not related to their practice or philosophy, the fault must lie within the
individual. However in respect to labour centred materialism however, Marx asserts
that,
Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human
imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, detaches
from the individual and reappears as the alien activity of a god
or of a devil, so the activity of the worker is not his own
spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his
self. (Marx, 1844, Estranged Labour)

Australia’s ‘dead heart’; the reification and ossification of Aboriginality

The prevalence of Protestant sect missionaries in the South Pacific challenges the notion
that Australian socio-political culture is fundamentally secular. The indigenous peoples
of new nations were a particular target for these religions, such as Methodist, Baptist,
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and latterly, the various streams of Adventism. Literal interpretations of the Bible being
particularly dangerous for peoples with a minimal grasp of English, indigenous groups
who in many circumstances had little alternative but to believe what missionaries had
told them.
The dead heart phenomenon doubles as the white appropriation of desolate
Aboriginal territory and Australia’s consciousness of how Aborigines were
conceptualised as noble savages by the white settlers. The collectivisation of the
concept of Aboriginality began with the need to proselytize Christianity to the “savages
and heathens”, and the homogenising of tribal Aboriginality into missions. This feature
circumvents the fact that the ‘Aboriginals’ were a disparate group and did not all live in
the desert, but is where they reside in Anglo imaginations. The link can then be made
that ‘urban’ Aborigines with large portions of Anglo heritage, are not attending to the
needs of the ‘real’ Aborigines who live in remote areas.
The use of the Aboriginal flag, although used as a unifying and politically expedient
symbol for a broad Aboriginal identity, can be equally misleading, and be used against
those wishing to portray an essential identity based on actual Aboriginal disparateness.
This makes it difficult if not impossible for coastal or regional Aborigines to claim a
heritage and identity, and for non-indigenous Australians to recognise Aboriginality as a
diverse and disparate concept with an entirely different social ontology. The partial
acceptance that Aborigines can traverse on pastoral land, while it has been problematic,
would appear inconsequential if regional and coastal Aboriginal tribes attempted to use
their traditional lands. It would be difficult to imagine that in suburbia, where the great
mass of the working and lower middle class live, that they would consider the reoccupation of their patch of the Australian dream. Even more difficult to imagine would
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be the sharing of multi-million dollar real estate and homes on Australia’s coastal
fringes. Implicitly, Aborigines can have land or use of land, as long as no one else has
an immediate use for it, as this does not contravene Protestant values of hard work and
ingenuity, which produces immense wealth but justifiable waste and opulence. As
Kapferer argues in relation Aboriginal ‘national’ identity,
Aboriginals have become so close to the centre of nationalist
thought that they have suffered from it. An Aboriginal who
departs from Australian nationalist ideals, often inspiring a
particular Western conception of the purity of tribal like, its
unity in space and time, and its “natural” authority rooted in
Dreamtime, can contribute to discrimination and administrative
hardship exercised by members of the dominant white
population. The experience of Aboriginal urban and fringe
dwellers is frequent testimony to this (Kaperfer, 1988:142).
The beginning of the Olympic torch relay in Ayers Rock – Uluru- typifies how white
visions of Aboriginality was manifested in the national celebration of the Sydney
Games, and how Aboriginality is ‘centered’ within the Australian desert. After the plane
landed on Australian soil for the first time, the flame was passed to Aboriginal elders
who passed it then to the first relay runner, Aboriginal athlete, Nova Perris - Kneebone.
The actual Olympic opening ceremony, while having several Aboriginal themes and
rituals, was initially dominated by the colonial reification of The Man From Snowy
River22 with a lone horseman entering the stadium. Moreover, within the origins of
Australian mythology, the bushranger is in conflict with Aborigines as the authentic
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1982, director, G. Miller.
59

Australians.
Their adaptation to the new environment, in its rawest and most
difficult form was a nearly as it could be complete. Their lives
depended on its being so. Only the Aborigines were more at
home in the bush and these, when they took service with the
police as black-trackers, the bushrangers feared and hated
accordingly. Thus to the pastoral workers, to the free selectors,
to lower class people in general, and usually to themselves, they
appeared as ‘wild colonial boys’, Australians par excellence.
(Ward, 1958:164)
Similar manifestations of the dead and mysterious heart at the ‘centre’ of the
Australian national identity were represented in the Azaria Chamberlain disappearance
and the film the Cars That Ate Paris.23 It is a fundamentally inert mythology that
continues to mystify problems in Australian cultural history without remedying causes.
This constitutes an appropriation of Dreamtime, and as such, needs to remain unsolved.
The township of the fictional Paris, (the name suggesting a cultural antithesis to Paris,
France), is a conglomeration of various remote frontier towns in either Australia of
America. Inhabited by an incorrigible and backward “white trash”, what they lack in
intelligence they make up for in deviousness, by causing accidents for unwary travelers
passing through the town. Insular and bizarre, it poses the question whether an alternate
economy can be produced by this frontierism, or is perhaps equally restricted by this
cultural phenomenon. The allusion to an unsophisticated nation that is in dispute with
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1975, director P. Weir. The Cars that Ate Paris, was part of the renaissance in Australian film making
which attempted to find ‘authentic’ Australian cultures and traditions, irrespective of how unattractive the
discoveries were.
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itself is indicated by the brief display of a newspaper headline, (written during the
reformist government of Gough Whitlam) “new laws turn Australia towards socialism,
say conservatives”.
In the capitalist ontology, the concept of Aboriginality is fixed primarily within a
tourist perspective, similar to how islands such as Fiji and Tahiti are marketed as tourist
destinations. It promises a visit to a temporal place, where the complexity of
Durkheim’s organic solidarity can be experienced for a short period. Many Aborigines
are now employed at least partially in tourist type schemes, often “working for the
dole”. There is little concept of where to place Aborigines in liberal/egalitarianism, and
there is the tendency to treat Aborigines like local flora and fauna, hence the promotion
of Aborginality as a saleable product through tourism. Aboriginal land-rights
underpinned this feature, argues Johnson,
Government arguments sometimes seemed to imply that land
rights were a leftover issue from our colonial settler past that
had to be worked out before we could move on to create the
dynamic twenty-first century version of an Australian capitalist
economy. Robert Tickner, minister for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander affairs, predicted that there would be ‘a rapid
growth in indigenous business and economic development
opportunities over the next five years…… Priority areas for
development will include art and craft, tourism, the pastoral
industry and businesses associated with the mining industry’.
The growth of such businesses would flow from the
achievements of the reconciliation process and the related social
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justice initiatives including the Native Title Act and the
establishment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Fund.
Aboriginal culture and identity were becoming ‘trendy’ due to
the reconciliation process and therefore saleable. (Johnson,
2000:32-33)
A new division of labour based on degrees of Aboriginality could result, as the
educated lighter skinned Aborigines could become managers over ‘authentic’
Aborigines, who reside in remote areas and produce traditional Aboriginal cultural
forms. In Thomas Keneally’s The Chant of Jimmie Blacksmith, a light-skinned
Aboriginal is the archetypal ‘black’ who has lost his ‘real’ culture, and is caught
between versions of colonising and indigenous cultures.24 The lightness of his skin
24

Boxer Cassius Clay, later taking the Islamic name of Muhammad Ali, became a symbolic figure in the
struggle for black autonomy and identity in America during the 1960s. Former heavyweight champion,
and African-American, Floyd Paterson, a Catholic, bore the full brunt of Ali’s verbal and physical attacks.
Ali’s use of the taunt, “an Uncle Tom negro”, symbolised his attitude towards black men he believed
were overly compliant, and fearful of appearing like they were ‘uppity niggers’. Paterson believed that his
attitude towards himself and other black fighter’s was designed to assert that because he was a black
Muslim, he also had to appear as the superior black man.
Early on, as Cassius Clay, he had an insolent contempt, a promiscuous spray
of disrespect that indicates someone trying to secure rank by mere display; a
rather mean fool. When he became champ, he accelerated the contempt that
shames and humiliates, especially against those he saw as threats to his
superiority and rank amongst blacks, particularly the much loved Floyd
Paterson and later the implacable challenge of Frazier. (Kram, 2001, 30)
Within the logic of Social Darwinism, this can be seen as a feature within white power structures which
indicate superiority, as two black men fight over the remnants of Social Darwinism’s “second prize”;
who is the superior amongst ‘blacks.’ With a distinct white ancestry, as well as a prominent black
heritage, Ali used this to influence both white supporters and black detractors. As a result, Ali, the great
champion of the black movement, also displayed racism to his ‘brothers’ who were of a fuller ‘caste’. Ali
mainly used the notion that the fuller caste opponents such as his main protagonist and rival, Joe Frazier,
as ugly and having animalistic characteristics. Frazier became to deeply resent both Ali’s politics and his
personal attacks on him, and his role in Ali’s propaganda circus as a bad black man, because of his
resemblance to a negro caricature.
Joe Frazier should give his face to wildlife fund! He’s so ugly blind men go
the other way! Ugly! Ugly! Ugly! He not only looks bad! You can smell him
another country! He held his nose. What will the people in Manilla think? We
can’t have a gorilla for a champ. They’re gonna think, lookin’ at him, that all
black brothers are animals. “Gorilla”, he said. “Ugly and stupid.” He then
dropped low on his haunches, splayed his feet, knuckles waving by his knees,
and turned his nose flat and gross as he mimicked an ape. (Kram, 2001:169)
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serves as a barometer of his chances to be accepted within the mainstream, and as such,
his ability to be inculcated in the imperialistic practices of Christianity and hard work.
“Jimmie’s criteria were: home, hearth, wife, land. Those who possessed these had
beatitude unchallengeable. Other men had accidental, random life Nothing better”
(Keneally, 1972:15).
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CHAPTER TWO:
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY and ECONOMIC RATIONALISM

The failure of post-welfare state social democracy poignantly reveals the alienation the
‘people’ experience from nationalism, and the bourgeois imperatives that underpin its
existence. Its implied theme is that those groups defined as historically ‘privileged’,
(such as white, heterosexual males), have to remain grateful and aware that there has be
a ‘lowering’ of personal expectations, for until such time that all social groups attain
equal status. The problem with a perhaps well intentioned “political correctness” is that
it does not fully explain the underpinnings of prejudice – rather, it shifts ground, hoping
no-one will notice the flaws within its frameworks, specifically the type of economic
and social relationships that produce an ill-defined ‘patriarchy’. In Marxist terms,
‘individuals’ are taken in the context of the relation to class position and privilege to
material advantage. The greater number involved in social group theorisation will
inevitably produce those that possess advantage denied to the proletariat. “Individuals
have always built on themselves, but naturally on themselves within their given
historical conditions and relationships, not on the “pure” individual in the sense of the
ideologists (Marx, 1845: “Proletarians and Communism”).
Therefore it should not be surprising that the dominant ‘left and right’ political
parties in Australia are now reflecting a similar economic and social agenda.
Subsequently it is asserted that the process of social fascism in post-welfare state liberal
democracies first occurs from a form of social democracy that attempts a complex
management of marginal groups. The re-alignment of capitalist values during the 1970s
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profoundly altered the Whitlam government’s broad based social democracy
particularly in relation to class based issues. What remained and in essence,
‘affordable’, were liberal left reforms that during the recessions of the 1990s, became
derided as “liberal elitism”. As Beilharz indicates,
It is self-evident that the 1970s were a vital moment in
Australian cultural history. But this is only if we look back.
Now, if we turn forward, it also becomes clear that the 1980s
were constructed very much against a particular, ramshackle
image of the 1970s. The Labor decade tried to present itself as
everything which the Whitlam interlude was not, and more.
(Beilharz, 1994:82)
The decline in the effectiveness of unions and the ideology of the welfare state,
combined with new industries that are less labour intensive, suggests that structural
economic and social issues require careful analysis. Marx’s totalising theory is seen in a
post-Cold War context as its greatest foible. However it provides greater insight in the
labour process in a mode of production, than post-modern discourses that seek freedom
and separation from economic and public sphere realities. Subsequently to restrict the
level of populism that emerged in Australia during the 1990’s “everything but the real
reason” must become the imperative for true social and economic change, based on the
rationale that ‘everything’, has now been tried.
Consequently the attempt to include ‘outsiders’, within the hegemony of liberal
capitalism is counter-revolutionary and based on a form of liberalism outside of the
social individual within history. Moreover the relative class privilege held by academics
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reflecting “politically correct” policy is the most enduring legacy of the Whitlam
government’s broad-based welfare state and social democracy. Whitlam’s vision for a
modern Australia was to be underpinned by the public sector, and the public
employment was to reflect the need for a culture of anti-discrimination and political
correctness. By the 1980s and early 1990s however, the selective welfare state increased
its focus upon the maintenance of this cultural perspective, despite the dramatic decline
in public service employment opportunities.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australian cultural policy
studies came together around the idea that cultural studies
should engage policy bureaucracies. Writers in this field directly
challenged what they saw as an unwarranted suspicion of the
State and official politics in cultural studies. But they took a
remarkably circuitous route to the policy position, using Michel
Foucault’s writings on governmentality to provide theoretical
justification – at both the epistemological and ethical levels – for
cultural studies’ “move toward policy”. (Sterne, 2003:102)
Sterne’s thesis is that “Foucauldian governmentality provides no mechanism for
determining the difference between working with the government and working for the
government” (Sterne, 2003:115), and “in taking capitalism for granted, Foucault offers
no account of corporate or economic power” (Sterne, 2003: 111)1.

1

See chapter seven for an analysis of Foucault’s governmentality thesis; (the control and regulation of
bodies).
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The Labor Party and neo-liberalism

“There is nothing to look forward to except king-making and wire-pulling in the
A.L.P.” (McQueen, 1975:15).

Humphrey McQueen argues that that the formation of the Party came as a direct result
of the futility of strike action in the 1890s, and a belief that Parliamentary
representatives could ameliorate labour conditions. This pseudo unionism results in “the
unionists and others who have found it necessary to oppose the Labor Party are
indicative of a different class, of a proletariat” (McQueen, 1975:236). As the capitalist
society has shifted focus from heavy industry and manufacturing in the late twentieth
century, the problem of the Labor Party not representing the core concerns of workers,
has become more apparent. High levels of unemployment produced by the postindustrial society have seen the Labor Party take the capitalist perspective of viewing
unemployment as a necessary consequence of capitalist activity. As Marx and Engels
argue,
The socialistic bourgeois want all the advantages of modern
social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily
resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state of society,
minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements. They wish
for a bourgeoisie without a proletariat. The bourgeoisie naturally
conceives the world in which it is supreme to be the best; and
bourgeois socialism develops this comfortable conception into
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various more or less complete systems. In requiring the
proletariat to carry out such a system, and thereby march
straightaway into the social New Jerusalem, it but requires in
reality that the proletariat should remain within the boundaries
of existing society, but should cast away all its hateful ideas
concerning

the

bourgeoisie.

Marx

&

Engels,

1848:

(“Conservative or Bourgeois Socialism”)
The late twentieth century Labor Party practically abandoned any reference to the
working class, justifying what McQueen saw as specious beginnings of Parliamentary
representation for workers. The tenure of former ACTU (Australian Council of Trade
Unions), leader Bob Hawke as Prime Minister, was marked by the creation of “super
unions”, which removed rank-and-file conflict and participation. Moreover, the function
of the Accord represented an informal consensus between government, unions and
capitalists. In essence, the government became the protectors of the capitalist rate of
profit.
The Accord, through successive major modifications between
1983 and 1993, was a consequence of the unlikely union of
Thatcherite economics legitimised by contradictory appeals to
the need to modernise the economy and to protect the interests
of the least well-off, and implemented within a modicum of
Swedish corporatist and welfarist institutional arrangements.
(Watts, 1996:62)
Furthermore, for Kuhn, the Labor Party used its ‘capture’ and trust of the working class
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to run its neo-liberal reformist agenda that was underpinned by the Accord.
Measures that would immediately attract hostility if pursued by
a conservative government are given the benefit of the doubt by
workers and unions when implemented by Labor. Under Hawke
this mechanism was institutionalised as the 1983 Prices and
Incomes Accord. (Kuhn, 1993:24)
The Labor Party Gough Whitlam had recast in his own bourgeois image was the
gestation of a different type of masculine personality, and a deliberate shift from a bluecollar image. Yet a particularly ruthless form was re-produced following Whitlam’s
sacking that had again seemingly consigned the Labor Party to another long period of
opposition. The new Labor ‘men’ expressed a strong desire to dominate in the
‘business’ of government, with the urbane Labor personalities including Paul Keating,
Neville Wran, Bob Carr, Graham Richardson2. Consequently they were also dedicated
to the nullification of the party’s left wing, which was seen as an impediment to seizing
and retaining power. The ascent of Bob Hawke of the leadership of the party
immediately prior to the 1983 election at the expense of Bill Hayden was to ensure
electoral success. Then in 1991, this same ethos enabled Paul Keating to defeat Hawke
who was the Labor Party’s longest serving Prime Minister. Suspected underworld
involvement in the bashing of left wing M.P. Peter Baldwin, indicated how determined
some forces associated with the right were to silence the left in 1980. The tribal-like
loyalty of the right, the ruthlessness and efficiency of their machine bureaucracy, has

2

Marian Wilkinson’s 1996 biography of Richardson, “The Fixer”, details his role in making the Labor
Party a ruthless and poll-driven political party, as well as his association with criminals that were
suspected to be involved in the bashing of left-wing MP Peter Baldwin.
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led some observers such as former Liberal leader John Hewson3 to suggest that the right
wing faction of the Australian Labor Party, is the closest manifestation of the Mafia in
Australia. The symbolic masculinity of the right can be seen as an appropriation of the
traditional forms that the Labor Party once represented to greater effect. As Watts states,
Much of the distinctive ritual, modes of address and policy
preferences have been until the 1980s grounded in the figure of
the male. In policy terms laborism produced discourses and
policies about a male wage-earner rather than the potentially
more generic and strategically more open discourse about
citizenship which some parts of European social democracy
have sustained. Laborism’s ‘workers’ are ‘men’ and ‘mates’
rather than ‘citizens’. (Watts, 1996:50)
The Labor Party’s embracement of liberal and civil rights issues inevitably
intensified the orientation of Australia’s traditional conservative parties, the Liberal and
National Party Coalition. The long reign of this type of Labor Party between 1983 and
1996, (beginning with the Whitlam government of 1972), solidified the need for the
Coalition to move further to the political right to maintain its identity. The deletion of
class as a major identifying theme in nationalist politics, created the illusion that there
are more significant issues in a nation’s social life. As Frankel asserts,
Culturally, the Whitlam leadership signified the beginning of a
conscious strategy – realised more fully by Wran, Hawke and

3

This assertion, made in Parliament in 1993, reflected on the effectiveness of the dominant right wing of
the Party to operate as a disciplined machine. Hewson suggested that there was a culture of criminality in
this faction. Hewson it is assumed makes these assertions based on the involvement of ‘standover’ man
Tom Domican in the Party, and the assault of left wing member Peter Baldwin in 1980.
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Keating – to remould the ‘labour party’ into a classless
‘Australian’ party. (Frankel, 1992:34)
Subsequently a post-working class form of social democracy has been promoted by
the Labor Party since the advent of the leadership of Gough Whitlam in 1967. The
appeal now concentrated on a radical centre of Australian political life, based in what
were once thought to belonging to a “lunatic fringe”, such as expanding various civil
liberties and embracing environmentalism. The embrace of these policies by a largely
mainstream political movement such as the Labor Party captured the electoral support
of a new educated elite and a modernisation paradigm stimulated by 1960s ‘radicalism’.
By the mid-1970s, the post-war economic boom was clearly over, and what was
required was a traditional labour response to the rising unemployment. However the
publication in 1971 of Towards a New Australia, a collection of essays in the
expectation of a Labor government’s role, suggested that,
An intent to modify and manage capitalism, not replace it; an
emphasis on the market as the pivot of the economy; the use of
monetary and fiscal controls as the means of managing
capitalism; an emphasis on a rational, humane, efficient, ‘mixedcapitalist economy’; and emphasis on meritocracy, hence on
equality of opportunity, not on equality per se. (Jaensch,
1989:92)
Whitlam’s quantum shift to the middle class (arguably the creation of a new middle
class), originates from a pragmatic and tacit admission that Labor’s traditional support
base and belief in class divisions, could not challenge Menzies’ capture of the “middle
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ground”, and its middle class hegemony in Australia. “New Labor”, therefore had little
alternative but to become middle class reformists if they were to achieve political power
in Australia. Reforms like free university education encouraged a new emphasis on the
bourgeois value of education, similar to the university led middle class revolts in
America in the 1960s. However this approach remained isolated from traditional
conservatism, and working class politics that used pragmatic manifestations of Marxism
(unionism) to understand the dominant economic and cultural system. As Castles
argues,
Gough Whitlam’s accession to the Labor leadership in 1967
marked what seemed to be a major change in Labor strategy
from a labourist defence of the working man through the
regulation of the wages system to a social democratic strategy of
social wage enhancement. (Castles, 1988:149)
The broadening of the Labor Party’s electoral base to incorporate sections of the
middle class did not initially weaken their traditional working class support base.
Whitlam’s reform saw increased public spending and expansion of the non-means tested
social wage now often referred to derisively as “middle class welfare”. Growing
unemployment under subsequent Labor governments, saw the support of the traditional
working class dissipate, culminating in the 1990s concept of “Howard’s battlers”, who
were groups of former Labor voters. The loss of the Party’s core identity, and the failure
of “social democracy”, has now placed the Labor Party in a difficult electoral position.
‘Conservative’ elements can still reinforce perceptions that Labor is a high-taxing, prowelfare party in government, despite the fact that the Labor Party has been at the
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forefront of instituting welfare state decline whilst in government. The post-Whitlam
Labor Party has therefore struggled with Whitlam’s legacy that attempted to destigmitise welfare as a result of cyclical and structural causes of unemployment and
underemployment. The underlying issue for Frankel is that,
instead of mass unemployment and poverty producing militant
protest movements, we have a labour movement largely
preoccupied

with

constructing

a

globally

competitive

‘productive culture’ rather than a post-capitalist society.
(Frankel, 1992:24)
The long-term high unemployment levels have also extended into the
proletarianisation of the middle class, and new adherents in the working class that are
now often referred to as ‘aspirational’ The erroneous implication that this is the first
time that the working class has aspired for conditions better for themselves or their
families, illustrates the intensification of effort required to succeed in the neo-liberal
economy. Subsequently the Howard government’s social racism and pernicious
treatment of welfare recipients, is a manifestation of the insecurities of the middle and
working classes, which ‘values’ their contribution to a difficult economy, while
punishing ‘outsiders’, such as Aborigines, asylum seekers, (grateful, employable
outsiders rather than more welfare recipients) and the unemployed. As Archer argues,
“Howard’s neo-liberalism has a different (and much more complicated message) from
that of Hanson. It shares the idealisation of the pre-1970s culture while rejecting its
economic relationships” (Archer, 1997:96).
Previously, former Prime Minister Robert Menzies had circumvented politically
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divisive issues such as class warfare by emphasising the role of the “forgotten people”.
Menzies appealed to those who did not have direct links to the obvious politics of class
or did not want to be defined this way – the original aspirational cross-class voter. The
attraction of a vague political symbol such as the middle class eventually seduced and
ensnared those who were not in Menzies’ original description of membership of such a
class. He argued that the middle class, were,
salary-earners, shop-keepers, skilled artisans, professional men
and women, farmers, and so on. These are, in the political and
economic sense the middle class. They are envied by those
whose social benefits are largely obtained by taxing them, (yet),
they are not rich enough to have individual power. (Brett,
1992:6)
The model of the bourgeois family in developing post-war Australia was the
cornerstone of life in the lucky country – particularly as the ‘foreign’ connotations of
the Cold War impacted on insular Australia. Increasing the sense of insularity through
the nuclear family, Menzies referred to the family as “the foundation of sanity and
sobriety; it is the indispensable condition of continuity; its health determines the health
of society as a whole” (Brett, 1992:7). This feature gave women a recognised role in the
home, (a pseudo feminism), taking the emphasis away from male dominated union and
workplace activity. Menzies could then suggest and imply that vaguely defined
“external concepts” posed a threat to political and social stability – particularly those
associated with communism. The “middle class” has thereby become a reified entity in
the ‘classless’ Australia, and in an inverse interpretation of historical materialism,
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communism was represented a retrograde step, as could ‘progressive’ politics generally.
The requirement to secure ‘values’ that shape its existence is a feature of the denial of
the alienation experienced by the middle class.
The bourgeoisie is as much subject to self-alienation as the
proletariat, “but the possessing class…feels at home in this selfalienation, it finds confirmation of itself and recognises in
alienation its own power. Unlike the proletariat, the bourgeoisie
has no interest in seeing through and beyond this self-alienation
or in removing it. The proletariat, however, is “annihilated” by
it, lives an “inhuman existence” and is therefore forced to do
everything in its power to remove it, theoretically and
practically. (Jakubowski, 1990:110)
These middle class mythologies has served Australia reasonably well, however for at
least economically at various periods during Australia’s brief history, it has been easier
for working class Australians compared to workers in other mature industrialised
countries to ascend class boundaries. It was once relatively common for example, for a
young man who had completed his apprenticeship at BHP, (Broken Hill Propriety Ltd)
as an electrician or plumber, to leave the company, begin his own small business, and
eventually employ others. It is these mythological standards, now largely redundant in
practice, which underpinned Donald Horne’s idea of an indolent “lucky country”.4
Consistent with frontier societies that were orientated to an expanding middle class and
populism, Ward argues that the bourgeois respectability that emanated from Australian

4

1964, D.Horne, The Lucky Country: Australia in the sixties.
75

society following the Gold Rush, terminated the overt romanticism held towards the
bushranger. “For example, even the radical, and relatively cant-free, Bulletin took a
wholly proper attitude in 1880 to the ‘annihilation of the Kelly’s,’ denying that they, or
the spirit they symbolised, possessed any redeeming qualities whatever” (Ward,
1958:153).
While Menzies can be credited with solidifying a conservative tradition in Australia,
his approach to the role of state was quantifiably different from that of late
twentieth/early twenty-first century ‘liberals’, who often evoke his legacy. The Menzies
era serves as a barometer in late twentieth century political history, and reveals how
profoundly the Liberal and Labor parties have altered in philosophical structure in the
intervening decades. As Bryson asserts,
During the post-Second World War era, when there was a period
of over twenty years of conservative government, the platform
of the Liberal Party was discernibly more politically liberal. The
Party accepted the role of government as to ‘encourage’,
‘stabilise’, ‘maintain’, ‘promote’, ‘stimulate’, and ‘assist’. While
there is no sense of any great originating role….neither is
anything portrayed as ‘not government business’”.(Bryson,
1992:44)
By using the “Tampa refugee crisis” during the 2001 election as a backdrop, Prime
Minister Howard exploited the social and economic fears wrought by globalisation, to
assert somewhat contradictorily, that while Australia is a part of the global economy, its
people are defiantly ‘Australian,’ evoking the type of racial nationalism not seen since
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the “White Australia” policy. Post-welfare state social democratic proponent Mark
Latham also reveals the dearth of answers regarding the “social fascist nationalism”
wrought by globalisation and the proletarianisation of the workforce. Rather than seen
as a disadvantage, (the shrinking of the middle class), it matches an Australian
egalitarian and racial ideal that dispenses with a cultural and national ‘flabbiness’.
As long as workers regard their interests as matching those of
footloose capital, distributional conflicts are externalised into
national contests for competitive advantage. Economic leverage
passes to the global sphere of capital, creating new issues of
economic sovereignty and equity. Within terms of this analysis,
the durability of nationalism is explained away in terms of
capitalist hegemony. It is not available to social democracy,
however, restricted to national systems of parliamentary
democracy, to simply ignore the strength and political
importance of nationalism. It needs to develop, consistent with
its equity goals, a satisfactory response to the pressing
nationalistic tensions between the globalised sphere of capital
and the localised features of governance. (Latham, 1998:44).
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Post-welfare state Labor

Early twentieth century European representative democracy organised in liberal and
labour parties were beginning to contest conservative dominance and reflected the
requirements of a mature and diverse industrial economy. Post-welfare state labour
parties, represent a trend where an increasingly unrepresentative form of democracy,
exemplified by the Australian Labor Party’s, “right wing” faction formed a culture of
“political correctness”. From his vantage point in 1992, Frankel was able to claim, “the
U.S. campaign against ‘political correctness’, for example, has not really made much
headway in Australia” (Frankel, 1992:145). However in the following few years it
reached epidemic proportions in Australia, as Keating’s political opponents suggested
that his vision for a compassionate yet hyper-capitalist Australia was impacting
deleteriously on the mainstream. The ability for various small vocal groups to dominate
against the omnipresence of the ‘apolitical’ Anzac tradition suggests that interference by
the state is superfluous to independent “frontier individuals”. Moreover, Keating was
not averse to using overt nationalist symbolism to divert attention away from the
recessions of the early 1990s, even originating the notion of the “one nation” before
Pauline Hanson. As Wiseman asserts,
The ALP under Paul Keating’s leadership has been very
effective at playing the nationalist card, proposing that Australia
should break its last ceremonial ties with the Britain monarchy
by becoming a Republic. There has also been much talk of
creating ‘one nation’ and supporting ‘the promotion of
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individual and collective rights on one hand and, on the other,
the promotion of common national interests and values’.
(Wiseman, 1996:105)
If political correctness is seen as a manifestation of neo-liberalism, it stems from the
institutional problems of Western democracy that places the electorate in a profoundly
subordinate position. As Hennessy suggests, “one of the reasons neo-liberalism has
succeeded so well is that it works best in countries where there is formal democracy but
the public is diverted from meaningful participation in governance” (Hennessy,
2000:77). This broadly un-consultative approach, and the traditional working class
constituents that they took for granted, resulted in their collapse as a Federal political
force. As Beilharz prophetically stated, “The final irony for Keating may yet be that
traditionalism will be caught up in his downfall” (Beilharz, 1994:89). “Political
correctness” implies within that in a relative context, a dominant group has “had it
good”, and that they now have to have diminished aspirations until such time all social
groups achieve equality. Kirchheimer suggests the relationship between interest groups
and the former mass political party, acts as a de-facto arm of the party that now attempts
to “catch all”.
Only the interest group, whether ideological or economic in
nature or a combination of the two, can provide mass reservoirs
of readily accessible voters. It has a more constant line of
communication and higher acceptance for its messages than the
catch-all party, which is removed from direct contact with the
public except for the comparatively small number intensively
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concerned about the brand of politics a party has to offer these
days – or about their own careers in or through the party.
(Kirchheimer, 1966:193)
A broader concern for former mass parties that have evolved in catch all movements
and beyond, is a permanent loss of identity as their conventional left alliance becomes
untenable to return to, and they are stranded if liberal left reforms become unpopular
with the electorate. The unique characteristic of Australia politics where the ‘liberals’
are actually conservatives and the Labor Party are the liberals, is a product of the
dominance of the labour movement and Labor Party in a historical context.
Lenin pointed this out – ‘Never a socialist party, but a liberalcapitalist one’ – long ago. He noted that ‘The Australian Labor
Party does not even claim to be a Socialist Party. As a matter of
fact it is a liberal-bourgeois party and the so-called Liberals in
Australia are really conservatives’.(Catley & McFarlane,
1974:4)
The impact of a social engineering that has liberal connotations has occurred in an
era of de-industrialisation and globalisation in the West that had been preceded by full
employment in the immediate post-war years. The employment problems of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries give the appearance of relating to a
transformation and decline in the original dynamics of industrial capitalism, based upon
labour intensive work based in manufacturing and construction. Political parties that
emanated from the labour movement and hence mass support, no longer support
working class issues because they have been too difficult to manage in the “post-
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industrial” age. With individual nations having no direct ability to alter the ascendancy
of capitalism to globalisation, the management and manipulation of marginal groups
becomes one of the few areas for government to define a nation’s identity. Policing of
the welfare state in particular, can resonate with themes of a lean and hungry economy,
keen to do business. However the potential for unemployed people to find work,
accompanied by the work ethic, remains one of the key symbols of social and economic
power in the West despite a decline in actual employment opportunities.
An unemployment per vacancy ratio existed ranging from 44.4
applicants in the recession of 1983, and 35.0 in the recession of
1993, to a low of 10.4 in 1988 and 14.5 in 1997. Parttime/full/time ratios jumped from 14.8% of the workforce in
1978, to 24.8% in 1997. Part-time workers who want to work
more than their allotted hours rose from 13.5% in 1978 to 27.1%
in 1997. (Mitchell & Watts, 1997:2)

The selective welfare state

The selective welfare state had to demarcate between groups as selectivity became
associated with efficiency, and the philosophical desire to lessen the size of the welfare
state. Post-welfare state social democratic rhetoric attempts to shift priorities from
issues that cost money in real terms, such as unemployment, to identified social issues.
While they are not distanced from the politics of funding, the post-welfare state suggests
that it is now addressing the most salient social issues of the times. Conversely,
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Jamrozik argues that the Australian welfare state has always been selective and residual
in function.
It may have been a ‘wage earners’ welfare state’ as argued by
Francis Castles (1985), but that concept applied to workers only,
providing a minimum wage but not alleviating the inequalities
of the market. Unfortunately, the period 1972-1975 benefited
mainly the new middle class of professionals and administrators
because the traditional and well-entrenched attitudes towards
inequality and the narrow perspective on welfare were too
powerful to overcome in a short period of time. (Jamrozik,
2001:81)
Moreover, consistent with Kirchemer’s thesis that democratic political parties have
experienced a weakening of its centre to incorporate potential supporters from its fringe,
Frankel considers that the Accord signalled for feminists an opportunity, despite the
overall restrictive and conservative orientation of the Accord. In late capitalism the
consumer society5 distinctively aims products at women and the material – diamonds
being a girl’s best ‘friend’. It also uses women’s residual antipathy towards men that has
not been ‘cured’ by feminism, and perhaps most significantly, women’s moral and
social asceticism, which created their principal identifying theme in early capitalism.
Feminism,

it

could

be

interpreted,

‘plays’

within

the

epistemology

liberal/egalitarianism, and is by nature, opportunistic. As Frankel argues,
The ideology of the Accord legitimised femocrat activity as a

5

See chapter five and advertising that exploits ‘female’ characteristics.
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form of ‘strategic feminism’ – similar to ‘strategic unionism’.
Liberal feminists did not need to be persuaded as they had long
been attracted to social-democratic reform agendas. Yet, many
socialist feminists in the labour movement, education and social
welfare sectors, despite their initial doubts, soon become
promoters, or at best, non-opponents of the Accord. (Frankel,
1992:214)
With the labour movement increasingly corporatised, the “big picture” issues of social
democracy have replaced the micro groups of the community such as small to medium
sized unions. Post-welfare state social democratic policy reveals the Australian Labor
Party’s problem with Marxism, by using the language of its oppressors to describe the
inadequacy of Marxism to analyse the dynamics of the global economy. Reinvigorated
social democratic theorists are now inverting their crude understanding of Marxism to
assert that a “skilled worker”, can transcend their relationship to the capitalist order by
the accumulation of marketable skill. Workers now can be interpreted as anyone not
receiving welfare, or middle class if involved in the post-Fordist labour market.
The bargaining power of highly skilled, internationally
competitive labour can often outstrip the value of capital. In a
post-industrial economy, not all workers are vulnerable, in the
sense of having their labour exploited. Some workers receive an
economic premium on the contribution their skills make to the
production process. If this contribution is expressed through the
international production system, then the value of the premium
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is usually multiplied several times over. (Latham, 1998:84).
Latham’s faith in capitalism poignantly reveals the Labor Party’s entrapment in
attempting to continue manifestations of Whitlam’s legacy. Social democratic rhetoric
served the governments of Hawke and Keating well as they pursued economic
rationalist policies that impacted most profoundly on the working class.
Prime Minister Keating was fond of reporting to the Federal
Parliamentary

Labor

Party

on

his

sophisticated

social

democratic model for Australia: an open and competitive trading
economy supported by strong citizenship rights and an effective
social safety net. He had much to be proud of, with a record, too
rare in Australian public life, of turning good ideas into reality.
Yet, perversely enough, the big picture was never quite big
enough. (Latham, 1998:8)

The social democratic backlash

The employment crisis in Western democracies from the 1970s onward was exacerbated
by the expectation that the exceptional conditions that provided the “long boom” in
Western capitalism following World War Two, would continue. As Jamrozik also
argues,
In Australia except for the 25-30 years of the post-Word War
Two period, unemployment was usually around the mark we
now have, (7%-8%, if it were calculated as we calculate it now).
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A similar situation was present in most industrialised countries.
The exception was the period of the Great Depression during the
1930s, when unemployment was at extremely high levels. In a
historical perspective, the so-called ‘long boom’ of the 1950s
and 1960s was an aberration, but it came to be regarded as a
norm. (Jamrozik, 2001:140)
A feature of Pauline Hanson’s unconscious critique of the “selective welfare state” is
that of revealing the hegemony of capitalism. In particular, her critique suggests that for
many alienated labour is not an enjoyable or profitable experience. (Capitalism is taken
in the Weberian tradition as the internalisation of delayed gratification values and the
purchase/ownership of large consumer items such as a house and car, and perhaps the
possession of a “savings account”). The long hours worked by small business owners is
further evidenced by those who “work hard” such as salespeople meeting enforced
targets, to various semi-skilled and unskilled workers whose wages are low and the
work menial and repetitive. Conversely, employees of the ‘state’ such as politicians,
public servants and academics, or beneficiaries of the “Aboriginal industry” can be
viewed as not directly related to capitalist ‘struggle’, and living in a quasi-socialist
utopia.
For Hanson, the so-called new class made up of intellectuals,
bureaucrats and other elitist no-hopers is the curse of the
ordinary battler. It involves an intensely nostalgic recreation of
an historical golden age of triumph for ordinary, unpretentious,
hardworking, white Australians. For those entering the Hanson
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mythology, this supposed achievement is now seen as being
threatened by a conspiracy of the major parties, intellectuals and
city based big business. The powerful symbols of Aboriginal
Reconciliation and Land Rights are seen as particularly
dangerous threats to this white heartland. They are resymbolised
as a dispossession and a subjection of the battling settler.
(Archer, 1997:95)
Therefore unless “social democracy” is underpinned by traditional democratic
concerns relating to the ameliorating of labour problems and conditions, it becomes a
victim of unleashing of expectations that cannot be met within conventional economic
or nationalist paradigms. The tradition of antagonism based on class and capitalism
were largely clear and concise – socially progressive ‘issues’ tend to perpetually
accumulate in number. This also creates the environment for a populist reverse elitism,
as people now feel free to air ‘bigoted’ opinions that contribute to the political and
national debate. This development highlights the effect of a folk-lore or ‘wisdom’, and
focuses on Gramsci's contention that, “the notion that “the intellectuals” as a distinct
social category independent of class is a myth. All men are potentially intellectuals in
the sense of having an intellect and using it, but not all are intellectuals by social
function” (Gramsci, 1971:3)
Right wing ideologue and commentator Alan Jones, uses the term “struggle street”,
to allude to the working and lower middle class. It is a re-working of the political
maxim of appealing to the “hip pocket nerve”, when talking politics to the mainstream.
While commentators such as Jones are elucidating an appeal to the “little Aussie
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battler” in Australian mythology, such an appeal can also locate the fascist strain that
exists in right-wing populism. This relates to the implication that fascist politics has a
place within capitalism, for through the elimination of some nefarious racial and social
elements, capitalism is an equitable social and economic order and a natural base for
nationalist politics. In contrast,
For Marx, “Communism is the positive abolition of private
property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real
appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is,
therefore, the return of man himself as a social, ie., really human
being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the
wealth of previous development. (Fromm, 1961:33-34)
Economic rationalist sourced polemics coming from commentators such as Jones
suggest that welfare payments to Aborigines and others are coming out of individual
taxpayer’s pockets. This is despite the fact that governments have a variety of sources of
expenditure and income, and various names for different types of ‘handouts’, including
those to ‘assist’ industry. It also clearly implies that the problems of the urban existence
- maintaining an unsatisfying job, (if employed at all) a mortgage, a family, and a
concept of the personal, (sex and love), means that there is no time left for so-called big
picture issues. Reactionary politics unleashes ‘pragmatic’ lower class conservatives,
such as the fictional Alf Garnett,6 who see that ‘radical’ politics are practiced by
‘bludgers’ who come to the pub with no money. His flippant critique is significant, for
what really achieves social power and individuality, is money. Well meaning notions

6

1970. From the British comedy series, Till Death Do Us Part.
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cannot change the true character of capitalism and the centrality of money in the fight
against the alienated self
By possessing the property of buying everything, by possessing
the property of appropriating all objects, money is thus the
object of eminent possession. The universality of its property is
the omnipotence of its being. Money is the pimp between man’s
need and the object, between his life. But that which mediates
my life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for
me. For me it is the other person. (Marx, 1844: “The Power of
Money”)
Therefore in the climate of the philosophical reversal of the all-inclusive welfare
state, the working class also becomes attracted to an ideology that concentrates on
issues of welfare waste and abuse, under a nationalist discourse. Like Margaret Thatcher
in the 1979 British elections with the British national front, John Howard was also able
to appeal to the respectable racist vote, in the 1996 election while the extremists did the
bidding for him. As Johnson asserts, “The ‘race relations industry’ was a common term
in ‘Thatcherite’ discourse in the eighties” (Johnson, 2000:46). The small advantage
however, gained by attacks on the “race relations industry” is counterbalanced by new
pressures placed upon the dominant racial group. To maintain racial and cultural
heritage involves overcoming significant economic disadvantage that been produced by
economic reform. The emphasis is then upon the structural inefficiencies/problems of
the welfare state, rather than the human cost of reform. In Dalrymple’s “common sense”
view of the underclass he worked with in English slums, he asserts that;
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In the past few decades, a peculiar and distinctive psychology
has emerged in Britain. Gone are the civility, sturdy
independence, and admirable stoicism that carried the English
through the war years. It has been replaced by a constant whine
of excuses, complaints, and special pleading. The collapse of the
British character has been as swift and complete as the collapse
of British power. (Dalrymple, 2001:5)
Dalrymple’s interpretation of the underclass as men chronically unemployed, substance
abusers, habitual criminals, in relationships with women who are hapless victims of
domestic violence and children suffering physical and sexual abuse, resulted from
Margaret Thatcher’s view of a re-invigorated Britain, suggests Hall.
Ideologically, Thatcherism is seen as forging new discursive
articulations between liberal discourses of the ‘free market’ and
economic man and the organic conservative themes of tradition,
family and nation, respectability, patriarchalism and order. Its
reworking of these different repertoires of ‘Englishness’
constantly repositions both individual subjects and ‘the people’
as a whole – their needs, experiences, aspirations, pleasures and
desires – contesting space in terms of shifting social, sexual and
ethnic identities, against the background of a crisis of national
identity and culture precipitated by the unresolved psychic
trauma of the ‘end of empire’. (Hall, 1988:2)
The merging of neo-liberalism with social fascism thus tests the notion of nationalists
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and ‘subversives’, against the background of Nazi Germany’s ‘excesses’ that provide an
exemplar model for democracies to compare and contrast themselves. John Howard’s
use of “authoritarian populism” in defining the neo-liberal Australian state is evocative
of Thatcher and the phenomenon of pushing, but not crossing, the historical
understanding of fascism. Subsequently, no matter how pernicious late capitalism
becomes, it can never compare with ‘real’ fascism, as social fascism operates on an
economic rationalist criteria that then spreads to the social, seemingly as an unfortunate
consequence. For Pusey, as Australia was ‘born modern’, the idea that Australians
should have to choose between state intervention in the economy or free markets is not
a natural choice. However the economic reformers have been able to inculcate (through
the media and at election time), that an American-style ‘economic correctness’ presents
private enterprise as the only alternative (Pusey, 2003:157).
Social fascism consequently can appeal to all strata of society, (marked by its selfserving comparisons to ‘real’ fascism) – and appeals particularly those who now have
nothing to lose.
The ‘dangerous class’, the social scum (Lumpenproletariat), that
passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old
society, may here and there be swept into the movement by a
proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it
far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.
(Marx & Engels, 1848: “The Communist Manifesto”)
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Academia and New Labor

Academic developments in the selective welfare state compounds Gramsci’s assertion
that, “The popular element “feels” but does not always know or understand; the
intellectual element “knows” but does not always understand and in particular does not
always feel” (Gramsci, 1971:418). It has proved difficult to inculcate into the broader
Australian community, and the ethos of the free market and the power of private
employers. This approach promotes a position of an antagonistic polemic that seeks to
educate society about its narrow-mindedness as it attempts to defeat Australia’s cultural
cringe by obliquely contributing to it. Particularly in relation to the university milieu, it
results in the phenomenon of “preaching to the converted”, and coercing those least
likely to be misogynists, homophobes and racists. This ignores the fact that the type of
traditional masculinity they reproach, is more likely to exist in the type of profession
where such gender analysis is absent or minimal, such as the sciences, medicine,
engineering, or in entrepreneurial activity. As Sterne asserts,
To draw out the broad contours of history, Zygmunt Bauman
(1992) has argued that humanistic intellectuals have moved
from “legislators” who legitimised the workings of governments
to “interpreters” whose work is largely irrelevant to the
functioning

of

contemporary

States.

In

Bauman’s

simultaneously tragic and comic view, the modern state started
out by needing its intellectuals, but by the end of the twentieth
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century it worked best by ignoring them. (Sterne, 2003:101)
This trend towards intellectual postmodernism reflects a petit bourgeoisie
professionalism that implies that the marginalisation of labour in a post-Keynesian era is
not as bad as it often appears. Moreover, it appears to link heterosexual masculinity to a
myriad of stereotypes, ranging from corporate dominance to ‘elite’ working class
occupations such as coalmining to domestic violence. The ignorance of changing
conditions of life for working class is however based upon a 1960s social science that
shifted attention from class-based issues during the post-war full employment period.
Although they acknowledge various influences-from earlier
philosophers like Nietzsche to more recent thinkers like Lacan,
Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida-today’s postmodernism belongs
above all to the sixties generation and their students. This
postmodernism, then, is a product of a consciousness formed in
the so-called golden age of capitalism, however much it may
insist on the new (“post-Fordist,” “disorganised,” “flexible”)
shape of capitalism in the 1990s. (Meiksins Wood, 1997:3)
Ultimately, as Pusey suggests, the inclusion of women in the labour market forces a
co-habiting couple to earn what was once possible for one wage-earner, as “economic
reform has made families more dependent on the market in a situation of rising
consumption, rising debt, falling savings and eroding labour market lifetime incomes”
(Pusey, 2003:91).
As women have been traditionally marginalised in capitalism and unionism, much of
first and second wave feminism has been concerned with redressing the discrimination
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against women in the public sphere. However the proliferation of employment growth
in service sectors and casual employment generally, has not dispensed with the
masculine bias in what remains of unionism. The new service industry of the so-called
“call-centres”, operate on the principles of ‘Taylorism’7, where maximum effort is
expelled in minimum time. As Beder states,
millions of employees today are subject to some form of
electronic surveillance of their work, such as counting key
strokes or keeping track of time spent on telephone calls. Such
monitoring is just as intimidating, persistent and stressful as an
assembly line. (Beder, 2000:141)
The employers exploit not only women’s traditional antipathy to unionism, but also the
modern ‘superwoman’ image of the woman who juggles a job or career with the main
responsibility of household8. Therefore to suggest that the pace of work is too great is to
admit failure to a phenomenon that poses a challenge to masculine capability that
thrives on over-tasking. As Kuhn argues, despite the influence of the Accord in
Australia’s political and social history “the proportion of women in middle income jobs
was nineteen per cent lower in 1990 than 1975”. Furthermore, “the centralised phase of
the Accord initially froze existing inequalities in place, a situation compounded by the
Commission’s rejection of the comparable worth claim” (Kuhn, 1993:36-37).
The inclusion of women at the margins proves that capitalism ultimately has no
gender bias, (as this was ever in doubt), as the egalitarian mythology dominant in the
descriptions of Australian democracy, has been altered to bring women within the ethos.
7

The most significant “time and motion” expert in twentieth century capitalism. J.C.Spender & H.J.Kline
eds. 1996 “Scientific management: Frederick Winslow Taylor’s gift to the world?”
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The advocacy for equality in the labour market after generations of an unequal
relationship between men and women cannot be achieved without an increasing
competitiveness amongst all ‘labourers’. In a victory for liberalism and capitalism, this
can be seen as evoking a new and more complete version of egalitarianism. Marx,
reflecting on the nineteenth century phenomenon of replacing male labour with women
and children, argues;
The more productive capital grows, the more it extends the
division of labour and the application of machinery; the
more the division of labour and the application of machinery
extend the more does competition extend among other
workers, the more do their wages shrink together. (Marx,
1944:39) (emphasis in original)
Neo-liberal “success stories” of women breaking through the “glass ceiling” and
working in traditional male dominated employment such as entrepreneurship and
technical spheres has not altered women’s overall marginalisation in industrial
capitalism, nor that of working class men. Such success therefore, is at the expense of
others, and is characteristic of a class based economic and social system. The role of
enthusiasm and subservience by ‘outsiders’ to liberal capitalism, then acts as a general
warning to those reject the notion of a ‘McJob’ in favour of welfare.
Female part-time employment now accounts for 21 per cent of
total employment (12.3 per cent in 1978) and 46 per cent of total
female employment (34 per cent in 1978). Male part-time

8

See chapter five.
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employment has steadily increased and now accounts for 8 per
cent of total employment (3 per cent in 1978) and 15 per cent of
all male employment (5 per cent in 1978). (Mitchell &
Muysken, 2003:5)
Despite the legitimate claims about social and economic marginalisation under
capitalism, women’s primary employment options have exacerbated the gender
divisions inherent in a capitalist social order. In the context of neo-liberalism, women’s
relationship to the neo-liberal labour market suggests a relationship similar to Weber’s
view of the symbiotic connection between Protestantism and capitalism9. Working class
men’s ambivalence and disengagement with the ‘status quo’, as articulated through
unionism, produced a more relaxed attitude toward the demands of capital. A
withdrawal of labour as represented through the appropriation of domestic work, would
been seen in the context as an attack on the family, rather than attempting to subvert the
inequities in capital, that exist ‘outside’ the home. A central theme and justification
suffragists used was that so exemplary was women’s performance in the private sphere,
that its value should be naturally extrapolated into the public domain.
The suffragists’ ultimate conclusions were that private morality
could be transferred to the public level; that public persons
ought to be judged by the rigorous standards of the private
sphere; that the public (im)moral qualities men exhibited were
probably innate to the male character, but that they, too, could
be transformed (as could public life by the entry of women into

9

See chapter five.
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it); that the qualities women exhibited were innate and were not
merely an outgrowth of their enforced domesticity; that these
same qualities were the qualities that would invest the political
sphere with a sanctified aura. (Elshtain, 1982:63)
The tendency for women are to be over-represented in the lower level bureaucracy of
the public service or related agencies, (despite large reductions in overall public servant
staff) , results from affirmative action policies and the disciplined code of the outsiders
to liberal capitalism that produces the desired utilitarian effect for employers. The
growth in the policing of unemployed is one area where these features can be
advantageous, and where a “moral dimension” is used in the era of welfare state decline.
This dynamic was apparent in the British response to disciplining and regulating the
unemployed in the neo-liberal economy. Considine reports that,
The UK offices mostly employed women who made up seventy
per cent of staff, higher than for the other countries in the study.
This contrasted with the client population who were mostly men
and this required careful planning in situations where job
seekers became angry and violent (Considine, 2001:49-50).
The capitalist view of political correctness is recognised in a piecemeal fashion, and
as a consequence, it has been prone to hegemonic corrections. However the ‘value’ that
women bring to capitalism, and the divisiveness that liberal left theory presents, has
seen it build its own niche in the capitalist economy. The conflict between good
intentions and political reality is described by Speier as a process of “the economic need
for gain, the political need for power, the social need for recognition figure prominently
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in the theories that attempt to uphold the social determination of ideas” (Speier,
1970:267).
Academics in the humanities face a dilemma not presented in those academically
trained professions that are not directly related to solving the complex psycho/social
needs of individuals and societies. Consequently the elitism accorded to other
professions, becomes problematic in the humanities that also use a middle class
perspective. The challenge relates to whether to approach the dilemma similar to the
“trickle down ethos” of capitalism, or engage directly with the social problems of the
working or underclass. In the Australian context, the left and right wing has traditionally
been bland and follow narrow polemical precepts and targets. The best option is to place
these imperatives within a strategic position that exploits the ease of “ripping off” the
Australian state. As Frankel argues in relation to feminism,
Apart from minority radical currents, key aspects of feminism as
practised in the public sphere have become profoundly deradicalised. Even the feral forms ceased to frighten the
suburbanites as they were assimilated or safely marginalised in
the university and bureaucratic zoos. (Frankel, 1992:208)
Post-welfare state social democracy therefore is the new conservative left wing,
occupying the space once taken by trade unions, with a similar degree of effectiveness
in altering profound social and economic inequities. Its paradigms are bounded by a
symbiotic relationship to ideology, policy, organisation and practice. Subjects such as
Sociology, known for its interest in minority or “politically correct” issues, now
constituted by much which was Labor government policy in regard to gender issues and
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multiculturalism. For academics particularly, where much Cold War and social
democratic rhetoric has sprung, it reveals the bargaining position academics have been
able to wield in the capitalist society that is dominated by popular culture. There also
remains the prospect, similar to that of trade union leaders who are also divorced from
physical labour, of developing facile concern and imitation. Academics who concentrate
on social democratic issues can then resemble the trade union official – concerned but
relieved-to-be-distanced from the actual process of labour. Compounded by the fact
that, “It is well known that the various forms of Western Marxism thrived within
academic circles and were almost totally divorced from the labour movement” (Frankel,
1992:177-178).
The ascetic, contemplative academic is not a serious threat to ingrained inequality
due the trade-off they have within capitalism, “as it the separation of mental from
physical labour that permits the existence of a consciousness which believes itself to be
independent of material factors” (Jakubowski, 1990:83). Academics have replaced
mediaevalist religious scholars, where they represent a small proportion of people who
are truly literate. The use of universities to promote social equity, suggests that a state
that is mature and capable of reflexivity without the threat of dramatically altering it.
However in their general orientation and persona, academics resemble ascetic
Victorian/Enlightenment scientists, on which scientific method is concentrated. The
focus on models of literacy and a specialised academic form of argument negates other
options for overthrowing of state oppression, such as violent insurgencies. For Marx,
‘contemplation’ cannot compete with the need for a broader development of
‘consciousness’, which was preceded by production.
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Man seeks to satisfy economic needs, produces means of
satisfaction, creates new needs and reproduces himself – and in
these four activities he cooperates with other men. Only after we
have recognised these four aspects of the original historical
relations, Marx declares, do we find that man also has
consciousness. “Contemplation” was subsequently presented as
a socially necessary illusion of man living in a capitalistic
society; the so-called fetish character of that society serves to
account for the contemplative attitude of philosophers who,
failing to appreciate the dynamic and dialectical nature of the
social structure, have no material interest in changing it. (Speier,
1970:268)
The growing pressure from governments for universities to find their own sources of
funding, places pressure on Arts-based and humanities courses to reflect contributions
to commercial culture. Disciplines in the Arts, which are often totally dependant on
government funding, need to project their worthiness to the state and the nation.
However, despite overall academic loyalty to this principle, they, along with other
sections of the labour market, are increasingly pressured to undermine workplace
standards and their traditional themes of autonomy and independence. The method of an
overall acquiescence to capitalist demands, and a fairly organised and muted concept of
dissent is manifested by the fact that;
Dilettantes and academics can afford to keep silent since they
produce

books

for

personal
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and/or

career

reasons.

Revolutionaries who retreat from any ideological struggle
abandon one of their most important defences against the
bourgeois trap of ‘good manners’ which are nothing more than
rules for fighting on their terms and in no way preclude their
backstabbing and gossiping. The impropriety of public debate is
mild stuff compared to their maliciousness over cups of tea.
(McQueen, 1975:14)
McQueen therefore is alluding to a central problem in academia – their petit
bourgeois status - with the language and psychology of manners and civility being an
invitation onto a terrain of limited power. This then can act as a delineation of what they
dislike about the working class in comparison to the importance and significance of the
working classes’ historical and social marginalisation. In the neo-liberal economy, the
fear of the “savages at the walls of the city”, is represented more by the working class
than Aborigines for example, who are once removed from the class struggle.
Consequently while intellectual independence has coincided with a professed antipathy
and ambivalence to the capitalist mode of production, they have become entrapped in its
cultural and economic hegemony, due to the academic tendency for ‘abstraction’. The
tensions in the neo-liberal workplace relating to job security and work-loads, also
increases the tendency to ‘backstab’ colleagues out of frustration, and indicative of a
growing sense of powerlessness.
The broadening of the scope and function of universities begun by the Whitlam
Labor government ultimately created more academics in the social democratic ethos of
‘embourgeoising’ society. It also reduced the academic to the level of a public servant,
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as academics became increasingly aware of the link between their employment and
government policies. A phenomenon of governments desire to obscure the sharp and
consistent rise in unemployment since the 1970s, has been to advocate greater high
school retention, subsequently leading to a larger number of students attempting
university degrees. This has turned academia from a part-time job, full-time occupation
with light teaching responsibility, to one much closer to the pressures felt by school
teachers. For while,
School retention rates had indeed more than doubled since 1983,
but one never escaped the impression that the public suspected
keeping kids at school was a means of keeping the
unemployment rate down. Another section of the public, who
were regularly represented among the talk-show calls and
newspaper letter writers, believed their diligent, deserving
children were suffering because children who were only fit for
‘dead-end jobs’ now remained at school to disrupt classes and
drag down standards. (Watson, 2002:224-225)
Similarly, the advent of ‘Medibank’ while initially offering security for General
Practitioners through the ethos of a national health scheme then reduced their faith in
“socialised medicine” by increasing an emphasis on the means testing of patients. This
was then combined with providing insufficient funds to provide the necessary support
for the maintenance of such a health care philosophy. As Marx argued, “the bourgeoisie
has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked upon with
reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of
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science, into its paid wage-labourers” (Marx & Engels, 1848: “The Communist
Manifesto”).
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CHAPTER THREE:
COMPETING ‘WELFARISM’

The notion of wide-scale welfare abuse has attained hegemonic status. Despite
consistently high levels of unemployment during the last thirty years, the suggestion
that ‘individuals’ are primarily responsible for their joblessness remains. Sustained by
an unquantifiable assertion that the unemployed are simply not trying “hard enough”, it
largely ignores the cultural developments such as welfare poverty traps that results in
the unemployed ‘choosing’ government benefits over low-paying work. Ignoring
working class issues in time of great structural change has become a tradition in all
Western countries, focusing on minority issues that enhance a democratic ideal “on the
cheap”. The concept of “mutual obligation” for the poor removes any doubt if indeed
any existed, that an individual’s worth is aligned to their respective positions in the
labour market. As Harvey argues, this is related to the re-alignment of capitalist values
during the 1980s.
And then there is the whole question of how an “industrial
reserve army” of labour has been produced, sustained and
manipulated in the interests of capital accumulation these last
decades, including the public admission by Alan Budd, an
erstwhile advisor to Margaret Thatcher, that the fight against
inflation in the early 1980s was a cover for raising
unemployment and reducing the strength of the working class.
“What was engineered”, he said, “in Marxist terms – was a crisis
in capitalism which re-created a reserve army of labour, and has
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allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since.”(Harvey,
2003:262-263)
The traditional tension between liberalism and individual freedoms and the policing
powers of the state, results in the “social fascist” strain being barely concealed behind
liberal/egalitarian nationalist discourse. Post-welfare state social democracy has become
complicit in this new virulent and strident form of nationalism, which imitates fascism
through the sublimation of dissent for the “national good”. At a time when “global
forces” limit a nation’s ability to act with autonomy, welfare also becomes a key
ideological weapon for governments. Rhetoric that asserted that ‘Aboriginality’ was
more deserving in a nationalist and welfarist ontology eventually produced the rationale
for the conservative backlash, which undermined the idea of universal welfare access. A
problematic middle class reformist ethic, later satirised as emanating from a “liberal
elite”, enhanced the creation of a socially conservative government and created a twotiered democracy. As Wiseman suggests, “the most lasting legacies of Labor’s period in
government will be a deregulated and globalised economy fully engaged in a race to the
bottom with the low wage, low taxing economies of South East Asia” (Wiseman,
1996:101).
Perhaps the most difficult and intractable problem of capitalism, unemployment
exists as both an example of capitalist ‘efficiency’ and its ruthlessness. This chapter
extends the themes of chapter two where it was argued that post-welfare state social
democracy has increased the levels of alienation for the working class. Reference to a
“post-industrial society” obscures the type of work conditions that still exist for workers
in new industries such as fast food, call centres and hospitality that are organised on the
same principle of the nineteenth century factory. As Marx noted,
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Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the
patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial
capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are
organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army, they
are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers
and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class,
and of the bourgeois state; they are daily and hourly enslaved by
the machine by the overlooker and above all, in the individual
bourgeois manufacturer himself: The more openly this
despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty,
the more hateful and the more embittering it is. (Marx & Engels,
1848: “Bourgeois and Proletarians”)

Unemployment and notions of ‘bludging’

The late twentieth century had been marked by the notion of “the end of ideology”,1
coinciding with the decline of twentieth century communism. Post welfare state social
democracy has implied that ill-defined concepts of compassion and inclusiveness,
separate from the politics of work, will compensate sufficiently for a society that needs
specific answers to structural problems. Its parameters are unclear, and as a result the
outcome is often glib, pretending to offer opportunity and equality to those who are
ostensibly blocked from middle class aspirations. Previously, the key to an expanding
middle class was the product of government invention in the economy through tariff

1

1992. F. Fukuyana. The end of history, and the last man.
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protection for major industries, and an alliance to the economic logic of Keynesianism.
As Pusey asserts,
Until the early 1960s, about 60 per cent of Australian secondary
industry was protected by tariffs. During those postwar years to
1965, Australian gross domestic profit increased by nearly 5 per
cent per annum, faster than in the United States or Britain, and
with lower levels of unemployment and poverty. Incomes were,
disputably, more equally shared than in any other ‘developed’
nation in the world. Real average weekly earnings for employed
males grew by 52 per cent from 1945 to 1965. (Pusey, 2003:22)
Economic reform has now created a permanent underclass, where they are alienated
from all mainstream functions, such as work and housing, the principal themes of
survival in the urban society. The tension between good intentions and economic reality
is played out from;
The fierce pressure to attract footloose capital, expand exports
and compete on more open world markets generates a process
variously described as ‘downwards harmonisation’ a ‘race to the
bottom,’

‘competitive

austerity’

or

the

‘low

road

to

restructuring’ in which there is constant downwards pressure on
wages,

working

conditions,

social

programmes

and

environmental protection. (Wiseman, 1996:94-95)
Subsequently the welfare state can be seen as a patchwork response to capitalist
inefficiency and inequity, with its post-welfare state form defining the politics of a neoliberal work culture. The policing of the welfare state, particularly of those on
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unemployment benefits is contrasted with the glorification of gratuitous wealth that is
appropriated by a relative minority2. The disdain of the “well-off” is matched by those
on low wages who can easily be persuaded about the connection between the high rates
of tax and a ‘bludging’ minority who abuse an overly ‘generous’ welfare system. While
welfare access is based on egalitarianism, governments have concentrated on
stigmitisation in an attempt to limit the number of applicants. Alternatively, this
ostensibly ‘generous’ system of welfare also forces those retrenched before retirement
age to live off accrued superannuation (that is otherwise inaccessible) in preference to
collecting government benefits3. As Beder points out, “today Australia has one of the
‘most tightly targeted welfare systems in the OECD – and one of the stingiest’,
spending a significantly lower proportion of GDP on welfare than the average OECD
country” (Beder, 2000:159-160).
A distinctive theme that has emerged from the existence of a more flexible and
vulnerable labour market is how quickly a responsible taxpayer can be transformed into
a potential welfare abuser, and that success or failure in securing employment is defined
by the eternal question of is the individual trying “hard enough”. Compared to the
legislative protection existing for other marginalised and stigmitised groups in the
community, systemic and verbal abuse of an unemployed person is seen as a ‘natural’
feature of their status.
‘Bludging’ is then often seen apocryphally as a manifestation of the Australian beach
culture, where an unemployed person prefers to spend their time rather than looking for,
2

This form of private property is in contrast with classical liberals such John Locke who had also placed
private property central to his interpretation of liberalism. “Locke believed people should be allowed to
accumulate only as much as they could use. He did not support amassing huge fortunes in the hands of
some people while others lived in poverty” (Baradat, 2003: 75).
3
Cash amounts of between two and a half to five thousand dollars, can be counted as “liquid assets”
affecting payment of benefits. www.centrelink.gov.au
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or engaged in work4. Work-shy tales also emanate from the Australian traditional ethos
of working to live, rather than living to work, yet ironically, Australians now have to
work harder to maintain the lucky country legacy. Residual welfare states will use
elements of a nation’s mythology to stigmitise the individual, (in the projected hope that
the treatment will push the abuser into action – or perhaps more saliently that “dolebashing” has become a new national sport). An unpublished 1974 study into the workseeking activities of the unemployed suggested very few are work-shy, (as did similar
studies in the US and UK), however the media preferred to emphasise the “beach bum”
having fun at the taxpayers expense. As a result of a negative media campaign
suggesting abuse of welfare in 1975, a poll found that the question of “did unemployed
people want to work” that had provoked a response of thirty per cent in 1974, had risen
to forty-eight per cent in 1975 (Beder, 2000;159).
That ‘bludging’ is linked with physical rather than mental labour, ignores the fact
that the eradication of alienating work through continued mechanisation and
computerisation, practically invites the unemployed person to “take it easy”. Moreover,
in this context, it becomes clearer why Marx considered the working class as the agents
of revolutionary change in the industrial society – humankind was either going to be
advantaged by technological benefits that eradicated alienating work, or they were
simply dispensed with unceremoniously as the advancements occurred in the usual
haphazard fashion.
However at its peak, labour intensive work was an “alienation trade-off” for the
working class; as unchallenging repetitive work was rewarded with generous staffing

4

The so called “Byron Bay” policy limits the movement of unemployed people into areas of high
unemployment. Such relocations of unemployed people can result in financial penalties, such as forgoing
benefit receipt for up to six months. www.centrelink.gov.au
108

levels and job security. This feature also applied to lower level public servants whose
work was principally manual in orientation. The association that this work was
conducted at relaxed levels of exertion has underpinned the rationale of efficiency
cutbacks in staffing levels. While ‘bludging’ is a relatively new term that originated in
the response to long-term structural unemployment, the notion of disciplining workers
has always had currency in the industrial capitalist society.
A man does not “by nature” wish to earn more and more money,
but simply live as he is accustomed to live and to earn as much
is necessary for that purpose. Wherever modern capitalism has
begun its work of increasing the productivity of human labour
by increasing its intensity, it has encountered the immensely
stubborn resistance of this leading trait of pre-capitalistic labour.
And today it encounters it the more, the more backward (from a
capitalistic point of view) the labouring forces are with which it
has to deal. (Weber, 1930:60)
Hence governments have been successful in using the desire to work to force the
workers to internalise their ‘inadequacies’ that ultimately portrays government’s
function as ‘lackeys’ for business, rather than deal with the actual causes of
unemployment. Within a paradigm that a traditional welfare state equals abuse of
taxpayer largesse, a “carrot and stick” approach is used by the government to force or
push people into what the government implies, is innumerable work opportunities. This
is further revealed in Minister Abbott’s speech, when he states,
another way to make work pay is to make non-work pay. If the
alternative to working for a wage is working for the dole, there’s
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much more incentive to take work, particularly the entry-level
and temporary jobs that employers often find hard to fill even
when unemployment is high” (Abbott, 2001:4-5).
Lost in the rhetoric of welfare abuse and ‘grateful’ welfare recipients is the fact that
pernicious treatment of those out of work has a significant impact on those ‘in work’.
The competition to avoid the dreaded “dole queue” is used by employers and
governments to maximise employee output, minimise wages. In some instances,
employees, in their enthusiasm to work efficiently, “work their way out of a job”. This
relates to capitalism’s tendency to ‘cannibalise’ those who contribute to its success, by
using fewer workers to do more work. As Marx asserts,
The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces,
the more his production increases in power and size. The worker
becomes an ever cheaper commodity, the more commodities he
creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct
proportion to the increasing value of things. Labour produces
not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a
commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces
commodities in general. (Marx, 1844: “Estranged Labour”)
Moreover, the ability for people to make money simply through investments
theoretically creates the situation where investors never actually have to work. When
this is combined with the beneficiaries of corporate fraud, leaves a significant gulf in the
operation of a work ethic based on ascetic and disciplined codes. As in Marx’s thesis of
alienation where the labourer experiences a “death” in the practice and experience of his
work, the unemployed become “cannon fodder”, in the ‘war’ against national
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subversiveness and indiscipline. They become a metaphoric step away from being
expendable within the national discourse and occasionally as a literal reserve army in an
un-winnable

military

conflict.

Short

of

this

becoming

public

policy,

the

individualisation of structural unemployment produces a form of public shaming.
Already identified by a menagerie of concession cards, the only feature preventing a
more permanent form of public identification and shaming, (such as the wearing of the
cards in public), is the egalitarian mythology which underpins the otherwise pernicious
unemployment policies5. As Marx suggests, the marginalisation and stigmitisation of
unemployed ‘individuals’ is an inherent feature of the relationship between labour and
capital.
Capital can multiply itself only by exchanging itself for labourpower, by calling wage-labour into life. The labour-power of the
wage-labourer can exchange itself for capital only by increasing
capital, by strengthening that very power whose slave it is.
Increase of capital, therefore, is increase of the proletariat,
i.e., of the working class. (Marx, 1944:27) (emphasis in
original)
As there are high rates of welfare dependence but with no clear alternatives, welfare
becomes a central feature in the politicisation and proletarianisation of the middle class,
and the attempt to eradicate class-consciousness amongst the working class. Both
classes are now amenable to the “abuse of taxpayer” rhetoric that selective welfarism
creates. This battle amongst the ‘lowers’, in social Darwinistic terms, is used

5

As Beder points out, the ritualistic shaming of the unemployed goes back to at least to the seventeenth
century when the poor wore badges on their sleeves. “Those receiving poor relief in the American
colonies were also required to wear badges sewn into their clothing” (Beder, 2000:161).
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symbolically and metaphorically for those remaining in employment, and in the name of
‘survival’. All are expected to be as ruthless and efficient as the capitalist.
The comfortable majority has been developing an increasingly
antagonistic

attitude

towards

the

marginalised

persons,

perceiving them to be ‘dole bludgers’, or irresponsible and
morally suspect. That attitude is deliberately cultivated by the
government and by many public figures. The ‘underclass’ – a
socially

and

economically

marginalised

population

in

sociological terms – becomes a ‘moral underclass’ – a
population with perceived inferior personality characteristics
(probably with deficient genes), with biological determinism
expressed in many forms. (Jamrozik, 2001:146)
However despite massive social dislocation brought about by de-industrialisation and
globalisation, and hysteria regarding welfare abuse, the balance of recipients versus
expenditure reveals that despite the growth of overall recipients, its impact on GDP,
(gross domestic product), has remained relatively stagnant. While in 1966 recipients as
a percentage of the population were 8.7%, and rising to 32.4% by 1995, expenditure had
risen from 4.3% in 1966 to 9.6% in 1995 (Latham, 1998:201). Abstract categories such
as unemployment statistics then become the determinant, and without recognition of the
incongruity that unemployment is both de-personalised, but a problem of the
“individual”. Previously,
The transformation of the conceptually liberal state into a
welfare state, or – in broader terms – the transition from liberal
to organised modernity, involved the ‘substitution of the
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homogeneous language of statistics and social research for the
contradictory language of rights’. Or, as Winston Churchill put
it in 1911 on the occasion of the passing of the British National
Insurance Act, it meant ‘bringing in the magic of average to the
aid of the millions’ (Wagner, 1994:106).
The movement away from the all-inclusive welfare state, to one that is “meanstested”, results in the welfare state becoming increasingly problematic. For means
testing immediately implies the practice of abuse as the rhetoric of the “safety net” is
applied to a range of issues. While all Western democracies have experienced a
rescinding of the welfare state, residual systems in the United States, Great Britain and
Australia remain the most vulnerable, as the “safety net” becomes increasingly tested
against capitalist normalisations. A toughening of welfare criteria can be seen as an
outcome of economic reform that articulates profound difference between “winners and
losers”. For Pusey, despite the fact that “Middle Australia” clearly see who are the
winners and losers of economic reform, judgements about the fairness of the
restructuring has produced a hardening of attitudes even during times of economic
boom (Pusey, 2003:45).
Post-welfare state social democratic rhetoric and practice therefore plays a central
role in producing welfare outcomes that assert notions of the deserving and undeserving
poor. In neo-liberal terms it also suggests that traditional welfare provision does not
cater for ‘individual’ needs. Wagner suggests that such perceptions are an inherent
feature of the standardised welfare state bureaucracy.
Interventionist policy-making had relied far too strongly on the
idea of the possible cognitive mastery of society. The definition
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and analysis of societal issues that could be turned into policy
problems seemed relatively unproblematic at the height of social
science optimism. For policy-makers and administrators it was
often an incomprehensible and painful experience to see that the
instruments they offered had been derived from a problem
definition which their clients and supposed beneficiaries did not
all share (Wagner, 1994:133)
The argument that welfare packages do not cater for individual needs, allows the
practices of capitalism to remain as unencumbered as possible, as “individual needs”,
are overwhelmingly defined by the culture of business. Significantly, it cast no
aspersions on capitalism itself, and its traditional failure to generate economic and
social equity. Alternatively, Aboriginality as the most deserving welfare category,
evoking the inclusive policy of the original welfare state, does little to shift Aborigines
away from being permanent welfare subjects, as well as creating divisions between the
Anglo working and middle class. The politicisation of the welfare state thereby plays a
significant role in restricting working class recognition of the source of their oppression
and subsequent reliance on welfare. As Jakubowski states in relation to the core identity
of the bourgeois state,
The lack of a developed proletarian class consciousness is thus
vital to the existence of the capitalist state. If the state apparatus
is to maintain the class rule of the bourgeoisie in a period when
the objective economic conditions for its defeat are already a
reality, then to have a monopoly on the ownership of weapons is
not enough. The maintenance of bourgeois rule requires also
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that the proletariat and the other oppressed layers have no clear
socialist consciousness. (Jakubowski, 1990: 52)
The broadening of the welfare state by Gough Whitlam, was followed almost
immediately by a winding back of reforms by subsequent governments, both
conservative and reformist. Malcolm Fraser in particular, attempted to shift the focus
back onto the work ethic with his famous epithet “that life wasn’t meant to be easy”. In
the frontier context, this perspective also resonates with the assertion that “hard work
never killed anyone”. The re-alignment of capitalism during the 1970s asserted the need
for the re-definition of the high unemployment capitalism as being partially related to
the phenomenon of the unemployed as individuals that had become welfare dependent.
Therefore the notion of a job, any job, is preferable to a residual welfare state that
stigmitises those brave or desperate enough to register for support. A simple connection
can then be made those recipients who were more likely to be ‘bludgers’, or “job
snobs”. For Castles then, the reality lay in the fact that there were actually “too few
jobs”.
For the Fraser Government, it was no longer the case that the
level of employment ‘was the chief test of whether economic
policies are successful’, or, if it was, the test seemed to imply
policies exactly the reverse of those which the Liberals had
thought appropriate less than a decade earlier. The deficit and
public expenditure levels were targeted as chief public enemies,
and it has been argued that, in the Fraser years, Australia
experienced a welfare backlash, despite not yet having achieved

115

anything like the status of a fully matured welfare state.
(Castles, 1988:27)
More recently the Federal Minister for the Department of Employment, Workplace
Relations and Small Business, Tony Abbott, argued
since the beginning of the welfare state, successive governments
here and abroad have made the discovery that guaranteeing the
wherewithal for life can easily remove the motivation for work.
After one hundred years, western countries are still coming to
terms with the complex impact of the welfare state on the work
ethic and wrestling with new ways of supporting people which
don’t discourage self-help. (Abbott, 2001:1)
Deliberate welfare income choice or ‘abuse’ can occur when poverty traps inherent
in welfare are preferable to choosing low paid employment. Transport, health care
concessions or public housing subsidies are factored in when considering the effects of
employment that takes individuals off benefit. Particularly for those with children, it
becomes increasingly difficult to find an unskilled or entry-level position that will
justify, in the short or long term, leaving a benefit payment and associated concessions.
Given that rising unemployment rates coincided with the Whitlam’s government’s brief
attempt to de-stigmitise welfare provision, welfare as a lifestyle choice for some would
be undeniable. If it is accepted that the unemployed are the most alienated in the
community, with too much “time on their hands” the feared reality of the social security
ingrate can become a legitimate social reality.
Since production is the expression of the social life of men, and
since the product is therefore the objectification of this social
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existence, the alienation of labour has the effect of an alienation
of man from man. Social life becomes merely a means for man’s
self-preservation. (Jakubowski, 1990:86)
Unemployment that results partially from the problems created by global “level
playing fields,” sees those countries with the lowest minimum wage levels dominating
labour intensive employment. The undermining of the welfare state at a time when it is
greatly needed is evocative of a ‘need’ to discipline and punish the unemployed of the
Western countries, despite structural unemployment. Consequently the white
civilisation has to prove itself superior to the feared ‘Asianisation’ of the Asian Pacific,
because of their significantly lower minimum wage levels. This is then matched by the
increased policing powers of the welfare state as welfare recipients are further
monitored, stigmitised and conditioned. Abbott argues that the
resentment of people whose benefits rarely seem enough,
coupled with the resentment of middle-income taxpayers at
those “working the system”, threatens to undermine the social
consensus on which the welfare state rests.( Abbott, 2001:1-2)
What Abbott fails to acknowledge is that the Government is actively stoking the
resentment of these “middle-income taxpayers”, through the tax system and the media.
Dominated by the virtues and power of American capitalism, the trimming of the
welfare state varies only marginally according to local political traditions, as
globalisation creates an equalisation in all economic and political markets. The change
from the Department of Social Security to Centrelink, to an Agency of the
Commonwealth, further suggests that the government is attempting to diminish its
‘central’ welfare responsibility. The term ‘centrelink’ appears to imply that it is viewed
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as only a link in welfare services, albeit a ‘centre’ link – currently at least. Where the
majority of welfare resources may eventually reside, is discussed below.

Mutual Obligation

A foundation philosophy of the Keating government’s Working Nation white paper,
“Mutual Obligation”, attacks the perception that older forms of welfare provision such
as the ‘dole’ and the supporting parent’s pension placed no imposition on the recipient
to reflect their gratitude for welfare support. Concepts such as “working for the dole”
reflect this new approach to welfare and “mutual obligation” that is active recognition
and gratitude for accepting state, and hence taxpayer support. Part of its theoretical basis
consists on ‘helping’ those who have been “lost in the system” with their decreasing
skills base and work ethic the longer they are unemployed. However Mutual Obligation
is a forced concept of community, and a manifestation of “third way” perspectives,
revealing the emphasis in post-welfare state social democracy on placing higher
expectations and demands on those most vulnerable. From this position, the
‘conservatives’ can then simply intensify the ‘obligation’. As Pusey illustrates,
It is a policy with broad appeal: it also gathers up the differently
grounded sentiments of the ‘North Shore’ people, and the highachiever elements of the upper ‘middle class’ who actively back
the reformers or, like their American equivalents, have not much
idea of and little interest in how the other half lives. (Pusey,
2003:73)
The payment of unemployment relief, originally called “the dole” during the 1930s
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Depression, consisted mostly of food rations. Cash payments in countries such as
Britain and Australia have traditionally been at subsistence levels, indicating that
punishment has always been a feature of the distrust that exists between government,
employers and workers. Subsistence payments are underpinned by a consumer culture
that perpetually promotes the notion of ‘worthy’ individuals who can afford the latest
consumer goods, versus the unworthy, punished and teased by what they cannot afford.
The process of de-industrialisation beginning in the late 1960s saw a gradual
increase in the policing of the unemployed. In the late 1970s, as the unemployment rates
stabilised around ten per cent, the then Department of Social Security attempted to track
the activities of the unemployed through activity statements that were lodged in person
every fortnight before money was deposited in a bank account. This is still the primary
way that unemployment relief is allocated, although further activities such as “dole
diaries”, increased the level of job seeking activity before the benefit was forwarded.
The economic conditions of the post-war boom concealed the true nature of Australian
capitalism and its residual welfare system, suggests Castles.
In 1970, at a time when average weekly earnings for an adult
male were eighty dollars a week, an unemployed man with a
wife and two children received a mere twenty three dollars a
week. Before the very substantial increase in benefit rate
initiated by the McMahon Government in 1972, and subsequent
increases by the Whitlam Government between 1973 and 1975,
residual ‘state charity’ for the unemployed, and destitution and
misery for their families for their families if they remained so
for any length of time, was still very much the order of the day
119

in Australia’s affluent society. What saved the situation in the
1960s was, of course, an average duration of unemployment
well below ten weeks; by the end of the 1970s, it was nearly
thirty weeks; and by 1985 nearly fifty weeks. (Castles,
1988:157)
In principal, the policy of Mutual Obligation also attempts to include those at the
highest level of the socio-economic scale. The example of media magnate Kerry Packer
losing thirty million dollars gambling in a single weekend, wrought the ire of “third
way” proponent Mark Latham. For Latham, the “third way” is based on a holistic
community approach, and not just in the punishment of those most vulnerable in the
welfare system6. However his ‘equitable’ approach includes policies such an
unemployed person paying back to the state income earned through unemployment
benefits, once they find work.
While governments need to advance income support whenever
its citizens are victim to economic un-certainty, they should also
consider the equity features of a repayment scheme (similar to
the principles underpinning HECS, the Higher Education
Contribution Scheme) for recipients who subsequently benefit
from economic change. This should be regarded as a key aspect
of the development of reciprocal responsibilities in the welfare
system. Those who benefit most from the discharge of public
responsibilities have a moral obligation to replenish the common
pool

of

public

resources

from
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which

their

improved

circumstances, at least in part, originated. This concept also aids
the intergenerational equity of the public commons by ensuring
a reasonable balance of revenue contributions across all
generations. (Latham, 1998:227-228)
The reality in dealing with wealthy individuals such as Packer compared to welfare
recipients is that they can be moulded, manipulated and forced into mutual
responsibility. Control of wealthy individuals in contrast is almost entirely contingent
on their will to co-operate. Already taxation minimisers, the government or state
remains beholden to the magnate and in relation to welfare policy, the wealthy
individual would have negligible interest or exposure. Any attempt to legislate against
their economic power could result in the withdrawal of investment in the Australian
economy, and the abandonment of the country if they suspect that the government is
attempting to undermine their autonomy.
A justification used by the wealthy, particularly in countries such as the United
States, is that the practice of philanthropy alleviates their community responsibility to
those who cannot help themselves. Particularly in the American context, philanthropy is
closely linked with the Christian charity ethos suggesting that Christianity engages with
the capitalist status quo in a non-threatening and compliant fashion,7 if not overtly

6

“Latham suggested that this sort of gambling puts notions of public morality and justice under threat”
(www.abc.net.au/lateline/s 170683.htm “Friday forum”, broadcast 1/9/2000.
7
The concept of philanthropy would also seem to originate from the conflicting sentiments of economist
Adam Smith. While he asserts that,
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self love, and never talk to them
of our own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith, 1954:13).
With allusions to a charity ethos, he also states that, “To feel much for others and little for
ourselves….to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of
human nature” (Smith, 2000:27). It can be assumed therefore that those who cannot achieve ‘self love’
require love from the community as a substitute. Eighteenth century French theorist Rousseau with his
notion of surrendering to the ‘general will’ of the community also evokes the practice of a mutual
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supportive of it. Moreover, charity functions instigated by the wealthy can result in just
another opportunity for mingling with their own social class, and for society matrons to
have an occupation in lieu of a career.8 Implicit in philanthropy is that it edifies the
person and the ‘individuality’ in dispensing the largesse. This promotes the concept that
assistance should only be given when the ‘individual’ considers that there is a crisis
worthy of their involvement. In this context, the waste involved in government
bureaucracy is highlighted, and the claim that government welfare programs are not
targeted at needy individuals but welfare abusers. Consequently another phenomenon of
philanthropy or charity is the ability to portray those that are extremely poor in a nonWestern context, against various definitions of poverty in the Western nations that have
‘generous’ welfare states. Famous charitable figure, Princess Diana, exhibited this new
type of caring in a conservative political culture. The creation of the Diana myth,
contributed to the perception that the monarchy or at least manifestations of it, are
involved in the politics of neo-liberalism9.
To an extent, the increased uncertainties of economic conditions
in New Right Britain worked to preserve the cultural role of the
Royals. Diana appeared on the stage as a sign of continuation:
she became a mother, worked for charities, later nominated
herself as ‘Queen of Hearts’- symbolising the traditional clutch
values associated with caring femininity. Her connections with
obligation to be practiced by those who offend the sensibilities of the majority. According to its logic, “if
those in the minority refuse to follow the general will, they are violating their own will and thus are
refusing to be free” Baradat, 2003:82).
8

A typical corporate response to philanthropy is the promotion of charities and causes that are in contrast
with negative public perceptions of the corporation. “Ronald McDonald House”, provides
accommodation to the parents of sick children who are in nearby hospitals.
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the established Royal Family reinvigorated not just their profile
as ‘modern and progressive – but also their affectivity as bearers
of English History, as living embodiments of a self-perpetuating
social contract. At a time of social stress, through increased
individuation and an unsure industrial landscape – shipyard and
mine closures, decimation of the North, the new homeless on the
streets of London – the emotional appeal of this continuing royal
theatre is obvious, particularly as manifested in a female,
demonstrably capable of modifying the entrenched aloofness of
the House of Windsor. The spectral Diana was a repeated
feature – we might say ‘a certainty’ – not delimited, but a
delimiting for a culture coming to terms with the new uncertain
torsions of a diminished public infrastructure, and a conservative
government moving at times towards authoritarian restructure.
(Alberts, 1997:100)
Dalrymple also bases his attack on the overly generous welfare state against his
experience and observation of what he considers the “real poverty” of Africa and parts
of Asia. According to this paradigm, the disciplined workers and families of the West
and post-war period have undergone a remarkable metamorphosis due to the crippling
effect of the welfare state – rather than the social conditions that produced such a
reliance, (whose position as an ‘objective’ observer appears remarkably similar to
Minister’s Abbott’s assertion that the welfare state is the singular cause for the sharp
rise in unemployment levels during the 1970s).
9

Voluntary work is encouraged as an activity to fulfill mutual obligation objectives.
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Yet nothing I saw – neither the poverty nor the overt oppression
– ever had the same devastating effect on the human personality
as the undiscriminating welfare state. I never saw the loss of
dignity, the self-centeredness, the spiritual and emotional
vacuity, or the sheer ignorance of how to live that I see daily in
England. In a kind of pincer movement, therefore, I and the
doctors from India and the Philippines have come to the same
terrible conclusion: that the worst poverty is in England – and it
is not material poverty but poverty of the soul. (Dalrymple,
2001:143)

The Job Network and working for the ‘dole’

The Howard government’s attempt to reinvigorate the welfare sector saw the closure of
the Commonwealth Employment Service, (CES) and replaced by a free market
orientated Job Network, which involved several private job service providers. More
controversial was the involvement of Church based groups such as Mission Australia 10,
Salvation Army and the Wesley Mission, in the Job Network. This brooked the
traditional separation of church from state, and particularly controversial was its
function of disciplining job seekers, as this involved informing Centrelink if welfare
beneficiaries breached Mutual Obligation guidelines. Work For The Dole schemes play
an integral feature in the concept of Mutual Obligation and the private sphere
www.centrelink.gov.au
Mission Australia is a non-denominational Christian organisation. The McClure report was produced
by Mission Australia on behalf of the Federal government. The proposals included the controversial
option of financial penalties for breaches of welfare ‘responsibilities’ by the recipient.
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10

involvement in the Job Network – no longer is the government to be seen as perpetually
involved in “doling out” welfare to ‘unworthy’ recipients. In what resembles a form of
indentured labour, and evocative of Arbeit Macht Frei (work makes you free) signage
that adorned Nazi concentration camps, the lack of a training component is further
indicative of its punishing and corrective rationale. As the experience of Australian and
American Work For The Dole participants reflect, work involved “sanding the rust off
memorial cannons at the Wollongong Lighthouse” or street-sweeping, that revealed for
the participant that it was “not a training programme at all. It’s a kind of slave labour”
(Beder, 2000:182).
Working for unemployment benefits in the Australian context appears to have
originated from the Regional Employment Development, (RED) schemes of the
Whitlam era that gave unemployed people a wage in work-creation community projects.
Despite unemployment levels not seen since the Great Depression during the early
1990s, the Keating Labor government stubbornly refused to return to the program.
“RED schemes became a symbol of all that was wrong with the Whitlam government
and the embodiment of Keynesian follies. It was a hallmark of Hawke-Keating Labor
that there were ‘no RED schemes’” (Watson, 2002:135).
This was exacerbated by the perception that the Labor Party and in particular Prime
Minister Keating became inured to the human cost of the recession and unemployment,
(the recession we had to have). Despite increasingly tenuous relationships with the
“labour movement”, the Labor Party of the 1990s would still not have been able to
instigate policy as controversial as working for unemployment benefits. The Coalition
in government simply followed the logical conclusion to Mutual Obligation by
including working for the ‘dole’. Watson’s sentiments regarding unemployed “pot
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smokers” reflects the traditional conservative view about lazy jobless people, as Watson
flippantly alleges that the ‘RED’ scheme, “through bringing young people into contact
with each other and putting money into their pockets, gave an unprecedented stimulus to
cannabis consumption” (Watson, 2002:135).
Therefore while the Labor Party has been highly critical of the Job Network in
Opposition, they have not denied that it would continue if elected, a similar scheme,
based on using the philanthropy of church and charity groups.
Labor acknowledges that there are strengths in a framework that
allows local individuals and groups and businesses to get
involved in job matching and intensive assistance provision for
their communities. Local contacts and community ownership of
decisions and solutions does matter. Together you are stewards
of local infrastructure; of social capital. And I think it’s true that
there is indisputably a history of a strong caring ethos in many
elements of the community and church sector. Some of the
private providers are going to be similarly orientated. (Kernot,
2000:3)
While the tendering of contracts for the job network are conditional and regularly
open for tender, the involvement of Protestant based groups such as the ‘Salvos’
Mission Australia and Wesley Mission, results in a high collective representation in the
Job Network. It also suggests the first phase of the state alleviating its responsibility to
the poor as once again welfare is in the control of charitable and philanthropic based
groups. This again may involve the shift away from cash payment to emergency
provisions such as food relief, and may be precipitated by the popular perception that
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payments are too generous, and substance abuse problems are pivotal in restricting the
individual in finding work. In one sense this already occurring when recipients who are
‘breached’ (amounts deducted from Centrelink payments), are forced to rely on the
charity arm of Job Network provider). Wiseman predicted the pattern created by
Hawke/Keating Labor governments when he stated,
While the ALP has been good at winning elections the price of
competitiveness has been heightened inequality and a radical
program of deregulation and privatisation, which prepares the
ground for more savage forms of economic restructuring when a
more openly right-wing Liberal/National Party government is
elected. (Wiseman, 1996:101)
The forerunner to the welfare state, The Poor Laws, indicated that the Church was
defining morality, and although the state was increasingly involved in legislative
functions regarding poverty. The most persuasive socially conservative argument for the
role of churches, welfare and the State, is Protestantism’s role in defining the individual
as an adjunct to capitalism, suggests that it should also be involved in its
‘diminishment’. As Bryson asserts,
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 was significant for the
manner in which it enshrined the concept of ‘less eligibility’. In
doing this it established not merely an administrative principal
but also a moral code. The intention was to ensure that a person
in receipt of welfare would experience a lower standard of living
than an employed person. The 1834 Poor Law Report (Vol.
Xvii) expressed it thus: ‘The first and most essential of all
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conditions…..is that his (the pauper’s) situation on the whole
shall not be made really or apparently so eligible as the situation
of the independent labourer of the lowest class. (Bryson,
1992:78).
The Salvation Army revels in its pragmatic and active involvement in the helping of
the poor. Founded by in William Booth in 1861 the ‘army’ bases its philosophy in
pragmatic asceticism, and turning around the lives of the homeless, alcoholic, and drug
dependant, through abstinence and the dignity of work. The non-alliance with the labour
movement has left them open to criticism by forcing people into unskilled and
underpaid work, onto this path of “self healing”. The Wesley Mission also focuses on
the problematic individual, and the need for personal re-orientation before re-joining the
labour market. This is exemplified by programs such as the Community Support
Program, managed by Wesley Mission and funded by the Department of Employment,
Workplace relations and Small Business, (DEWSB), it aims to identify and assist those
troubled by:
*Drug, alcohol and gambling addiction *Homelessness* Very long-term unemployment
*Mental illness *Time spent in custody *Domestic Violence *Victims of Trauma
*Behavioral problems *Motivational problems *Disabled *From non-English speaking
background.
Dr. Keith Suter11 says
Our Mission is to ‘help the community’, and is a direct response
to our commitment to the Gospel of Jesus Christ. This includes
the operation of the job network. Our rationale for all our caring
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work is the example shown to us through the life and teachings
of Jesus Christ. For the Mission, this includes caring for the
homeless and the jobless, the alcoholic and the drug addicted,
the deserted wife and the fatherless child. It is the example and
then the command of Christ that provides us with the framework
in which we run all our services.
Asked if Wesley’s involvement with the Job Network reflect a broad acceptance of
the government’s policies in relation to the unemployed? He answered with, “Yes”.
Do ‘job snobs’ exist? “This is not a phrase we use or understand” However, the term
has currency in media, and has been used repeatedly by Minister Abbott in describing
employment solutions. For Abbott, this relates to the phenomenon where
there was even a period under the Whitlam Government when it
was officially decreed that people on unemployment benefits
were not expected to take jobs beneath the status of their former
employment. Although the Fraser Government quickly reversed
this edict, the era of unconditional entitlement had begun, if not
in theory at least in general practice, and unemployment steadily
rose from under two per cent in the 1960’s to about five per cent
a decade later (Abbott, 2001:2).
“Job snobbery” or ‘bludging’ requires to be put in the context of the development of
the ‘McJob,’ where pay rates are barely above welfare, and by implication, the work is
highly undesired. The ‘McJob’ has been a pivotal revolution in labour practices in the
last few decades, and is the colloquial and collective term for work in the McDonald’s
11

Dr Suter, director of Wesley employment programs, answered some questions in relation to Wesley’s
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fast food restaurants. Utilising the development of the youth wage, the phenomenon also
trades upon the exploitation of youthful enthusiasm, and the lack of after-school work
opportunities. A revolution beyond the scope of the “service industry”, it codifies the
approach required in the post-Keynesian economy to keep unemployment rates down –
and to justify the disciplining of those who reject the new code12.
Suter’s evasiveness on the question of “job snobs”, suggests that they leave the
necessary and abrasive ideological work to the government, while they can simply
appear as ‘caring’ and pragmatic. This projected state of apoliticality is a seemingly
pious view favoured by various other manifestations of philanthropy by clubs such as
Rotary, where the membership mostly consists of local business leaders. This could not
be achieved however, without the coercive and pernicious authority of the state, to force
welfare recipients into the purview and influence of job network providers like Wesley
Mission. The issue is responded to evasively by Dr Suter, and only obtuse references are
made to the government’s role in the ‘successful’ participation of their programs. This is
if to suggest that the “invisible hand of God”, is superstitiously and surreptitiously
involved in the programs.
The government had previously followed media initiative in welfare abuse
campaigns that made the government look more benign on the subject of welfare, and
philanthropists as ‘pragmatic’. This is further revealed in the response to the question:
Do you believe that a culture of welfare abuse or “dole bludging” exists on a broad
scale? “Welfare abuse does exist, but we are not in a position to judge whether it is on a
broad scale or not. However many previously long-term unemployed people are now

involvement in the job network via email. 9.7.01
In 2002 people between the ages of 25-40 that had been unemployed for twelve months or more were
included to participate in a Work for the Dole activity. www.centrelink.gov.au
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12

employed because of our work for the dole programs”. Suter adds that “while the title
(working for the dole), is somewhat unfortunate, (a US government agency would have
created a more inspiring title) he argues, “the essence of the scheme is very good”.
Characteristic of the blurring between Wesley’s ideological position and their
‘pragmaticism’, he states that further that,
The Work for the Dole13 scheme is very controversial. It has
attracted negative comments – even from agencies with which
this Mission enjoys a close friendship. Some agencies have
refused to participate in the scheme. This is counterproductive.
First, as the Mission has shown, the provision of training can
make this scheme very useful to our clients. Second, agencies
which

boycott

the

scheme,

exclude

themselves

from

involvement in discussions with the Australian government on
how it can be enhanced. Incidentally, the “work for the dole”
scheme is not all that new. Australia’s indigenous peoples have
had

a

similar

scheme

for

several

years

(Community

Development Employment Programme) and they have made a
success of it.

13

In an ironic position in relation to claims of protecting tax-payers’ funds, Minister Abbott was forced to
concede in Parliament that the cost of administrating the ‘Work for the Dole’ scheme in the last two years
amounted to ‘about’ 190 million dollars. (The Daily Telegraph, June 15, 2002).
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Public housing and neo-liberalism

The position of the New South Wales Department of Housing, reflects the pressures and
changes brought by economic rationalism, the reduction of the welfare state, and
increased demands brought by a diverse social democracy. The capitalist society based
on the ownership of private property, and particularly large items such as a personal
dwelling, (the home), becomes an expression of individuality and autonomy. This is
also reflected in style, shape, and location (postcode) of the house, with public housing
often recognisable by its bland uniformity of construction reminiscent of government
housing in former Communist countries. The conformity of style in Western
democracies constitutes a need to reflect an “anti-individualism”, represented in welfare
generally to diminish the recipient. Hence, public housing style must reflect part
punishment, part incentive to reclaim individuality through private home ownership.
Originally designed as low-income housing, the former Housing Commission, is
now known internally as reflecting a philosophy of “social housing”. This re-definition
of the deserving and undeserving poor is consistent with Commonwealth welfare state
reform, (state government housing also being partly dependant on grants from the
Commonwealth government), by asserting that efficiency is derived through assisting
those defined as most marginal. Therefore poverty as the central criterion remains along
with a litany of social problems that are associated with poverty that gives greater
legitimacy within the social housing ontology.
The building of large-scale public housing following 1945, mirrored the growth of
the British welfare state, and its development of a large public housing estates, called
‘council’ flats and houses. The greater acceptance of public housing in Britain following
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World War Two reflected the reality of a large population and limited land mass. In the
Australian experience, it has come to constitute a more American-style version of public
housing. It represents an association with outright poverty, stigmitisation and failure.
The “white trash” populations of estates such as Claymore, Miller and Cartwright, in
Sydney’s southwest, operate as a socio-economic group that are barely above those of
Aborigines in social status and employment opportunities, yet can appear privileged by
comparison within the liberal/capitalist social democratic or social justice regime.
Eligibility requirements have become more stringent, and if accepted on a housing list
or register, waiting times for assistance are usually several years in duration. The redefinition of public housing to service only the needs of those who fit the most marginal
social and economic paradigms makes it unattractive in terms of perceptions and actual
living standards. In combination with high crime rates, turned some of the largest
estates into urban ghettos. As Davis argues in relation to the walled communities of Los
Angeles,
The old liberal paradigm of social control, attempting to balance
repression with reform, has long been superseded by a rhetoric
of social warfare that calculates the interests of the urban poor
and the middle classes as a zero-sum game. In cities like Los
Angeles, on the bad edge of postmodernity, one observes an
unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and
the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort.
(Davis, 2003:308)
Those who wait patiently on extended housing lists or registers, or tolerate with
resignation the poor living standards, inculcate varying degrees of their ‘deserved’
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punishment. By creating an analogy between public housing and more overtly ritualised
forms of punishment, it can be argued, “Penal punishment is therefore a generalised
function, coextensive with the function of the social body and with each of its elements.
This gives rise to the problem of the degree of punishment, the economy of the power to
punish” (Foucault, 1977:90).
The complex relationship between changes in mental health policy, public housing
and welfare state decline is indicative of the determination to speciously assert that
while the state is deconstructing the welfare state, it is still compassionate. The
campaign in the 1990s of “question your attitude” to mental illness, was supplemented
by psychiatric hospital closures and a policy shift towards short -term hospital stays for
patients. In between these short-term hospital stays, they require permanent
accommodation, and as such, the co-operation from the Department of Housing. The
“question your attitude” campaign and the resultant economic cutbacks in permanent
psychiatric vacancies, was one of the most complex manifestations of welfare state
decline. By putting the question and issue back onto the community, mental health
dynamics become difficult to criticise on legal and moral grounds. This was
compounded, it is asserted by the latest inquiry into mental health services in New
South Wales, that;
The Richmond, Barclay and Burdekin reports, and the
accompanying policy and legislative changes, were prepared in
a decade of increasing recognition of civil liberties and at a time
when the powers to schedule (involuntary admit) patients to
psychiatric hospitals were being restricted. (Pezzutti, 2002:11)
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A tenant14 supplied information about life on a large housing estate in Newcastle,
which had a high rate of mentally ill people. His experience is not necessarily typical of
life on a housing estate, as the problems can be diverse, and disparately hidden or
spread in these large communities that resemble commune living. In his side of the
block which housed nine one bedroom units, four of the tenants, which included one
couple, were on disability pensions due to psychiatric problems ranging from manic
depression to paranoid schizophrenia. The informant, Paul, had also periodically resided
in psychiatric institutions following a motorcycle accident in 1970. Paul however, is
intensely private and keeps his problems to himself, whereas tenants upstairs fuelled by
various addictions and their psychiatric conditions regularly ‘party’ or argue during the
day and night. One tenant, whose one job lasted for only for two days, is also outside of
the concept of routinisation so valued in the operation of the capitalist society, and as
such, this ‘problem’ resides next to a designated psychiatric condition.
The shift from low-income housing to a quasi-medical institution has been
surreptitiously achieved, relating to a duel application process. One relates to a general
admission, to which an intending tenant must fit the limited economic criteria. At
present, income for a single tenant must not exceed three hundred and ninety eight
dollars a fortnight15. A second application process is where an intending tenant, as well
as meeting the economic criteria, fits a medically defined housing priority. Priority
applications consequently take precedence over those that are exclusively economically
based. By using the stringent economic criteria as the fundamental measurement for all
eligibility, they are largely able to conceal their involvement in the housing of people
with medical problems. Commensurate with the broader proletarianisation of the middle
14

Interviewed 10.9.01
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class is the merging of the Anglo/Celtic underclass with Aboriginality and those with
profound mental disturbances. This becomes indicative of all marginal groups,
including ones based on class that are all “thrown together,” as economic and social
class, unless linked with another type of social marginalisation becomes the least
significant factor.
While public housing tenants are housed in separate adjoining accommodation the
financial ‘squeeze’ on the welfare state in re-creates the general environment in houses
for the poor instituted by the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. Foucault’s Madness and
Civilization reflects upon the contradictory savage anti-humanism in Christianity, and
the “there I go but for the grace of God” pseudo-humility in the leper houses on the
fringes of European cities in the Middle Ages.
Within these enclosures lepers were isolated from the
inhabitants of the city and, at the same time kept close enough to
be observed. Their liminal position – at the edge but not beyond
– was paralleled by the acute ambivalence with which they were
regarded. Lepers were seen as dangerous and wicked; they had
been punished by God but by the same token they were
physical, bodily reminders of God’s power and of the Christian
duty of charity (Dreyfus, Rabinow, 1983:3).
The renaissance in morality and welfare has risen proportionally to structural shifts
in late capitalism from high employment, high growth economies to high
unemployment, growth economies. In this context, perhaps unsurprisingly, the
Department sees the decline of the welfare state as ‘natural’. “In the nineteen fifties,

15

www.housing.gov.au
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public housing was mainly a stepping-stone towards home ownership for low income
working families and a way of helping to get the post war economy going again”
(Woodward, 2001). It can hardly be disputed, unless on ideological grounds, that the
same degree of assistance would not be required today for individuals or couples in
using public housing as a ‘stepping-stone’ to home ownership. Particularly in Sydney,
where rental properties and accommodation prices are high, this problem is exacerbated
by a weak public housing sector. An effective public housing system could act as a
brake on private home prices, thereby providing an inbuilt inflation barrier against often
un-sustainable private home values.
During the nineteen sixties and seventies public housing was
used

as

a

way

to

support

industrial

expansion

and

decentralisation into cities and towns across the state. It was
during this time that most of the large estates were built.
Housing was still directed at low-income families with the
intention that work would be available locally in the new
industries. (Woodward, 2001)
There are oblique references in this paragraph to the ‘unforseen’ unemployment
problems in the Western economies, and how, large housing estates, built in a pragmatic
function to house masses of low-income working people, now resemble urban ghettos
where the myriad of social problems reside next to one another. In the Campbelltown
LGA, (Local Government Area) 41.7% of residents of public housing estates are
unemployed, compared to 10.7% of the remainder of the Campbelltown LGA (Latham,
1998:105). For Latham, the problems with these housing estates mostly built in the
decades following World War Two, reflect the ‘Fordism’ of the old industrial economy.
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The “broad-acre public housing estates were built on the edge of Australia’s major cities
to accommodate a blue collar workforce engaged in tariff protected manufacturing”
(Latham, 1998:209).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE FORMATION of SEXUALITY in INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

In the following two chapters heterosexuality is considered from an anthropological
perspective – an inherent feature of the structural and organisational aspects of the
industrial capitalist society. Its dominance in previous epochs increased its tendency to
coalesce during the Age of Enlightenment. Consequently, this gave the appearance that
it provided the theoretical underpinnings for capitalist social expansion. In this context,
the attempt to include marginal sexualities discussed in chapters six and seven,
(particularly when they are viewed separately from work and mode of production
issues) increase the opportunity for a cultural backlash to interventions based upon a
liberal/egalitarian ethos. Moreover, the gradual inclusion of various ‘marginals’ within
the scope of liberal capitalism are ultimately conservative in nature, and tend to
exacerbate the traditional problems of capitalism itself.
Consequently a dialectic is formed between Marx’s concept of alienation which has
been linked to the public sphere of work, to the failures and foibles of liberal left theory
that has favoured private spheres of identity over work based issues. Intractable levels
of unemployment that has resided alongside traditional conceptualisations of alienation
see the inevitability of public and private issues of alienation converging with
heterosexual concerns that directly impact on the majority of the population. For Marx,
‘identity’ in its generalised constitution, was not meant to have explicit separation from
work identities. An ‘individual’ can only operate within the economic framework that
connects their personal and social space, as Meszaros argues, “in Marx’s dialectical
conception the key concept is “human productive activity” which never means simply
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“economic production”” (Meszaros, 1970:115).
For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each
man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is
forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a
hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must
remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood;
while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive
sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any
branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and
thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear
cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind,
without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.
(Marx & Engels, 1845: “Private Property and Communism”)

Debauchery or Morality?: the choice between Classical or Christian sexual ethics

Christianity first denoted the shift away from the homoerotic cultures of antiquity. A
principal myth of Christianity is founded upon the assertion that the decline of the
Roman Empire was principally caused by a particular lack of sexual morality. As Webb
states, “this view conveniently ignores the fact that such debauchery was merely
symptomatic of the political and economic chaos that brought The Roman Empire to an
end” (Webb, 1975:71). The influence Christianity had in the latter stages of the Roman
Empire enabled this myth to consolidate its reign and pronounce a new morality, a
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forerunner to the sparse Middle or Dark Ages. It was this propagandistic beginning
which set the parameters for future cosmologies that were pivotal in the problem of sex.
The problem of homoerotic masculinity in Classical cultures and how this
epistemological shift was achieved formed the basis for Christian icons and belief.
Christianity was forefront in separating the spiritual from the profane, meaning that
bodily pleasures could only obstruct the relationship with God with anxiety about sex
fueling much of the Christian cosmology. The concept of the self, as mediated and
defined by Christianity, is a method for controlling the sinning self, and the use of the
body as the instrument of this sin. While in Genesis 1:28, God says, “Be fruitful and
multiply”, St Paul taught a new way of life based on a revelation of Jesus Christ in a
post-Armageddon world. (Galatians 1:12). Jesus said “for in the resurrection they
neither marry nor or given in marriage, but are like angels in heaven” (Matthew 22:30;
Mark 12:25; Luke 20: 35, 36). Paul even opposes sexual activities within marriage, (1
Corinthians 7:1, 5, 8-9, 29), and that “marriage and sex are only for those who cannot
control their libidinous impulses” (1 Corinthians 7:8, 9)1. Sex had perversely replaced
the stealing of the poisoned apple as the original sin.
The cult of the death and resurrection of Jesus, and the semiotic purity of Mother
Mary, formed the basis for Christian representations. The sacrifice of Jesus’ life in the
physical world promoted the ideal that the body was merely a vehicle for the spiritual
identity of mankind. His eventual return to his Heavenly Father was metaphysical proof
that his life and physical sacrifice on earth was an ethereal existence. This life and
sacrifice was to be temporary and marginal, compared to the spiritual life that existed
outside of, and despite of, the body. Consequently “the “abnormal” status of the virgin
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body made it, like the angels, a “mediator between the human and the divine”, virgins
were ‘heroes of the soul’”(Bloch, 1991:97).
The absence of the physical act of sex and the exchange of bodily fluids represented
through the virgin birth, gave indication of where ‘sexuality’, was directed. Mother
Mary therefore plays a more gender-specific role than Jesus, although Jesus also had a
feminised identity (based on the sublimation of the self), which contrasted with
harshness of the God in the Old Testament. The objective behind this Christian
iconography was to shift societal sexual mores away from homoerotic themes to a
mystification and purification of a female virtuous identity. The notion of the virgin
birth is symptomatic of this approach - pregnancy without sex is the ultimate female
role, incontrovertible with pleasure. As Bloch argues, “for the early Church fathers
virginity always carries a reference to Adam and Eve before the Fall, a time when, it
was assumed, because of the absence of sexuality the sexes were equal” (Bloch,
1991:97).
The emphasis on female procreative powers and heterosexual attraction constructed
around the fear of the vagina in antiquity, in combination with the myth of motherhood,
created an “eroticisation of the denied”. The reaction to the overt heterosexualisation
brought by Christianity attempted to define women as available, but only in a given
context mediated by marriage and the principal responsibility of procreation. The
negative vagina iconography in the Greek world appears to have assisted the Christian
concept of the vagina where there exists a basic contradiction - desired but now
regulated by other Christian requirements, that fuels a guilt-ridden obsession with
female sexuality. It has proved difficult to eroticise, because of the feature that is so
demonstrably linked with life and purity in Christian iconography, creating a form of
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eroticism which is based in its denial – the multifarious cunt is to be desired in a
distinctly sexual sense yet respected for its maternal function. This constituted an
epistemological transformation, compared to Greek concepts of the vagina, as Keuls
reveals,
Men’s mythological imagery reflects their castration fears:
Snaky Medusa heads, the jagged aegis of Athena, and a whole
cup-board-full of female monsters are rightly considered as
revealing Greek’s men’s fears of the vagina dentata the
emasculating machinery of female revenge. (Keuls, 1993:125126)
The emphasis now on maternity through the image of Mother Mary, was to shape the
role of the modern woman, as Jesus represented the generic symbolism of body (life)
excrescence, and spiritual normalisation. Nuns became the essence of Mary’s role and
sacrifice, and in the Christian iconography Horner argues that the “body is both an
enclosure, a vessel that must be discarded or transformed in order to reach the spirit
within, and a spiritual text of truth that itself be enclosed or veiled. The exposure of this
truth to the pagan gaze thus becomes analogous to rape” (Horner, 1994:664). In this
context it is considered that periodic or sustained withdrawal of access maintains allure
and purity. This then provokes a problem for male responses and construction, which
are foreign to such prescriptive and complicated rules and procedures. For Reich the
problem of release in the sexually moral society, results in,
Sexual excitations as tortuous, burdensome, destructive. In fact,
sexual excitation is destructive and tortuous if not allowed to
achieve release. Thus, we see that the religious conception of
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sex as an annihilating, diabolical force, predisposing one for
final doom, is rooted in actual physical processes. As a result the
attitude toward sexuality is forced to become divided: The
typical religious and moralistic valuations “good”-“bad,”
“heavenly”-“earthly,” “divine”-“diabolical,” etc., become the
symbols of sexual gratification on the one hand and the
punishment thereof on the other hand. (Reich, 1970:149)
In the Enlightenment society dominated by science and Protestant values, women
became the barometers of the heterosexual values of the capitalist society, and active in
the definition of heterosexuality. The ‘civilising’ of men and capital, results in maternal
values residing along the domestication of society as a whole. The narrow moral
framework in which women reside exacerbated by the public/split of morality, places
the virgin and the prostitute at obverse ends of the spectrum that accentuates difference.
While according to Christian dictum all sins are viewed equal in the eyes of God, the
prostitute seemingly has a great distance to travel to seek and find complete redemption.
Beginning in later Middle Ages Roman Catholic Europe, Weisner-Hanks argues the
prostitute had to be presented as repentant.
Mary Magdalene was the most popular saint after the Virgin
Mary in the Middle Ages, although, like the Virgin, she
provided an ambiguous message about female sexuality, and by
extension male sexuality as well; yes it was possible for
someone who had been sexually active to be saved, but only by
renouncing

sexual

desire

and

2000:45)
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activity.

(Weisner-Hanks,

If a woman falls, therefore, it can only be hoped she does not fall too far. In the popular
film Pretty Woman2, the basic subtext of a wealthy male white knight rescuing an
unfortunate damsel in distress is repeated in a well-crafted narrative. The male character
in Pretty Woman is Jesus in situ, where he ‘cleanses’ the fallen woman eventually by
marriage as he sacrifices and shares his integrity with the fallen woman. Here he shifts
the prostitute from official to unofficial status based on the acceptance that prostitution
is defined legally as the exchange of money for sexual favours. Usually covert payment
or protection is not, and those that can parry the line between the unrespectable and
respectable seem guaranteed ‘successes’.
The narrow ideological framework of Christianity reveals poignantly how it reacts to
the role of the “world’s oldest profession”, with Victorian England in particular,
mirroring Greek concepts based on a male’s civic or public role. Although some
Australian states there have legalised brothels, police tend to sporadically attack street
prostitution, when its presence becomes too noticeable and a nuisance to the local
neighborhood.

Sexology: the sexualisation of Age of Enlightenment discourses

In terms of maternity, (the maternal instinct), sexual drives, and later, biological
assumptions on homosexuality, science assumed a unique legitimacy. The certainty of
Age of Enlightenment promulgations and the enmeshing of ‘natural’ science with the
developing human sciences, along with a renaissance of religion, via Protestantism,
created a dynamism that was unique in its ideological force. Protestant religion and
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Enlightenment science formed a beguiling relationship that produced syntheses despite
the fact that Enlightenment science eventually promoted the theory of evolution.
However the general orientation to explaining the universe by way of advanced
scientific methodology usurped and appropriated conceptualisations of God’s power;
previously, power was invested in ignorance and mystery and a fear of heresy. Modern
science therefore created a great fervour and zealotry. Science ultimately became a
phenomenon unable to recognise its cultural or historical milieu, and became a reified
entity, absorbed and consumed by the limits of its own discourse. As Freud argued,
The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilisation. It was the
greatest before there was any civilisation, though then, it is true,
it had for the most part no value, since the individual was
scarcely in a position to defend it. The development of
civilisation imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that
no one shall escape these restrictions. (Freud, 1930:33)
The eroticism of the denied that was formulated by early Christianity exacerbates the
gulf between women as a sexual creature and object versus their maternal and social
role connected to this responsibility. Consequently it exploits the moral dilemma
promoted by the simplistically defined and strident moral frameworks as it produces a
constant extinguishing and repudiation of the lessening of morality. Therefore the
greater the emphasis on sexual modesty the greater the desire exists for displays of
sexual immodesty. Enlightenment theorists also believed that an open sexuality could
promote a healthy heterosexuality, possibly identify and remedy causes of
homosexuality, which in turn could assist the burgeoning eugenics movement. As
Foucault argues,
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Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given
which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain
which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that
can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is
difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the
stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the
incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges,
the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one
another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge
and power. (Foucault, 1978: 105-106)
Although sexology had an implicit relationship with the scientific discourses of the era,
the controversial nature of its material placed it on uncertain ground with the religious
tone of the day; which was one of unbridled conservatism. The constraints of
Victorianism created the culture of openness, which sought to circumvent the influence
of conservatism by testing the boundaries of what was considered decent behaviour and
attitudes, through a legitimising scientific gaze. The public/private concept of morality
meant that displays of immodesty were highly desired and covertly encouraged, in the
form of prostitution and pornography. It implies that a certain type of woman is required
for different types of male needs, (although the pornographic image of women implies
that all women want to be viewed this way, and is their true sexual identity). The
sexological emphasis on the male sexual response provided further justification for
prostitution as the ‘innate’ biological sexual drive cannot be sated by wives and
partners. The tension between these points was underpinned by the fact that “married
heterosexuality displaced monastic denial as the most honoured form of sexuality. The
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cultural authority of compulsory heterosexuality clearly followed this shift” (Connell,
1995:186).
The didactic nature and character of Enlightenment discourses came to their ultimate
scientific nirvana in the study of sexuality. The pursuit of sex as happiness or fulfilment
was a chimerical illusion for other agendas such as the growth of eugenics, and the goal
of the heterosexualisation of culture. The pursuit of ‘openness’ and the amelioration of
inhibitors to sexuality focused on orgasm culminated in the theory of Wilhelm Reich in
the 1920s. The orgasm as the locus of physical and psychological health has
subsequently become the principal motivation behind twentieth century sexuality. The
building upon Freud’s psychoanalytical understanding of the psyche through bodily
functions, combined with the splitting of the body from the spiritual that flowed from
the cultural impact of Christianity, proved to be fertile ground for sexologists. For
Laqueur, the identification of masturbation as a feature in defining the problematic
individual by doctors was a distinctive element of Enlightenment constructions.
Previously,
They were largely silent on the topic because it was not
particularly exigent in thinking about how a reasonable man
should live his life. In a world in which the upper-class male had
available almost unimaginable possibilities for excessive
behaviour – slaves and prostitutes of both sexes, endless rich
food, almost no external curbs on anger or violence –
masturbation was off the lower end of the scale. (Laqueur,
2003:88)
The meaning and practice of sex or sexuality has been one of the pivotal markers in the
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development of societal and civilisation changes. With Christian-directed societies,
sexuality moved from the centre of life to a despised marginality, that eventually placed
it awkwardly back in the centre, through an emphasis on biological determinism. The
result was the furtive and distorted, culture of openness. As Foucault argues, “what is
peculiar to modern societies, in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shallow
existence, but they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum while exploiting
it as the secret” (Foucault, 1978:35). In respect that sex and the conduit of romantic love
has been one the most eulogised subjects of the twentieth century, sexology’s findings
and propositions are even more remarkably restrictive and contrary. For women, there
was an attempt through sexology to enable women to have a sexual consciousness,
separate from the motherhood doctrines promulgated in the Enlightenment treatises. On
closer inspection however, it mainly operates as a normalisation of male driven
heterosexuality and a minimalist (and adjunctural) role for women, for it “underscored
the notion that a mature, fulfilling sexual experience for a woman could only be
achieved through a vaginal orgasm in heterosexual intercourse” (Groneman, 1994:359).
Havelock Ellis a founding sexologist, articulated the banal “human to nature”
stereotypes on which modern sexology is built. His allegiance to these doctrines is
evident when he asserts that, “Feminine modesty is itself an expression of the female
sexual response: the more modest and timid the girl the more ardent the desire.”
(Jackson, 1983:8) This perspective, with the reliance on the male to locate and
extrapolate the female sexual response, places all of the trust and expertise in the
responsibility of the male. Implicitly, male sexual ‘violence’ (and control of violent
sexual urges) becomes the ultimate expression of masculinity. In a literal interpretation
it has a connotation of legitimising rape, and for this apparent problem Ellis developed
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the contingency of the “art of love”. This ability, which was aimed at separating man
from the animals, required the man to learn a particular script, which he could apply
generally to all females.
While the clumsy, inept husband was symbolised by an
orangutan trying to play the violin, woman was variously
described as a harp or other delicate instrument who, provided
her husband studied the book of rules, would eventually reward
him with melodious tunes. (Jackson, 1987:61-62)
Ellis’ theory of the art of love intervening between the human and the biology is an
variation and extrapolation on the thesis of the “great man”, where women are the muse
of the man who is a master of various arts and exponent of many skills and attributes.
The man in the sexual context, was not only responsible for the control of his own body,
but the woman’s, where she is to possess largely un-quantified, ethereal characteristics.
The discursiveness of Ellis and the general intellectual environment that promoted the
seemingly incongruity of science, religion and evolution, could legitimise the notion
that men are also controlled by hormones. For the biological constructionists, it also
gave unintended legitimacy to the assertion now generally adhered to, that the cause of
homosexuality being one of biological deterministic reasons - homosexuals are born,
not made, victims of their unique, yet undefined biology, that drives them out to seek
sex from other men. The search for the so-called gay gene continues3. As Hennessy
argues,

this

perspective

underpins

the

orientation

of

capitalist

commodification and consumerism.
Since the late nineteenth century the growth of consumer culture
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The social construction of homosexuality is discussed in chapter seven.
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culture

to

has depended on the formation and continual retooling of a
desiring subject, a subject who honours pleasures and may even
see them as forces that drive one’s existence or as pressing
needs. (Hennessy, 2000:69)
The uncomfortable arrangement between the concept of romantic love and rampant
orgasm-focussed sexual expression creates the dilemma of deciding what is more
important - ethereal concepts of love or powerful orgasm-focused sexuality. The
promotion of a hyper-virility meant that it was unlikely to be contained by marriage,
and the dominance of men in the public sphere conceptualised their autonomy away
from an increasingly marginalised domestic sphere. Moreover, the type of male sexual
response suggested by Ellis is probably best directed at homosexual relations between
men. They would not for example, have to learn a complex set of rules euphemistically
referred to as lovemaking, or persuade an unwilling partner whose increasingly stringent
denial of a sexual interest supposedly indicated a strong subliminal desire. Animalistic
desire and violence could be a key component of sexuality between men. The
restrictions placed upon homosexuality in broader society (and a narrow construction
based on effete characteristics), sees manifestations of male violence more likely to be
exhibited against women through rape. Conversely, this propagates the belief amongst
women that men are unbalanced and obsessed about sex, and the belief held by men that
women will use the lure and promise of sex, or regular sex, to orientate men into their
world of monogamy and domestic civility.
Unsurprisingly, the unusual relationship between nature and gentlemanly sexual
prowess provided a new dynamic, and one that would provide fertile ground for future
sexologists that of performance anxiety. With men bearing the onus for their own
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response, (and at least in principle for their female partner), manifestations of male
performance anxiety therefore implied a greater failure in terms of maintaining
heterosexual values. Performance anxiety could then range from a temporary aberration,
to a recurring theme throughout adult life. Some of the manifestations could also
include an eventual mastery of their own performance that pays little heed to actual
female desires. Furthermore an emphasis on performance will drive him to seek out
many different partners so the confirmation of his virility and mastery is continually
maintained. During sex, the male’s ‘performance’ is the one most easily measured with
the notion of delaying orgasm to give time for the woman to climax once or repeatedly.
As Weeks asserts, “sexual self-confidence is seen as one of the yard-sticks of
masculinity – to such an extent that performance anxiety is a leading cause of secondary
impotence” (Weeks, 1985:190). The implication for the work ethic, and particularly for
older males with concerns regarding virility and their relevance in the work force,
sexuality and work become analogous to issues such as “staying power”, youthful
stamina, “am I up to the job” and a general anxiety pertaining to usefulness.
The female performance anxiety is primarily internal - largely sublimated, and given
to a performance of its own - minimalist or faked enjoyment and arousal. Moreover,
particularly in the repeated occurrences of various “sexual dysfunction” by either sex,
could result in the individual considering themselves homosexual on the basis of these
subjective failures. As Morrow asserts, “sexual dysfunctions have no intrinsic and selfevident meaning apart from their construction and interpretation by sexologists”
(Morrow, 1994:33).
As men are central to the sexual ‘performance,’ men are much more likely to be
identified by sexual failure with various levels of impotency, to claims that they are
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inadequate or selfish lovers. In this context, a boy or young man seeking a successful
introduction to heterosexuality is fraught with difficulties, for there is no complete way
to digest and put into operation the complex art of love theory. Young women can at
least pretend to know, and hope that their signals that express an interest in sex is
received by someone who has partially mastered the rules. Generally, however, most
people tend to “muddle through” and become relatively normal adults expressing mild
forms of sexual dysfunction, or lack of sexual satisfaction.
The theorisation of heterosexuality by sexologists such as Ellis, gained wide
currency due to its perceived pragmaticism and its mechanical mode that imitated
industrial production techniques. Ultimately the gulf between the promotion of sexuality
and Victorian asceticism was the principal problem in turning the mechanical model
into one encouraging real intimacy and enjoyment for both partners. The ‘Englishman’
was also restricted by a gentlemanly ethos incompatible with the notion of sexuality as
enjoyable, as it promoted an obsequiousness or aloofness that orientated the sexual act
towards perfunctory ‘performances’. To counter the dynamic of sexual failure for men,
particularly in the earliest stages of their sexual ‘career’, a French tradition has been for
a mature woman (not a prostitute), to act as concierge for young men seeking sexual
instruction, based on learning the “art of love” symbolism. This was usually arranged by
the father, and was highly significant in not just making sure the young man was
sexually potent, but he was a powerful and considerate lover. In countries where
English traditions dominate, no such practice exists, and largely operates on an ad hoc
basis, with a young man seeking out his sexual instruction (and initial conquest), on self
appointed visits to a prostitute. The folly of this position, and the lack of adequate
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instruction for a young man was satirised in the American film, The Graduate.4
Significantly, the young man is an older than ‘normal’ male virgin, as he has graduated
from college, without graduating, as a ‘man’. The older woman, a family friend, seeks
out to seduce him, (although this is unknown or unplanned by the family). His extreme
reticence about sex with the woman reveals the problems that have occurred as a result
of his delay in initiation.
Problems relating to ‘experience’ and impotency were explored in the 1972 film,
Play it Again Sam5. Woody Allen plays a morose heterosexual male who has inordinate
problems in attracting and communicating with women. He feels that his lack of
masculine efficacy and charm is preventing him from succeeding, so he has surreal
conversations with his idol, screen legend Humphrey Bogart. Bogart is everything
Allen’s character is not: tough, cool and self-assured, especially with women, where he
is particularly insouciant. Allen’s type of character, prominent in his other movie roles,
is closer to caricatured effete homosexual, yet Allen always attempts to present as a
heterosexual man with various difficulties. Rather than hint at a subliminal
homosexuality, Allen alludes to impotency. When a friend asks if Allen’s marriage
breakdown was related to sexual problems, he self-effacingly jokes, “do I look like the
type of man who has sexual problems”? Meanwhile Bogart gives the appearance he can
sexually satisfy a woman while he is doing something else.

Late capitalist sexology

The nineteenth century form of sexology that originated from Europe reflected the
4
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European origins of capitalism that were constrained in comparison with the midtwentieth century American version of sexology, liberalism and capitalism. American
cultural dominance in the post-World War Two era was exemplified by Playboy
magazine, with the promotion of urban consumerism creating further distance from the
staidness of American frontier myths of family. Conversely, to be consumed entirely
with one’s sex life or sexuality in a capitalist mode of production, would be also to
suggest that sex can be performed without shelter or sustenance. As Marcuse argues,
Hedonism wants to preserve the development and gratification
of the individual as a goal within an anarchic and impoverished
reality. But the protest against the reified community and against
the meaningless sacrifices which are made to it leads only
deeper into isolation and opposition between individuals as long
as the historical forces that could transform the established
society into a true community have not matured and are not
comprehended. (Marcuse, 1968, 167)
As men’s sexuality ostensibly became freer, the focus on women’s sexual pleasure
ultimately increased in emphasis. The legitimation of clitoral orgasms was central to the
work of 1960s sex therapists, Masters and Johnson6. Previously, Freud believed that
those “who could not experience a vaginal orgasm as “frigid” even though they could
masturbate to orgasm through clitoral stimulation” (Morrow, 1994: 27). Under this
schema, the only power women could possess or exert over men was through the denial
or delaying of penetrative sex. As it is open to manipulation from those men who feel
justified in seeking a quick release, women will invariably know this is what men are
5

1972, director H, Ross.
155

seeking and react accordingly, either through acquiescence or manipulation. The
Freudian concept of immature and mature orgasms for women meant that;
In becoming adult they had to give up not only masturbation but
also the kind of orgasm produced by their infantile efforts.
Giving it up meant, in this account, giving up clitoral for vaginal
sexuality, fantasies of active masculinity for the reality of
passive femininity. (Laqueur, 2003:72)
The control of fertility, saw that medically controlled contraception, “the pill”,
presented the opportunity to fully unleash the male centered sexual response, and for
women to increasingly attempt to facilitate or mimic it. Women in particular were
encouraged to engage with the opportunities modern contraception presented. The
legitimisation of the clitoral orgasm in combination with the contraceptive pill,
indicated that women could mirror aspects of the male sexual response if not create their
own version. Sex freed from concern and worry of an unwanted or unplanned
pregnancy indicated that sex did not necessarily equate with love, and that sex could be
performed recreationally with men that were not their one true partner. Conversely,
promiscuity could heighten the feeling and pursuance of love as sex became
increasingly distanced, if not completely divorced from love7.
The unabashed pursuit of clitoral orgasms through either penetrative or nonpenetrative sex and appropriation of the male sexual response applied belatedly to
women created the environment for non-penetrative sex. Subsequently a greater
emphasis was on foreplay and a partial rejection of men through lesbianism, bisexuality and self-stimulation. Continuing the ‘naturalism’ of the Enlightenment, non6
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phallic lesbian sexuality could now be argued as a more ‘natural’ orientation for
women. Unless women are prepared to abandon heterosexuality completely the role of
“clitoris sex” remains unclear, however a compromise position exists through a greater
acceptance and practice of cunnilingus.
In the theoretical milieu where sexual emancipation appeared possible, the work of
sexologist Alex Comfort proved popular with the heterosexual status quo by promoting
nudity and wife swapping, otherwise known as ‘swinging’. Sexology’s raison d’etre of
normalising heterosexuality saw the sex manuals The Joy of Sex and More Joy, were
used by psychologists and sex therapists to deal with “sexual hang-ups”. They mainly
relate to issues of sexual modesty, for he implores that “there shouldn't be any pressure
on anyone to adopt any form of sex behaviour - only encouragement not to miss good
ones” (Comfort, 1973:116). In contrast, Jeffreys feminist critique reflects upon
participant/observer Gay Talese’s experiences at the sexual commune of the Sandstone
mansion in California in the early 1970s.
Sitting in the centre of the room, surrounded by a small circle of
people who seemed to listening raptly to his words, was the
burly figure of John Williamson, broad-chested with a pot belly
and small penis, a blond Buddha whose right foot was being
massaged by the dazzling olive-skinned Oralia, a nude Nefertiti
whose perfect body….. was the envy of every woman in the
room. (Jeffreys, 1990:128)
Sexology’s development as a respected discipline on matters pertaining to sexuality
has created some skewed results, which would have been apparent in the early stages.

7

See chapter five and romantic love.
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Its identity however, is intrinsically limited by its fundamental orientation to biological
essentialism. Moreover, there is little social or historical context to its findings. The
import of Christianity/sexology/science is endemic of its shortcomings, as its celebrated
openness is also its greatest weakness. The practical expression of openness is a
hedonistic fallacy that life can be the sum total of gratifying experiences rather than a
transcendence of the purely personal. Moreover, as Hennessy states,
By consolidating human sensation into discrete and bounded
sexual identities, heteronormativity helped shape the human
potential and need for sensation and social interaction (or eros)
in terms of objective aims and desires. This reification of the
erotic would prove vital to the development of commodity
culture insofar as it helped consolidate forms of desire that
would be crucial in the marketing and consumption of
commodities. (Hennessy, 2000:104)

Pornography

Mass produced pornography exploits the frustrations produced by a sexological theory
that placed onerous expectations upon men in heterosexuality. These expectations range
from initiating contact with a woman, to being a master of romance and seduction and
the resultant problems with sexual access when these approaches are attempted and fail.
Pornography and hence masturbation, circumvents the delaying of orgasm caused by the
heterosexual seduction process and frustrations that result from failure and rejection.
While pornography alludes to being an art form of nudes, it has been equally argued
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that the nude representations were actually serving a mass-market masturbation culture.
Pornography has become an inverted model of the Roman concept of sex ars erotica or
erotica art, transcribed into public space and commodified in accordance with the
capitalist ethos. The ‘gaze’ is also reminiscent of the Enlightenment focus on the
‘natural’, and nature, and hence capturing nature (nudity), with photography being the
most popular form, accessible through mass-produced magazines. For Horrocks,
The porn nude is more self-conscious than the classical nude.
Often she stares at the camera. She invites the viewer to inspect
her, to examine he proffered breasts, her splayed thighs, her
genitals. She has a curious look on her face, a mixture of coy
salaciousness (the ‘come on’ look) and aggression. (Horrocks,
1995:106)
Pornography thereby operates on the inversion of Christian sexual asceticism, to
expose what is generally uncommon public practice such as nudity, which is seen as a
temporary aberration in between being clothed. The clothed asceticism (the fig leaf
phenomenon, where at minimum, the genitals are covered) means that nudity
encourages sexual notions when they are revealed. Jesus says in Matthew 5:28,
“whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her
already in his heart”.
The Christian inspired fig leaf culture intensifies the interest in nudity and the
genitals, through the continuation of the small pieces of cloth that is required on public
beaches. This is the last defiant frontier in the nude gaze, despite the radical changes in
public swimming attire during the twentieth century. Pornography simplistically, aims
at discarding the fig leaf to promote an illusory openness and accessibility to the
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genitals, marking it as cult of the body and of the orgasm, in particular. As Connell
argues, “Auto-eroticism builds up the narcissism implicit in the ordinary masculine cult
of physicality, making one’s own body the object of skill and an object of admiration”
(Connell, 1983:21).
In pornography and prostitution, the viewer or participant is encouraged to suspend
belief that this is paid work or a job, as is preferred to be seen as an outlet for sexually
avaricious women, who enjoy performing for a public audience. The underplaying of
the financial aspect in a commerce and profit driven society, is deliberate, for it presents
women in the idealised, sexological state - keen, earnest to please, and compliant, as it
becomes an outlet for their secret nymphomania. Moreover, it presents women in their
most powerful sexological position - the ability to tantalise and deny, with the women
acting out how men wish or think they really are. Therefore the pornographic image is
the closest women get in appropriating the male sexual response, as it is founded upon
appearing available, and that women share men’s enjoyment of penetrative sex. For the
nude model and the prostitute who reasons that “he is only getting my body”, the
ethereal and essential female self remains untouched and remote, and known only to
herself. Consequently the commercial link and entrapment inherent in pornography
means that if a man has minimal skills in relating to women, he will have to buy an
actual woman if he wants to transcend merely masturbatory responses. As Horkheimer
and Adorno argue,
By representing deprivation as negative, they retracted, as it
were, the prostitution of the impulse and rescued by mediation
what was denied. The secret of aesthetic sublimation is its
representation of fulfilment as a broken promise. The culture
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industry does not sublimate; it represses. By repeatedly
exposing the objects of desire, breasts in a clinging sweater or
the naked torso of the athletic hero, it only stimulates the
unsublimated forepleasure which habitual deprivation has long
since reduced to masochistic semblance. There is no erotic
situation, which while insinuating and exciting, does not fail to
indicate unmistakably that things can never go that far.
(Horkheimer &Adorno, 1988:139-140)
The embourgeoisment and mass production of pornography began in earnest in the
early 1950s, with Playboy magazine, often referred to euphemistically as entertainment
for men. The Playboy ‘bunnies’ were part of a holistic fantasy package that promoted an
urbane lifestyle to the Playboy consumer, promising an endless supply of young8
attractive women, who, unlike real women were compliant to most male whims.
Playboy attempted to encompass an ideal away from a ‘grotty’ and desperate
masturbation culture, to one, which promoted also in its editorial approach, an urbane
professional man, who while riding the post-war economic/consumer boom, could now
afford to add improvements in his private life. The bourgeois values in Playboy
however, like most bourgeois values were illusory, and based on the concealment of the
purchase of a mass-market magazine for masturbatory purposes. Masturbation, while
ignored completely in its expressed sub-narrative, played an integral role in the
projected myth that Playboy readers could have sex with women like those portrayed in
the images. Masturbation remained the furtive, if denied, activity of most men who

8

The focus on female youth is significant in the Playboy morality. It distances itself from suburban
drudgery, promising escape. In the series of James Bond films, his courageous and debonair masculinity
is invariably rewarded by a liaison with an appreciably younger female.
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bought the magazine, beginning the now infamous and often repeated line, which
satirises their embarrassment, “I only buy it for the articles”. Scrine argues that in
relation to the proliferation of eighteenth century anti-masturbation treatises that,
Masturbation posed a fundamental challenge to the innate
qualities attributed to bourgeois masculinity on which the
struggle for hegemony, the model of citizenship and a sexual
identity were all based. The solitary, antisocial practice of
masturbation and the way in which it was perceived as the
product

of

an

uncontrollable

imagination

were

ideas

diametrically opposed to the understanding of the male political
subject – and the definition of man as a rational, controlled,
reasonable and free subject. (Scrine, 1999:96)
The “Playboy interview” was the underpinning of the bourgeois values that produced
interviews with famous people, (usually men) from science, politics and entertainment.
For Connell however, “The readership of this magazine was positioned as a corporate
sexual hero, consuming an endless supply of girls” (Connell, 1995:215). Playboy
attempted to locate its reader as a Renaissance man, consumers of an art form that
comprised entirely of nude women. Consequently Playboy morality suggested that the
man should be prepared to pay for female company in an unspoken quasi-prostitutional
role, as it enhanced their sense of economic power and dominance in the public sphere.
The commodification and reductionist ethos of “I want it, I can get it”, and “I can then
dispose of it”, dominated the exchange. Rather than direct payment, it would be
manifested through the payment of dinners, entertainment and gifts, broadening and
legitimising more obtuse versions of prostitution. This was an extension from women’s
162

traditional economic reliance on men and as such, while Playboy’s nudity offended
sexual ascetics, these aspects were counterbalanced by its traditional economic and
social values.
The Playboy ethos legitimised the emancipated man having a “little on the side”, as a
reflection of his autonomy in the public sphere, and conditional that he maintain the
façade and substance of his married and family life. The major themes then resonated
with the message that a man could not live like a woman – trapped by a primarily caregiving role. The phenomenon of the ‘sexless’ housewife became reified through the
cultural accessibility of other non-threatening forms of sexual gratification to a marriage
or the nuclear family. The pornographic vision of a woman’s body and the pressures of
monogamy sanctioned a partner thinking of others while maintaining the monogamy
and romantic love ‘contract’. The practice of vicarious adultery through masturbation,
fantasy or literal incorporation of the Playboy lifestyle shifts women towards the
emotional ephemera of romantic love, as juxtaposition to the ‘sexual’ men’s life.
Additionally, masturbation probably has ‘saved’ many from homosexuality as
pornography attempts to align heterosexual discourse within the limitations of its
masturbation culture, despite its connection with losing control.
The result of the sacrificing of neophyte femininity to the heterosexual masturbation
culture was exposed in a film about the life and death of an actual Playmate of the Year
Dorothy Stratten9. The narrative focused on her murder by a jealous husband who had
originally promoted her to Playboy as a model and the tragedy that enveloped the
magazine following her death. This brought into focus supposedly benign methods and
philosophy, as Playboy’s key marketing pitch of the nude “girl next door” was exposed

9

1980, Star 80, director B. Fosse.
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as instrumental in Stratten’s death, as well as the lure of fame. Many Playboy models
have aspirations of stardom in the entertainment industry, and while Playboy may not be
their ideal beginning, they feel they can use Playboy as a vehicle to gain a general
‘exposure’. Typecasting for nude models is particularly apparent, and for most, Playboy
is the only pinnacle they ever climb in the entertainment industry. Such things were
promised to Stratten and it was her escalation to, and away from Playboy, which
precipitated her partner’s murderous rage.
The desire for pornography manifested in the sexological response to
Christianity/Victorianism, for the popularity of pornography relates to a sexual void that
only can only be filled by a deliberate “eroticisation of the denied”. The cycle is created
thereby through a phenomenon of the more increased the activity and focus, the more
the tension increases, necessitating the desire for further fixation and release.
Pornography therefore inevitably thrives when attacked by society’s conservative
elements, and attacks made by anti - pornography crusaders such as Andrea Dworkin
and Katherine MacKinnon become ensnared unwittingly in same crusade conducted by
the religious right. However as Dworkin suggests, “pornography does not, as some
claim, refute the idea that female sexuality is dirty: instead, pornography embodies and
exploits this idea; pornography exploits and promotes it” (Dworkin, 1981:201).
While moralists and feminist moralists are philosophically and morally correct in
arguing that pornography is exploitative for women, pornographers are then forced into
semiotics that increase an intensity of focus, as pornography requires some resistance to
remain viable10. Subsequently it results in the need to spread the culture of openness
even further and perhaps recapture the days of mythological decadent Rome. However
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Seen chapter seven and internet pornography.
164

in the post-Enlightenment society, too much openness has the potential to destroy allure
through the weakening of the bonds of purity, and the dialectic of ‘dangerous’
sexualities. The following video review from Hustler magazine illustrates a quantum
leap from Playboy’s “tits and bums”, hidden by a bourgeois editorial approach.
I always look forward to the Private Stories, because their six or
seven different tales always have me tossing load after load of
hot, sticky scrotum slop around the room. None of my furniture
is spared from the creamy protein sprinkle from my overworked,
extremely happy purple - headed warrior. Let me describe to
you what was featured in this fuck fest. There was knob
polishing, muff diving, jizz, cum - guzzling cracks and most
importantly, there were big, gooey torrents of bubbling gonad
juice - from them and from me. Did I forget to mention the
amount of drilling of every squishy nook and cranny of the ‘fuck
- hungry harlots’ poop-shutes that occurred throughout? (Muff,
1998:22).
There has been a significant shift in men’s magazines market in recent years. The
Australian edition of Playboy magazine has ceased production replaced by a new breed
of men’s magazines that readers were not embarrassed to leave adorning coffee tables.
These magazines with names such as Ralph and Max focused more on editorial content
and used models that already had some type of media profile - hence there is less
graphic nudity, which also means a wider sphere of public display for sale, including
supermarkets. Masturbation had become furtive again, or as the trend attempts to imply,
men are masturbating less and having more sex.
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The original Playboy ethos is open to misinterpretation due to the uncomfortable
association between viewing nude women necessitating a requirement to masturbate.
Once this view is accepted, the projected male corporate dominance and that of men
generally in the post-World War Two era appears more evidently as an elaborate and
ingenious marketing ploy. An appropriation of the Playboy morality by women via the
gay gaze further reveals the limitations of the association between viewing pornography
and actual social power.

Phallus critiques

The cultural phenomenon of phallus critiques continues the search in an inchoate
fashion for an autonomous female sexuality, and the evolution of sexology’s culture of
openness.
The pattern of difference/dominance is so deeply embedded in
culture, institutions and body-reflexive practices that it functions
as a limit to the rights-based politics of reform. Beyond a certain
point, the critique of dominance is rejected as an attack on
difference – a project that risks gender vertigo and violence. In
Lacianian terms it means attacking the Phallus, the point of
intersection between patriarchal dominance of culture and the
bodily experience of masculinity; in more orthodox Freudian
terms it means reviving the terror of castration. (Connell,
1995:232)
The politics of ‘size’ can be made relevant to men, as the penis becomes a ‘tool’ for
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ownership legitimacy, firstly of his wife, and then his children from where they
originate. His penis efficacy is also a metaphor for his physical strength and his rank
amongst other men, where separate discourses pertaining to how a penis looks unaroused, or on the ‘slack’, (where other men view the penis) compared to the erect size,
(a women’s view), originate. Elvis Presley’s former bodyguards commented in their
book on the “King of Rock and Roll”, that when he wanted to urinate, he always went
into the toilet cubicle rather than the urinal. “He will never stand up alongside you in the
men’s room when you’re taking a leak; he will always go into the booth” (Dunleavy,
1977:89)11.
The predominately homoerotic Greek society used male phallic worship as a
manifestation of all things ‘male’. Whereas the phallus was portrayed as proud and
significant the female genitalia is constructed as an otherness that at best can only
threaten the phallus. The penis as a sexual instrument usurped the significance of female
procreativity, by emphasising the power of the seed, with Freud later basing his Oedipal
phase on the semantically charged concept of the ownership or lack of a penis.
Representations of a particular phallic masculinity “include double phalluses, phalluses
with eyes whereby they gain a kind of separate living identity; phallus plants, an entire
bestiary of phallus shaped animals and creatures with part of their anatomy transformed
into phalluses” (Keuls, 1993:76).
The practice of phallus humiliation by women is largely an unconscious attack on
11

Aware perhaps that a large appendage equated to “sex appeal” a musician that worked with Presley in
the 1950s claimed that
the singer even fashioned a prosthesis of sorts – to rock and roll inside his
baggy pants. Said Houston, “He would take the cardboard cylinder out of a
roll of toilet paper and put a string in one end of it. Then he’d tie that string
around his waist. The other end, with the cardboard roller, would hang down
outside his drawers.” Once onstage, as Elvis pulled his body backward as he
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Classical homoerotic phalluses, but is also stimulated by women’s assertion of the
‘patriarchal’ dominance in capitalism and sex theory. The perception that women were
manipulated into accepting penetrative sex forms part of the rationale for the attack on
phalluses or relative penis size. While feminists rightly perceive that penetrative sex and
procreative demands are related in part to an imperative to contain women in the home,
traditional analyses fail to account for the broader population imperative of capitalism
that ensnared men and women. Symbolic critiques of social characteristics therefore
operate in lieu of more significant analysis. Segal subsequently asserts that, “It is not
feminism which is the motor of male insecurities, but the fact that being a male entails
no psychological essence of ‘masculinity, merely a penis and scrotum – in most cases”
(Segal, 1994:283).
Women’s new critique of phalluses follows from a relative tradition of denial. The
type of questionnaire which focused on relative phallus efficacy found in magazines
such as Playboy and Cosmopolitan in the 1970s and 1980s, tended to prevaricate with
the sense that a vigorous discussion would be taking “things too far”, and result in the
overt humiliation of men. It has now become the new sexological openness issue of the
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and perhaps the most interesting feature of
post-feminist-feminism. This development however also conceals (yet builds upon) the
fact that men had already been partly humiliated and referenced by their phallus
previously in heterosexual pornography, where actors with well above average
phalluses are depicted, along with ‘dildoes’ that often exceed any human dimension.
Popular television programs such as Sex in the City based in heterosexuality, fulfils a
significant role in articulating ‘feminist’ themes in a post-feminist world. The
began strumming his guitar, he would also yank at the string. (Brown &
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perception that feminism was dominated by non-mainstream women or dominated by
lesbianism is redressed in a female led perspective that imitates Playboy morality. In the
female appropriation however, it is about women leading a single lifestyle while
awaiting their perfect partner, rather maintaining the façade of a home-front. The
narrative is also limited by the fact that the characters’ promiscuity and disappointment
with men may be actually concealing a desire for lesbian experiences. In one episode of
Sex in the City12, one of the characters finally finds her “Mr. Right”. Attractive
financially secure and that intangible ‘something’ draws her to him. There is a scene
where the couple, are having sex. Tears are streaming down her face, and he asks why.
It is because she is so happy she says. Yet the real reason, as she reveals to her
girlfriends later, is that his penis is so small that she does not derive any pleasure from
it!
Despite the emphasis on the sexual aspect of their love lives, compared to traditional
female idealisations based on romantic love the characters are often disappointed in
what sex ultimately does not give them - love, commitment, and the eternal myth of
finding that one true love. Subsequently while the women are presented as equal to men,
they do not want the appropriation of the male sexual response to indicate that they are
entirely like men. Therefore there is the sense that their partial appropriation of
masculine codes is only because of exasperation in finding a monogamous partner.
An internet “singles club” revealed individuals pursuing various sexual pleasures
based in heterosexuality. Members of Adult Friend Finder13 put profiles of themselves
and pictures if they wish to, in various sections that define their sexuality. In the sanctity

Broeske, 1997:54).
2000, director, A. McLean
13
AdultFriendFinder.com Accessed April 2000
12
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and safety of this environment, female members seek the ultimate sexual experience
often defined by physical attributes, or pursue bi-sexual experiences. “Andi”14 is a forty
year -old full time mother, and part-time computer student. Separated from her husband,
she has a penchant for sex toys, and pornographic videos that are lesbian in orientation.
She has had one lesbian experience, which was arranged, and shared by a male partner.
She claimed that she had no particular desire to repeat the experience, although she
stated that she enjoyed it immensely. She is mostly kept busy with looking after her two
young children, and arguing with her husband concerning maintenance payments and
visitation rights.
“Gypsy”, thirty-two, has been a prostitute for several years, and counts sex as one
and only interest, both professionally and personally. She sees prostitution as “just a
job”, and views the role of the prostitute pragmatically however she does not like to talk
about her job. She largely demarcates the sex she performs for work, against sex for fun
through the use of intimacy, for she prevents her clients from kissing her on the lips.
Her main sexual aspirations include achieving a vaginal orgasm during heterosexual
intercourse, having lesbian lovers, group sex, and watching two men having sex with
each other, (all of which she is also yet to experience).
“Blossom” forty-seven and a schoolteacher, has had several lovers aged between
twenty and thirty recently. When asked why she preferred younger lovers, she stated
that older men, such as those in their forties, and older, were often impotent. Another
interpretation is that younger virile men also make her feel younger and an experience
with an older man who was impotent, would have the double effect of her feeling older,
and reminiscent of losing her sexual appeal or sense of virility. This is confirmed by her
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Informants interviwed between April and July 2000.
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main sexual fantasy (of which she achieved once) of two young men having sex with
her at the same time.
“Blossom” also made the observation that men fall into ratios of seventy-five and
twenty-five percent when it came to the size of their phalluses. She claimed that
seventy-five per cent of men fell within a ‘normal’ range, which she identified as
between four and seven inches long when erect. The twenty-five per cent range includes
those with three inches and less, which she stated is relatively common. In the twentyfive per cent range, there was also those eight inches and above. Blossom claimed that
once had a lover whose penis was one inch long when erect, and that he displayed no
outward signs that it disturbed him. She also stated that on the one occasion she had sex
with him, it did not obstruct her enjoyment. It is also worth noting anecdotally, that
women use vibrators almost entirely on the clitoral area, therefore those who fall outside
of statistical models of normalcy can rightly feel reference to penis size is a sarcastic
reflection on their sexual potency. Edwards’ Definitive Penis Size Survey suggests that
‘modest’ length ranges from 141.5mm (5.6”), ‘average’ 161.8mm (6.4”), and ‘endowed’
181.1mm (7.1”). This was based on a combined adolescent/adult sample of 3,100
subjects. Those within a modest range expressed a 70% dissatisfaction rate with the
length of their penis, compared to a 10% dissatisfaction rate for those endowed”
(Edwards, 1998).
The Enlightenment relationship to Social Darwinism builds a mythology about large
black appendages with black men being closer to nature and white men the superior
intelligence and civilisation. The following example from an advertisement reveals a
complex weave of racism, commercialisation, and sexual semiotics, by playing on longheld fears that white women will prefer black men, because of their larger appendages.
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This fear of male black sexuality was exploited in the campaign for Bundaderg Rum15,
where the links with an alcoholic drink and masculine culture is obvious. Moreover,
with rum being a powerful alcoholic drink, there is a fine line between an inspired
sexual performance and impotency.
Bundaberg Rum is an Australian product, originating from the North Queensland
sugarcane fields. A large white polar bear has been the symbol used on their product for
many years, but for the television advertising campaign, the bear materialises as a quasiwhite man the viewer is left to presume. The creature goes to a blues/jazz club,
inhabited mainly by black men. After giving a black man a drink of his Bundaberg
Rum, the black man exclaims, in jubilation, “give me five”. The high five, clasping or
grasping of hands is associated with contemporary African culture. The creature
feigning ignorance, states, “you better have one at a time”. This is both a cultural
appropriation and minimalisation in one movement. The advertisement reaches its
semiotic climax in the urinal where the creature lines up along with black men in the
men’s toilets. The shot is taken from the rear, and shows the bear straddling the
individual urinal, (this is done to emphasise the creature needing to accommodate his
large appendage). At this movement all the other men gaze down in wonder at the size
of the bear’s appendage.
The sub-text of the narrative is that the bear, representing the white man’s version of
a well-known Caribbean product, outstrips it in performance. This “white man” not only
drinks more, but his penis is larger (when it is generally accepted that black men have
an overall size advantage). Moreover, he can outperform those who in a Social
Darwinian cosmology are considered closer to the animals and nature. Edwards found
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Viewed in national television campaign, 11/8/2001.
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however that “black men had slightly shorter erect lengths than their Caucasian
counterparts, 6.1” to 6.5” respectively. However, ‘the average flaccid length among
Blacks was 93.8mm (3.7”) compared to 87.7mm (3.4”) for Caucasians, which may
explain the impression that Black men have greater erect dimensions.” In the context of
the necessary public display at places such as urinals, the length of the flaccid penis is
perhaps more significant as a statement of manliness. Therefore “the difference in
flaccid length between those who are reluctant to potentially expose their penis to public
scrutiny and those who are not, remained strong. 81.0mm or 3.2” versus 89.6mm or 3.5”
respectively’ (Edwards, 1998).
Male revues such as the Chippendales uses male models wearing spandex type Gstrings, showing well above average appendages. The film The Full Monty16 satirised
the popularity of shows such as the Chippendales, but was also following a well-worn
path of gently poking fun at masculine standards, but used a larger sense of humiliation
to attack the male’s role in the family. He may be the head of the household, (albeit
grudging), but he is invariably taken advantage of, and made to look foolish by his wife
and children, based on an interpretation of male foibles. By using one of the few sites
where women exhibit an overt ‘sexuality’ (male strip shows), the writers of The Full
Monty took the concept of masculine humiliation to its theoretical conclusion. Whereas
he once gained respect in his role as head of the nuclear family, his function now is
reduced to a commercial value only, with the selling of their labour transposed by the
need to sell them-selves.
The narrative is based on a group of unemployed unskilled men in a formerly
prosperous British steel-making town, being driven to emasculate themselves further in
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the public sphere by putting on a stripping show for local women, along the lines of a
Chippendale production. The film had wide appeal, for the narrative completed the
public humiliation of issues that their wives had been implying for years. The failure to
perform as the primary breadwinner was equated to the notion that their penises were
small in relation to their sex drive and that of their social marginalisation and
emasculation through unemployment. As the men were looking for employment outside
of their usual employment options is indicative of the ideological power (and benefits)
of liberalism. Combined with the egalitarian notion that physically unattractive men
could use their bodies in an erotic show, they are further recognised for their bravery in
attempting a role given their physical limitations. Ultimately, they are rewarded and
compensated for their public shaming through their ingenuity to save them from
unemployment, albeit briefly. (The lead character is behind in maintenance payments to
his ex-wife, and is denied access to his child).
Indicating a female efficacy and the economic rationalist tone of the narrative,
(which appears to link women with its practice), the lead character’s ex-wife, who
works in a factory in a managerial position, offers him a below award wage job, so that
he can pay child support. The ex-wife had also recently moved in with a new boyfriend
a white-collar worker with a large house, with the only balance presented in the schema
is that her new partner is portrayed as effeminate, nasty and aloof. This serves as
motivation for the father to reclaim his ‘masculinity’ through stripping. The female
appropriation of masculinity is complete when in an earlier Chippendale strip show, one
of the intending strippers breaks in to the men’s toilet, (the show being closed to men),
where a woman, unknowing of his presence, in front of her girlfriends urinates upright
at the urinal. The implication in this context suggests perhaps, that women are still the
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real ‘tarts’.
Another British film, Brassed Off17, looks at the same issues relating to male
unemployment in an industrial town, but this time linking the male and female’s
experience of mine closures. Whereas the female lead character is first represented by a
function of an economic rationalist manager, she is soon is linked with the men through
a common love of music, (the Colliery Brass Band). In contrast the woman does not
appear to profit from the men’s misery, as evidenced in The Full Monty, but neither can
she do anything but to offer to go down bravely with them. The playing of The Land Of
Hope and Glory at their last performance, a pithy response to the reality of their lives in
a post-Thatcher Britain, attempts to obscure the feminisation of the narrative. The
corollary becomes that the female ex-manager encourages them to play their beloved
music, despite the inevitable conclusion, (no Colliery, no Brass Band). In an allusion
that economic rationalism has its advantages, (the greater involvement of women in the
economy), is that working class masculinity is not usually represented through music,
and that a woman had to show them how.
However, most representations of masculine marginalisation tend to follow the style
of The Full Monty, rather than Brassed Off, in the implication that women should take
full advantage of masculinity’s devolution from respected head of the nuclear family, to
satirised figure of fun. Therefore the post-feminist society tends to view masculinity
through a caricature of Greek homo-erotica, where it has repackaged it to satisfy the
desire for male heroes. By taking the homoerotic gaze, women have placed it within
their actual gaze, where they appear to have power. That the recipient of their gaze is
homosexual or heterosexual is irrelevant, as an example from a television advertisement
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illustrates18.
The advertisement involves two young women sitting in a room eating yogurt, (the
product), with a very small plume of smoke coming from a table in front of them. A
fireman is shown entering the building, designer stubble on his face, designer dirt
covering his muscular torso. He enters the room where the smoke is, and finds the
women calmly eating yogurt while approvingly gazing upon him. The smoke is now
revealed to be coming from a toaster from burnt toast. The “fireman” merely reaches
over and turns the toaster off, and the smoke disappears. His gentle yet purposeful touch
of the switch is reminiscent of expertly touching a clitoris, (sighs, giggles, emerge from
the women). He then shakes his head good humouredly, and leaves without comment as
if conceding he has no control over this female centered gaze. Implied however, is that
the danger can be increased on the discretion of the viewer, and the man, along with his
masculinity is equally disposable and transient. The overall suggestion is that they
would hire a male prostitute if they could find someone as masculine, gentle, and
ultimately submissive as this fireman, replicating the appropriation of the surplus value
of the housewife. A distinctive theme in male sexuality in the post-feminist society, and
in particular how women perceive and now accept male sexuality, is the development of
the disposable male – the ‘gigololisation’ of men. Those who fit the physical
dimensions of the ‘stud’ are highly valued – linked to the emphasis on body aesthetics
and the growth of fitness and weight loss industries.
The use of chocolate as a product more private and satisfying, (yet also dangerous
due to its high fat content) than sex or masturbation, alludes to the female phallus and
orgasm. Metaphorically and whimsically, they reflect vehicles that articulate women’s
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new conceptions of power in public and private realms. The advertisers usually play
upon the perception that the modern woman is extremely stressed and busy, but that
nothing can be done that may improve their lives. Implied therefore is that sexual
pleasures are unsatisfying or that lesbianism or bisexuality may be more gratifying, but
socially and personally stigmitising. Heterosexual promiscuity may be viewed the same
way or just generally unsatisfying. To reflect women’s greater economic and sexual
freedoms, symbolic relationships to the capitalist social order are stressed within the
restrictions posed by established moral codes. As Hennessy suggests
In advanced capitalism’s industrial sectors, middle-class women
have increasingly been invited to see themselves as sexual
agents, as “women on top” – with or without the boys on the
side – as professional managers in charge of their subordinates
and of their own orgasms, competing equally in the marketplace
with men, “fighting fire with fire”. (Hennessy, 2000:197)
The eroticisation of chocolate is consequently portrayed as a sin greater than sex
because of the effect on body image and health. Consistent with the ‘promise’ of
advertising, popular chocolate biscuit Tim Tam19 suggests the accruement of female
agency and power by consuming the product. The appropriation of the clitoral orgasm an extremely private and individually accessible pleasure, indicates the smallness of the
female psychic and genital ‘space’. The advertisers have repeatedly followed a concept
that what every woman secretly desires is a pack of Tim Tam (an orgasm) that never
ends. This is automatically granted by a male genie, which then leaves two wishes left.
One advert uses a male sarcastically wishing that the two women should have dressed
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for the occasion. One woman off-handily wishes that the annoying man to be
transplanted to a remote area of Russia. Wish granted. The intruder in their private
space and pleasure (an allusion to viewing lesbianism) disappears where he cannot
occupy this exclusively female site.
Whereas the association with women and chocolate is often portrayed as a secret
place and an oasis in their daily lives, an inverse approach is taken to men and alcohol.
Where the consumption of beer is usually in a public setting, never alone, for this can be
construed as alcoholism, chocolate for women is something which can be consumed at
various and repeated times of the day - which also implies that women’s neurotic
(sexual) impulses are frequent. A “man’s thirst” is quenched by “a beer” although his
consumption may be several that produces a negligible interest and capacity for sex.
In a series of Bundaberg Rum advertisements the advertisers combine alcohol and
football to suggest that in the final analysis men prefer both to even a good probability
of a “one night stand” with an attractive female. A private conversation between
girlfriends is listened to by the omnipresent bear, and passed onto a nearby table of men.
However the ‘footy’ starts on the pub’s large screen television and all interest in sex is
lost. As the gulf between chocolate and alcohol indicates, when alcohol is linked with
football, pursuing women for sex is too difficult perhaps and not worth the trouble, even
when given the type of privileged information men usually only dream about.20.
In an attempt to capture the development of the ‘ladette’21, Australian advertisers
have pursued the nation of female ‘mates’, who ostensibly now act in a very similar
fashion to men when socialising in hotels and nightclubs. One advertisement has an
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21

attractive young woman surrounded by a group of men in a bar, who are in competition
with another group across the bar to see who can open a twist top of beer in novel ways,
(teeth, forehead). All are shocked when the woman in the first group calmly and
decisively reaches down below the level of the bar with an unopened bottle of beer. The
viewer is left in little doubt that she has used her vagina to open the bottle, until she lifts
her shirt and torso above the level of the bar, to reveal that in fact she has used her
“belly button”.

179

CHAPTER FIVE:
WOMEN’S ROLES and SEXUALITY in CAPITALISM

This chapter continues the anthropological perspective of the capitalist society,
emphasising the dynamics of the public/private split and attributions given to women to
perform tasks in the private sphere. Protestantism gave women a distinct role in Church
and society that reflected female strengths and ‘freedoms’ given by liberalism’s
connection to Protestantism. Arguments that are based on female involvement in public
sphere are restricted by the historical legacy of these developments that assisted in the
growth of capitalism. Nurturing, romantic love, and a particularly pervasive form of
consumerism aimed at women, underpinned by a Protestant conservatism, results in
feminism and women in general lacking a mechanism for providing revolution in a
broader context.

Women and families

John Stuart Mill1 expanded liberalism to incorporate the notion of marriage as a
‘contract’ similar to the work contact, but women remained in a distinctly unequal
relationship to men. This has been due to the fact that these amendments to liberalism
could not alter the public/private dichotomy that emerged through industrialisation, and
the public/private dichotomy in relation to morality. The ideological construction of the
home as a source of stability gives the impression that it is separate from the demands
and characteristics of the wider society. For Pateman, advocates of female equality such
as Mill still underestimated the impact of the family that included women within
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domestic hegemony.
The structure of everyday life, including marriage, is constituted
by beliefs and practices which presuppose that women are
naturally subject to men – yet writers on democracy continue to
assert that women and men can and will freely interact as equals
in their capacity as enfranchised democratic citizens. (Pateman,
1983:213)
By focusing on maternity and the dogma of liberal/egalitarianism, women were
supposed to civilise men through their personal asceticism, as the principal aspect of
their role in the home. Later, through feminist movements, liberal/egalitarianism also
gave women one theoretical base from which to argue for greater equality with men. In
effect, it was a lower-level policing role that did not threaten men’s hierarchical position
in Church and society. The general role of moral policing and the emphasis on female
sexual ascetics, broadened the gulf between public and private spheres of acceptable
expressions of sexuality, and heightened the distance between legitimate and elicit
forms of sexual desire. This made it more difficult for the sexologists to subsequently
separate sexuality from procreation and promoted a conundrum that the pornography
and prostitution industry exploited so effectively. Asceticism was applied to the “sexless” housewife while women as sex objects, existed in the public domain. As Marx and
Engels argue in relation to private property and the division of labour,
The nucleus, the first form, of which lies the family, where wife
and children are the slaves of the slaves of the husband. This
latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first
property, but even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to
1

J.S Mill and H.Taylor, “Essays on Sex Equality”, A. Rossi ed. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1970.
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the definition of modern economists who call it the power of
disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and
private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one
the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is
affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the
activity. (Marx & Engels, 1845: “Private Property and
Communism”)
The society constructed around industrial capitalism saw an increased emphasis on
women’s utility that connected to them to their maternity. This emphasis resulted from
the new mode of production demanding armies of workers to fill its factories. For
women furthermore, the Christian concept of marriage and monogamy was the link
between illicit and legitimate expressions of sexuality. Consistent with the capitalist
emphasis on private property, paternal genes assisted identification and the concept of
ownership, as equally, women’s sexuality was became a function owned and scrutinised
by the society. Cott asserts that, “evangelical Protestants constantly reiterated the theme
that Christianity had raised women from slaves in status to moral and intellectual
beings. The tacit condition for that elevation was the suppression of female sexuality”
(Cott, 1978:227).
The awkward placement of women in the public sphere reflected their sublimated
status and servant role, but also the limitations and restrictions caused by an overt
sexual asceticism that could often only imply availability. While feminism has improved
the types of jobs and careers available to women the biological maternal ‘clock’
produces an inertia emanating from traditional roles. The creation of a partially
emancipated female subject has placed women in a “double bind,” as they are still
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expected to provide nurturing and meet domestic responsibilities. Consequently the
phenomenon of a “maternal sacrifice,” must be acknowledged in the social formation of
the industrial capitalist society. Thus, patriarchy is generally defined by feminists by the
contrasting positions held by dominant men and subordinate women in the family. As
Summers asserts,
Families provide an entire little world in which the man is the
legally acknowledged boss; and this can be a powerful
compensation for the man who has a menial or boring job,
especially one where he is continually forced to obey orders. At
home he is king and his dependent wife and children accord him
love, honour and obedience. Or, at least, this is how it is
supposed to be. (Summers, 1975:148)
The long periods of time spent by men in the public space of work, then in public
places such as hotels, gambling dens and brothels, necessitated unofficial prostitutes,
“baby makers”, moral police, and domestic scientists, working to civilise men from the
pressures and dangers omnipresent in the public sphere. By virtue of their public or
implied sexuality, women working as barmaids and similar occupations were required
to sell something of themselves alongside the obvious product. The incongruity of
sexual asceticism in Christian semantics, and the capitalist need to sell and promote
products and services, underpins the notion that sex ‘sells’. Much of capitalist work for
women has been semi-prostitutional with displays of ‘flesh’ assisting in work-place
dynamics, however an implied desire or offer of sex by women is often juxtaposed by
Protestant moral asceticism that will deny the opportunity of it actually occurring.
Other jobs that requires the female worker focus to be deliberately friendly or
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flirtatious, are indicative of this moral dilemma that adds to the general contradiction of
Christian support of a commodified economic system. Alternatively, women’s maternal
role and the implied nurturing, direct women to careers such as nursing and teaching.
However Summers points out, in Australia “in the 1880s, women who worked as nursemaids or in similarly esteemed jobs earned from 18 pounds to 25 pounds per annum; by
contrast, women in such disreputable occupations as barmaids earned between 40 and
70 pounds per annum (Summers, 1975:313). The blending of the sexual and maternal
could therefore include prostitution2, and is done both overtly in public space, and
covertly in their roles as housewives. The promotion of a male-defined female sexuality
was to play an integral feature of the industrial capitalist social order and the promoting
of ascetic values that characterised capitalist expansion. The existence of the nineteenth
century middle class wife;
Was, biologically speaking, specialised for one function alone sex. Hence the elaborate costume-bustles, false-fronts, waspwaists which caricatured the natural female form. Her job was to
bear the heirs of the businessman, lawyer or professor she
married, which is what gave her claim to income. (Ehrenreich &
English, 1979:95)
Subsequently the female sphere was based on pursuing (or covertly encouraging)
husbands to provide financial protection for maternity. Tennessee Williams in the play
The Glass Menagerie3 explored some of the negative consequences when a husband
leaves his wife, and/or fails as provider for ‘his’ family. The overbearing maternal
2

For Summers in the Australian context, the sheer disproportion in the numbers of convict men and
women between 1788 and 1841 underpinned a profound orientation to the sexual abuse of female
convicts. 78, 077 male convicts were sent to Australia in the period compared to only 9,422 women.
Summers, A, (1975), p.275
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presence of the woman who is left to fend for herself during the Depression in America
is stark, as she fails to recognise the problems for disabled daughter in finding an
interested suitor, and the son who feels an intense burden as the family’s only wageearner. The mother reminisces over past “gentleman callers,” who were potential
husbands, rather than the inadequate father of her children. The son plays a man cast in
his father’s shadow as he leaves the family due to the mother’s overbearing maternity
and bitter disappointment ‘caused’ by men. The belief that women possess the real
power in the family structure stems from their maternity, and is a play upon the Oedipal
complex. This coping mechanism attempts to negate the physical and economic power
of men, and is often referred to as ‘feminine wiles’, a manipulative theory which relies
on the woman knowing and controlling ‘her’ man. The extent and success of women
negotiating the conditions of their oppression have often been ignored by the polemical
practice of feminism. This perspective has been overridden by the implication that men
are identified either with the capitalist class, who exploit women directly or a working
class elite that exploit women as domestic and sexual slaves. However as Summers
concedes, structural problems that exist within marriage, are also conditional on
individual differences between men and how they relate to their wives.
Once in a marriage both partners can suffer – and sometimes the
men may suffer more. To express her resentment and frustration
at her overall situation of impotence, and unhappy woman may
dredge up whatever subversive weapons she can find to take
what is inevitably a petty retaliation. A woman who resorts to
nagging, or refusing to have sexual intercourse, to neglecting the
housework or the care of her children will not, by these means,
3

From a play by T. Williams. The Glass Menagerie, 1987, Director P. Newman
185

remedy or escape her cultural prison. Her revenge is ignoble
because it can only create guilt and self-hatred in herself – and
can no way alter the structural inequities of her situation. Such
measures can usually only be taken against a meek and
acquiescent husband – for a brutal or domineering man can
simply terrorise his wife into conformity or his will –and are
thus directed against an individual rather than the institution.
(Summers, 1975: 149-150)
Women make numerous sacrifices for the family unit, although they may also be
clinging to financial security and the material comfort the nuclear family brings.
Women, however, can become so immersed in the realm of the family that they have
difficulty in seeing the family in ‘objective’ context. Men’s more complete immersion
into the public sphere gives them distance and arguably a greater degree of objectivity.
Marriage then becomes a source of entrapment for women who are primarily defined by
their involvement in the nuclear family4.
The industrial capitalist family is unique that despite a great uniformity in living
arrangements in urban society, families came to represent secret societies, where

4

There has been much literary material in relation to women’s relationship to the nuclear family and
hence capitalism. Delphy and Leonard strongly assert that,
We see men and women as economic classes, with one category/class
subordinating the other and exploiting its work. Within the family system
specifically, we see men exploiting women’s practical, emotional, sexual and
reproductive labour. For us ‘men’ and ‘women’ are not two naturally given
groups which at some point in history fell into a hierarchical relationship.
Rather the reason the two groups are distinguished is because one dominates
the other in order to use its labour. In other words, it is the relationship of
production which produces the two classes ‘men’ and ‘women’. (Delphy &
Leonard, 1992:258).
The central flaw in this argument however, is that it obscures the fact that men and women have the
unifying problematic in capitalism, in “having only their labour to sell”. Moreover, the artificial creation
of a “class within a class” can directly assist the overarching thematic of capitalism itself. It therefore
tends to view patriarchy as merely a psychological or cultural phenomenon, rather than as a system which
has a material base in social relations.
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problematic marriages and families were commonplace but denied. Paradoxically little
is otherwise known of the actual internal workings of individual families. Experiences
of rape, child physical and sexual abuse, domestic violence and mental cruelty, are
difficult areas for many health professionals to access due to the veil of secrecy over the
nuclear family. Actual or implied violence, so called “domestic violence,” often plays a
pivotal role in maintaining relationships behind the façade of the united nuclear family.
Subsequently, coexistent with the experience of work, the family or marriage
relationship is coercive rather than contractual. On the basis of experienced women’s
refuge workers, the relationship with the perpetrator of violence is underpinned by the
perhaps naïve wish that “many women who have experienced domestic violence say
that they do not want the relationship to end but rather the violence to stop” (Summers,
2003: 90). In the early Enlightenment period, at the extreme;
The accused spouse was usually simply admonished to behave
better, and only on a third or fourth court appearance might
stricter punishment be set. Courts generally held that a husband
had the right to beat his wife in order to correct her behaviour as
long as this was not extreme, with a common standard being that
he did not draw blood, or the diameter of the stick he used did
not exceed that of his thumb. (This is the origin of the term “rule
of thumb”) (Weisner-Hanks, 2000:76).
The ideal of the nuclear family has dominated sexuality and romantic love in modern
society, and represents a type of individual sacrifice, which resonates with implications
for racial and national survival. Sexuality as a proponent of liberal theory is
counterbalanced by the limited individualism produced by the function of the nuclear
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family. Single status for women has been frowned upon relating to the imperative to
“populate or perish,” although the requirement to heterosexualise society is also
revealed when a single man’s heterosexuality is open to question.
Such intellectual and social frameworks helped perpetuate the belief that the
emerging capitalist middle class was one of the most stultifying, contradictory and
narrow portrayals of human social organisation The term ‘bourgeois’ that connotes
smug and boring ignorance is particularly marked in ruling class families. In Mike
Donaldson’s analysis of ruling class families he discovered a belief that ‘ignorance’ of
the world outside of the family dynasty was integral its continuation. A lack of intimacy
with the male children was justified as a toughening process that was necessitated by
instilling in them the foibles of lesser men (people outside of the family dynasty).
The boys are toughened, hardened, disciplined, strengthened and
stiffened, but within a particular environment, one which
effectively blocks them off from pernicious influences which
might soften their characters and undo the difficult and laborious
construction of their masculinity. They are brutalised and
protected at the same time. (Donaldson, 2003:171-172)
However the lives of the working class and middle class in the industrial capitalist
society have one stark similarity - the prosaic order of their lives. While the families of
the two classes were vastly different in many respects, they both shared enslavement to
the rapid and continual rise and demands of the new economic system. Women were
subsequently placed in these subordinate positions because of the exploitation and
sublimation of the working male. Women leading men into the virtues and attributes of
monogamy, do so to create for paternal identification and create stable environments for
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children to become citizens and workers for the new social system.
The unique pressure placed on women in monogamy raises the issue of whether they
are being led by their desires or are they simply being forced to inculcate an inverse or
inverted model of the male sexual and social response. The question whether or that
women even ‘want’ children, is concealed by the hegemony that has been built around
monogamous marriage, that there is little room for manouevre to alter or subvert this
ideology. Greater emphasis on liberalisation weakens the intrinsic appeal of the illicit,
and a return to a conventional concept of marriage for life and a sense of duty is, in
effect, too late and has a limited appeal. Careers and incomes that create genuine
independence, but finding a man to satisfy the desire to have children before the women
suffer from age-related infertility, is a new challenge for ‘emancipated’ women5. As
Summers points out, according to 2002 ABS figures, “more than one third (36 per cent)
of women aged 30 and over who earned more than $52,000 a year had not had children”
(Summers, 2003:243). An inversion of patriarchal marriage and monogamy to suggest a
post-modern matriarchy can only invert the hegemony of the original paradigm that
favoured men. The advent of men as househusbands, sperm donors to career women,
will perpetuate gender inequality that is reproduced by class divisions. Equally, the
‘gigololisation’ and transitory nature of male sexuality based upon women’s ascendance
in the public sphere will impact on working class women who will be employed as
child-carers and domestic workers for career women. The duplication of what are
perceived to be the male privileges continues the principal function of class division
amongst all men and a new proletarianisation of women who fall short of possessing a
‘career’.
5

“Sunday” Nine Network. http://sunday.ninemsn.com.au/sunday/cover_stories/article_1545.asp
Producer: A. Buchner, 2/5/04.
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Giving voice to those who were previously silenced, exploited,
marginalised or oppressed, ‘a history from below’, a ‘people’s
history’, though not unrelated to the interests of labour
historians, dramatically redefined the historical terrain. These
shifts from social class to the people – an altogether more
heterogeneous entity – broadened the scope but weakened the
theoretical and political coherence of socialist historiography.
(Wells, 1990:230)
The liberalising of marriage and marriage type relationships has diminished the
allure of the ascetic and the erotic through a destruction of mystique. The social
implications behind the so-called “impotence drug” Viagra suggest not merely a drug
providing assistance to geriatric men who have physiological problems in maintaining
erection, but as an answer to a sexual problem. The relative demystification of female
genitalia has led to a loss of erotic appeal, based on early Christian semiotics and
iconographies. Viagra, suggests a social impotence, and an attempt to realign the
masculine hegemonic order reminiscent of Victorian imagery of women taking their
partner’s erections, obtaining no pleasure themselves, and metaphorically “laying back
and thinking of England”. The taking of a drug like Viagra suggests the maintenance of
the image of virility is important when a general interest in sex is waning, or at least
with the current partner. The mechanical and stratified occurrence of modern sexuality
is emphasised, as it mimics the dominant mechanical features and imperatives of the
economic mode. Sex therefore is to be performed at night, and libidinous impulses that
are felt during the day are considered unnatural, and are to be sublimated. As Macuse
argues,
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These constraints, enforced by the need for sustaining a large
quantum of energy and time for non-gratifying labour,
perpetuate the desexualisation of the body in order to make the
organism into a subject-object of socially useful performances.
(Marcuse, 1966:199)

Late capitalist families

The pace intentional chaos and hysteria of the capitalist “market place” have placed
special needs and emphasis on individuals in the family. Its ‘hystericalisation’ is related
to the volatility of markets, and how unpredictable forces, can stimulate or deflate a
market or an economy. Darwin’s theory of natural selection also stimulated the belief in
laissez-faire capitalism that markets defined both the economy, and the ability for
people to adequately cope with the mode.6
Freud’s discovery of hysteria in the lives of middle class women was part of the
general malaise that emerging social sciences such as psychology explored - there was
little or no social context that fed and created some of these ‘illnesses’. Weber alludes to
this ‘rationality’ inherent in capitalism, its development from the Enlightenment and its
degeneration into socially created hysteria. “For rationalisation leads to a growing
consciousness of the autonomy (Eigengesetzlichkeit) of the individual value spheres,
thus creating latent tensions among them which may develop - under conditions Weber
6

Capitalism that is innately hysterical and unequal was satirised by Mark Twain in the novel, The Million
Pound Note. It is based on a poor American living in London that becomes involved in an experiment, by
two London bankers. They wished to prove that the mere possession of a million-Pound note could
influence people’s attitudes and hence markets. The American soon found himself in the receipt of many
unpaid goods and services, and the lending of his name to a business venture, ensured further capital
investment and success.
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does not specify-into overt conflicts”. (Brubaker, 1984:83)
The movement to high unemployment economies in the West, and dominated by the
share-market, has also intensified this trend towards anxiety and hysteria-producing
outcomes. Capitalism’s fabled strong feature of ‘choice’, is an intentionally anxiety
producing condition. Promotion of brand recognition rather the products themselves,
results in an ever-increasing escalation between competitors marketing similar products,
deliberately creating hysteria and tension. “That the difference between the Chrysler
range and General Motors products is basically illusory strikes every child with a keen
interest in varieties” (Horkheimer &Adorno, 1988:123). Moreover it is a fundamentally
deceptive and illusory bourgeois vision that attempts to sell products to new and
potential markets. Those who live on subsistence payments and denied access to
consumerism (compounded by welfare punishment regimes), can be seen as being on
“trial for being alive” as a result of their temporary or permanent failure within
capitalism. In Marx’s “species being” the estrangement from labour and the political
economy is a fundamental denial of human rights. As Marx asserts,
Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the
nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship
between the worker (labour) and production. It is true that
labour produces for the rich wondrous things – but for the
worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the
worker, hovels. It produces beauty – but for the worker,
deformity. It replaces labour by machines – but some of the
workers it throws back to a barbarous type of labour, and the
other workers it turns into machines. It produces intelligence –
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but for the worker idiocy, cretinism. (Marx, 1844: “Estranged
Labour”)
The effort required to fit into the various markets, or by the failure thereof, further
produces a social anxiety. Andreski asserts, “whereas in Antiquity the policies of the
city-states necessarily set the pace for capitalism, today capitalism itself sets the pace
for bureaucraticisation of the economy” (Andreski, 1983:158).
Capitalist society and capitalists in general, make more money through the
exploitation of the traditional family unit that works consistently over a long period of
time to obtain large material possessions such as a house and car. The use of transitory
consumer goods such as food and clothing is also concentrated within the family unit.
Whereas men are generally attracted to the large commodities such as a house, car or
boat, a woman turns the house into a ‘home’ via the plethora of household
accoutrements that shape its aesthetics. Nightingale argues that the connection between
women and ‘shopping’ that began with the nineteenth century department store, was
solidified by the impact of shopping complexes that provided a unification of “things
for sale”, free entry, and the institutionalisation of the impulse buy.
This involved the acceptance as ‘natural’ of the irrationality of
shopping, of the nature of women as superfluous and frivolous,
narcissistically absorbed in the beautification of themselves and
their houses. It involved persuading women shoppers to accept
the view of themselves as reflections of the style presented
inside the display window – the entrepreneur’s most desirable
object, and to believe that there she saw ‘what she wants and
what she wants to be’. (Nightingale, 1990:32).
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The marketing philosophy behind the success of the fast food chain McDonald’s,
appealed to both parents in the family by aiming advertising directly at very young
children7. By appealing directly to children, the company uses them as the leverage
points to persuade parents with the resources to purchase their products. “A survey of
American schoolchildren in 1986 found that 96% of them could identify Ronald
McDonald, making him second only to Santa Claus in name recognition” (Donaldson,
1996:5). McDonald’s is a phenomenon of American capitalism that has thrived
ideologically with no effective opposition since the devolution of twentieth century
communism. The type of corporate capitalism constituted in McDonald’s (and its
imitators) is opposed in function to the petit bourgeois spirit of capitalism that is
orientated towards competition between small-scale operators. A Marxist critique of
mass culture and a “culture industry” that underpins monopolised forms of capitalism
suggests that,
The customer is not king, as the culture industry would have us
believe, not its subject but its object. The very word massmedia, specially honed for the culture industry, already shifts the
accent onto harmless terrain. Neither is it a question of primary
concern for the masses, nor of the techniques of communication
as such, but of the spirit which sufflates them, their master’s
voice. (Adorno, 1991:85-86)
Such totalitarian capitalism can use judicious advertising that is ethically dubious (such
as directing their marketing and advertising at children, who have no disposable
income) and can overcome the fact that the actual food is bland and nutritionally poor.
Moreover, advertising in the ‘West’ rather than just an indicator of the “free world,” is
7

In the 1997 ‘McLibel’ case, it was found that McDonalds exploited children through their advertising.
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now the world, and as ubiquitous thereby increases its subliminal power. In particular,
television advertising mirrors the capture of the customer with the television station
forcing viewers to endure frequent interruptions to their favourite televisions programs.
This feature is vital to enhancing the popular and subliminal efficacy of the
advertisement, as interrupted pleasure is the intended focus of the medium, argues
Nightingale.
It is because of the relationship between advertising and
television that watching television is work. Watching television
is a leisure activity in the pursuit of which viewers are asked to
lose themselves, to blur the distinction between reality and
fantasy. They are also asked to forget that watching television is
also work, to see television advertisements not as a continual
reminder of the work of purchasing, but as entertainment.
(Nightingale, 1990:34)
The identification of women as the primary domestic providers and purchasers of
these transitory consumer products makes it simpler for advertisers and their clients to
appeal directly to women, while alluding to a power and autonomy in the domestic
sphere. The successful “milk is legendary stuff”8, promotion at one and the same time,
gave women oblique heroine status, while re-orientating them toward the home, and
congratulating them for being overworked and undervalued. This in itself was the
central feature of the campaign, as the appropriation of the surplus value of their labour
is portrayed as a virtue, not a problem. This is a pragmatic plea based on the tension
between partners who are working full time, and who have the primary responsibility
for the domestic sphere in general. In this context, advertising as a form of propaganda
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for the consumer society gives a presentation of how things are (a traditional capitalist
economic and social order) versus what things could be (social engineering that
attempts to ameliorate social inequality). The use of traditional symbols exist continue
because they have a resonance with the buying public, notwithstanding the conservative
nature of television. The link between women and shopping is integral to television’s
world-view, argues Nightingale.
Commercial television is an integral part of the modern
shopping world. In this age of image advertising, it is from
television that the meanings of brands are learned. If women
learned to shop in the nineteenth century, they had to be taught
to shop for others in the twentieth. The unpredictable woman of
the nineteenth century had to be transformed into predictable,
programmable ‘Mum’ one hundred years later. (Nightingale,
1990:33)
Based on television and billboard advertising, the female is masculated through the
image of an urban warrior. In the television version, coming from a morning domestic
scene that has run out of milk, the women walks into a corner store at the same time as
an armed robbery is occurring. Blithely ignoring the masked bandit, she proceeds to the
refrigerator, takes out a large carton of milk, and takes it to the counter. For the wife and
mother the bandit is just another inconvenience to the daily routine of looking after the
home, children and husband. Upon reaching the counter to pay the attendant, she knocks
the bandit out with her carton of milk. Hurried but unflustered, she walks out the door.
The billboard adverts bring the semiotics of the images into sharp focus. A single large
torso - head-shot - shows the woman, age between thirty and forty, standing defiantly
8

Viewed in a national advertising campaign, September 2000.
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with two cartons of milk clasped tightly to her chest. Wearing no makeup, except for
darkly drawn dark circles under her eyes, which in the context of the overall semiotics,
is another badge of honour, there is no suggestion that this should or could change. The
connection between women, milk, and breast feeding, (although the product is from a
cow), suggests biological determinism, which invidiously places women in this role.
A following advertisement in the series suggests that the intake of dairy products by
women is essential in the life of today’s woman, who needs to juggle a fine line
between sanity and insanity. A male voiceover accompanying the vision of a woman
states “he constantly marvels at her ability to cope”, (also with no suggestion of how he
might assist). This time the use of dairy products is directed at women, who need the
complex sources of minerals and vitamins from the dairy to supplement their equally
complex lives. Women in this context, are given a grudging acknowledgement of status,
versus ‘real’ concepts of status that exist outside of the home. The transformation of the
workplace and gender relations sees that the creators of the advertisement feel impelled
to reflect something from both traditional and post-modern values. As Adorno argues,
The more inarticulate and diffuse the audience of mass media
seems to be, the more mass media tend to achieve their
‘integration’. The ideals of conformity and conventionalism
were inherent in popular novels from the very beginning. Now,
however, these ideals have been translated into rather clear-cut
prescriptions of what to do and what not to do. The outcome of
conflicts is pre-established, and all conflicts are mere sham.
Society is always the winner, and the individual is only a puppet
manipulated through social rules. (Adorno, 1991:140-141)
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Romantic love

Romantic love is a distinctly heterosexual theme that mediates between the extremes of
prostitution, pornography, and homosexuality. It operates as a ‘pure’ discourse with
allegorical precepts attempting to marginalise the excesses of sexual discourses.
Moreover, by implication romantics suggest that homosexuality cannot be about love,
but is an activity that is reminiscent of Classical physical excesses. The
heterosexualisation of culture that began with Christianity, and culminated in
Enlightenment religion and science placed women as the central love object and as the
barometers and interpreters of the feeling. The Christian characteristic of asserting
heterosexuality compared to the homoerotic cultures of the Greek and pre-Christian
Roman Empire could constitute a “Christian antifeminism (that) represents one of the
sublimated effects of the repression of the freer homosexual practices of both the
Romans and the Greeks” (Bloch, 1991:76).
The ideology of romantic love has a symbiotic relationship to the Christian ascetics
of chastity before marriage, as sex becomes the prime barometer of love - at least in the
initial stages of a union. Women created a uniquely active proselytizing role in the
Church and marginalised by capitalism, also gave love an ethereal quality which they
could make their own. Consistent with Protestant discourses generally love emphasises
individual agency within an overall ontology of discipline and denial. As Cott argues,
“the pervasive ideology of romantic love, and also the evangelical conflation of the
qualities of earthly and spiritual love, bridged the gap and refuted the ostensible
contradiction between passion-less-ness and marriage” (Cott, 1978:234). The extremely
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high moral standards set for women in regard to sexuality suggests that women will
frequently ‘hide’ behind love as an excuse to have sex, but not necessarily to heighten
its enjoyment. Therefore knowing or feeling that a man loves a woman does not
necessarily increase the experience or sensation of sex, but the woman becomes more
compliant and accessible in the performance of the sex act. Romantic love therefore,
like Christianity, is fundamentally an anti-phallic discourse, with coitus as the
absolutely final act in the journey along the road to ‘love’. ‘Deconstructed’ notions of
love arguably existed in the original practice of lesbianism as Winkler argues,
Among the thoughts which Sappho has written into her poetry in
a way which both conceals and reveals without portraying, are
sexual images. These are in part private to women, whose
awareness of their own bodies is not shared with men, and in
part publicly shared, especially in wedding songs and rites,
which are a rich store of symbolic images bespeaking sexuality.
(Winkler, 1981:77)
The mantra of love has had a similar result the promise of un-alienated sexological
sex, based on frequent and powerful orgasms. The further it is pursued, the harder it is
to achieve the more it is desired and eulogised. Consequently, it ultimately places
women on the margins as it suggests an autonomous female sexuality that is guided by
love. Possibly even more than the sexological vision of sex, romantic love ideology
must operate on illusions and the need to allegorise. The tendency to project or over
empathise with the other person’s ‘individuality’ places it in contradiction with notions
of freedom, with many love affairs causing great psychological stress or violence when
the ‘individual’ refuses to behave in a manner consistent with expectations.
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The centrality of the nuclear family in the industrial capitalist society suggests it
would be easier to love someone, (a shared history, children, a long marriage), than to
stay in love with someone. A relationship breakdown can often reveal this as a painful
fantasy, or it is an accepted part of life that you do not find real love. This fundamental
essentialism of finding true love that has limited historical and social context then has to
be understood through psychology or astrology. For men, the desire to capture, keep and
control a love object can conceal a hostility that emanates from a sublimation of their
‘self’ to maintain this status quo. For, “he desires his own interminable suffering:
“Lady, I fear nothing more than failing to love you” (Bloch, 1991: 150).
The key to the working class marriage in particular was that clearly defined
public/private roles precluded overt expectation and intimate knowledge of each other.
Moreover, the tradition of the man initiating contact with a prospective
date/girlfriend/wife is in itself implying an expectation of paternalism. To give the
illusion of emancipation through marriage and monogamy, links were made with
romantic love. This created the notion that ownership and exclusivity of each other
would ultimately set individuals free, with the two intertwined individuals then
operating as a collective unit to confront and engage with capitalism. But the focus on
‘knowing’ and obsessing about an individual is simultaneously a phenomenon of private
property ‘ownership’. Temporary monogamy contests, yet increases the intensity of the
love relationship. The actual underpinning of the relationship is the potentiality of the
man providing material support argues Goldman.
Ours is a practical age. The time when Romeo and Juliet risked
the wrath of their fathers for love, when Gretchen exposed
herself to the gossip of her neighbours for love, is no more. If on
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rare occasions, young people allow themselves the luxury of
romance they are taken in care by the elders, drilled and
pounded until they become “sensible”. (Goldman, 1970:232)
The shift towards secular monogamy is a partial rejection of the female enslavement
to Christian iconography and its religious symbolism and sacrifice. Temporary
monogamy is increasingly linked to a performance evaluation that is harder to achieve
in marriage, despite readily obtained divorce. Once relationships are put on covert
“performance contracts” however, they risk losing the bonds that tie - everyone at all
times is “on the market,” and hence bound by challenging performance evaluation
markers.
“Tonight the light of love is in your eyes, but will you still love me, tomorrow.”9
The female sexual and maternal role demands for possibly unspecified periods of time
women will remain monogamous despite an inadequate sexual and emotional life with
their partner. The modern woman may have several partners while she is uncommitted,
but when she finds someone she considers appropriate, she will commit to the same
cycle of monogamy, again until the new bonds weaken.
Shifts in social mores, reflected in popular music, indicate a tentative shift to the
moral and personal implications of sex before marriage for a woman. The “light of
love” is an oblique allusion to manifestations of male desire, I know you want to ‘fuck’
me, but will you still want me respect me in the morning? Is sex with me special, or is it
merely sex? Written on the cusp of the sexual revolution, the tension between sex and
romantic love is explored in the narrative of the song. Sex for men, suspects Vidal is a
quasi-masturbation experience when “few lovers”, “are willing to admit in the sexual
act that to create or maintain excitement they may need some mental image as erotic
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supplement to the body in attendance” (Laqueur, 2003:69).
The changes in late capitalist sexological theory indicates that a heterosexual sexual
rite can have increased efficacy the more it is repeated with different partners, and
involve varying degrees of disconnectedness from ascetic sexual codes. Ultimately the
participant, immersed in the culture of romantic love, seeks a cleansing that only true
love and the correct monogamous partner can provide. There are few myths as powerful
in Western civilisation as the virgin bride married in white that will last the couple’s
respective lifetimes. As the ‘permissive’ society has not totally abandoned virgin
reification can now place an emphasis on the “born again virgin” – a sexually mature
woman who once again seeks love through sex.
In either the virginal or promiscuous cases, they both produce a type of romantic
love hysteria, where the search for love - either through chastity or promiscuity produces anxiety as a result of failure or disappointments. This idealisation of love is
closely related to the notion of sexual purity (and a general cleanliness) and while
promiscuity may eventually heighten the feeling of love for women, men are often not
interested with potential partners who have a promiscuous background, such as a
prostitute. The prostitute will often have a no-kissing relationship with her clients.
While in some circumstances this would be in part for a concern of oral hygiene, like
some lesbian discourses that are anti-phallic, kissing may be saved for her lover, as her
mouth transforms the site of the misused ‘cunt’. Women accept that men’s sexuality is
overt, and therefore have trouble understanding true intimacy, and tender romantic
feelings, unless guided by a woman in love. Heterosexual love based on a female purity
and the dynamics of capitalist social order is illustrated by Horrocks in the sub-narrative
interpretation of Pretty Woman. Moreover, there exists a requirement to eliminate
9
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themes that are ‘subversive’ to romantic love and late capitalism, which itself practices
a dubious morality.
It can be seen clearly enough with Hollywood, which has often
functioned as a ‘dream factory’, pumping out the reassuring
message that American society is the best in the world, that
every American can become rich and powerful if they want to,
that things like poverty, crime, homosexuality and feminism will
all evaporate. A film such as Pretty Woman (1990) shows this
perfectly: a ruthless and soulless businessman meets a sassy
hooker and they are transformed by each other. The zombie-like
man is enlivened by the woman, and becomes a good capitalist;
the energetic hooker becomes a Barbie doll with a credit card on
Rodeo Drive, Beverly Hills. All ills are healed and smoothed
over. (Horrocks, 1995:26)
Social Darwinism’s emphasis on male dominated animalistic and scientific
functions, and a banal and mechanistic sexuality necessitates the requirement to lift the
human existence to a higher level. Women represent a group where the mire of Freudian
defecation and oral stages, leads to a mystified ‘heavenly’ human existence on earth,
expressed through romantic love. Women were subsequently projected from the profane
subjects of defecation,10 and sex, ‘fucking’ - the combination of highly alienating and
dangerous work, (usually the ‘merely’ alienating) and the severe embarrassment and
shame of menstruation which became carefully concealed.
In essence the emphasis on love places it in conflict with sexological dogma such as
10

An inversion of the female reticence to display the most profound of human odours - (faeces) is
discussed in chapter seven in reference to lesbian sadomasochism.
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the art of love, as the catharsis of romantic anticipation realised suggests that love will
guide the way, without the need for an instruction manual. In this environment,
technique limits the natural gestation on this emphasis on feelings. Subsequently
romantic love represents the only site where the mechanical nature of sexological theory
is questioned. While there may be a temporary synthesis, the two ideologies continue to
contribute their own alienated themes and phobias. Principally this is because they have
an unhealthy symbiotic relationship - one which cannot lift itself from the mire of
alleged debauchery, (sex), and one so entrenched with its own asceticism that it
becomes too derivative of itself to play a role in the everyday life of people, (love).
Confusing messages in feminist discourse (and feminist icons) may also indicate a
return to the concept of love, as a discourse of last resort or familiarity. Segal
facetiously refers to:
Erica Jong, having made her name and fortune writing the
adventurous woman’s fantasy of a ‘zipless fuck’ with a stranger,
is now welcoming AIDS for having made sex ‘a little more
precious again; heading us back to a time when many women
were glad for an excuse to turn away from it’. Germaine Greer,
having once urged all women to fuck more freely, is now
advising us to welcome the menopause for finally unlocking the
‘leg irons’ which hobble us: the shackles of our sexuality.
(Segal, 1994:69)
Marriage and relationship counseling also tends to skirt the problematic issue of
romantic love, preferring to concentrate on learning improved communication skills,
providing no substantive theory or sociological base. In a case study described by
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psychologist Toby Green, she makes certain assumptions that she hopes will reunite a
previously happy and contented couple. Her assumptions, which are typical of
psychology generally (indicating a close relationship with sexology) that men are
basically ‘insensitive’, and that it is men who set the parameters and environment for
sex, (ie, the art of love). Max and Julie are both professionals, with a mathematically
‘gifted’ son, Greg, fifteen. Max resents Julie’s inability to be wrong. He feels that Greg
should be more rounded and involved in sports. “Last but never least sex was boring
and too infrequent. His decision to leave was sanctioned by the executive committee,
being his parents and brother. They’d always thought Julie a borderline bitch.”
Time away from Max made her realise that that there were things about Max that
grated with her also. “she hated the way he always checked with his family before
making decisions. She resented the fact that he was often publicly nice, but privately
grumpy. And sex? She considered Max an insatiable and clumsy lover who never read
her right.” Eventually Max wanted to come back however he did this several times and
his confusion still did not clear. Green ultimately discovered that Max possessed angst
over his concern “to “do the right thing” by Julie and Greg and go back. Green felt
compelled to explain to Max the difference between being Mr. Nice Guy, and being a
nice guy. Green states that “suddenly a very heavy therapeutic penny dropped. “What
should I do?” Max asked. Ask Julie, I told him.” Green, 2001:11).
Green suggests that “Max is scared of what he’ll find under his “Mr Nice Guy”
image. Green’s perspective reveals one of the few lasting legacies of feminism that is to
turn men into “sensitive new age guys.” The polemic style of feminism obscures the
role of women in a relationship breakdown, while still advocating that men should act
like ‘gentlemen’, for significantly, in sex, he needs to be more ‘loving’. Green therefore
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builds her framework around the assumption that the problems are principally caused by
the insensitive Max. That Max’s family considers Julie a “borderline bitch” is not
considered in this Freudian perspective that implies that he has not sufficiently moved
on from his original family ties to have control of his new family. Romantic love
therefore becomes a test for men, reminiscent of the knight winning over his damsel.
Men in the post-Enlightenment society also have to define themselves against the
rudimentary aspects of their sexual response, to appear worthy to a prospective female
sexual partner.

Popular literature and soap operas

The relationship between romantic love and sex suggests that if women are to pursue a
man that is based in physical attraction it should be shrouded by other issues. Intergenerational relationships while very common when instigated by men, has not been
duplicated easily for mature women. The example of the popular novel Tim 11sanctifies
the concept for a woman who falls in love with a strikingly handsome young man who
has an intellectual handicap. The fact that she is physically attracted to him is balanced
by her maternal caring. Popular culture constitutes that individuals are too alienated
from their everyday lives to have anything but a cursory relationship to the world at
large – and increasingly this is defined by media manufactured images designed to
titillate, and release surface tensions and stresses. Furthermore as Radway states,
they rely upon standard cultural codes correlating signifiers and
signifieds that they accept as definitive. It has simply never
occurred to them that those codes might be historically or

206

culturally relative. Thus the romantic heroine becomes their
version of an “independent” and “intelligent” woman. (Radway,
1984:190)
The suggestion that it is mildly and harmlessly titillating, becomes similar to the
argument that other forms of cheap entertainment have for the working class, such as
vaudeville, pornography, beer, cigarettes, or that;
the women may in fact believe the stories are fantasies on one
level at the very same time that they take other aspects of them
to be real and therefore apply information learned about the
fictional world to the events and occurrences of theirs (Radway,
1984:187)
It subsequently operates in feeding and releasing love hysteria, and simultaneously, it
sedates as it enhances expectations. As the gap between the ideology and the reality
grows, popular literature that exploits the contradictions continues to expand and
flourish. This is manifested in the exaggerated romanticism of a Barbara Cartland novel,
to the general kitsch expressed in popular music that is dominated by insincere and
insipid platitudes. It promotes to the consumer that if they are not experiencing it for
themselves, it needs to be experienced vicariously through popular art forms, which
obliquely promises in a liberal tradition that it can still happen to them.
Soap operas are concerned with the stuff of traditional women’s
culture not only in the subject matter (i.e. domestic matters,
kinship, sexuality) but also in their style. In particular, the
importance of talk in soap opera plots indicates the basis of
orality that persists in television in general, and affirms the
11
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power of talk in creating and maintaining relationships. (Brown,
1990:184)
Programs such as Neighbours have an explicit narrative with the closeness of
neighbours that live in a cul de sac. Others such as the Brady Bunch or Home and
Away, use existential concepts to highlight the exemplar or conventional. Therefore
while the narrative of the Brady Bunch is about uniting stepfamilies, the sub-narrative
argues that if this problematic group can succeed so too should the conventional nuclear
family. Home and Away employs a similar perspective of homeless children and
troubled adults overcoming their respective problems to find support and love through a
community that acts as an oasis. Love and acceptance competes with an everexpanding middle that is dominated by ongoing tragedies that envelops the town and its
visitors. This, as Brown states, is “one of the most striking features of soap operas in
this regard is the openness of their narrative form” (Brown, 1990:186).
The voyeurism that probes the lives of celluloid representations and the rich and
famous, (real life soap actors, dramatised by media portrayal), is motivated by the
search for exemplars and the ever-present theme that delights in their failures. It is
based in the narrative of ‘gossip’, and gossip as a form of pornography, for apocryphal
love visions, underpinned by “its aimless style that is apparently most objectionable.
The Biblical admonition by St. Paul to ignore ‘fables and endless genealogies, which
minister questions rather than godly edifying’ (Timothy 1.4) (Brown, 1990:184).
The Princess Diana phenomenon is endemic of this search for romantic heroes and
heroines, as Diana represented the concept of the virginal bride sacrificed for a “higher
calling” such as the royal family. For the followers of Diana’s life after separation from
Prince Charles, her quest had that quixotic appeal of the mediaeval royal tradition and
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the ‘single mum’, fighting prejudice and seeking ‘real’ love in the modern world. Her
alleged virgin status completed the vision of the neophyte royal female sacrifice and
could love re-birth the world’s previously most famous virgin? The media captured her
appeal to the women who adored, but secretly loathed her. Her charity work, which
became her epitaph, was generally seen with suspicion before her death, and death
transformed her back into virgin status and sainthood. Fear loathing and confusions
about the nature of love and sex are projected onto cult figures such as Diana that
become targets for other’s alienation. In the semiotics of the soap opera, this anger is
also a result that the vehicle for their escapism inconveniently cut the melodrama short.
The diagrammatic mappings many women have made between
Diana’s life and their own form axes of partial identification, to
which they supply their own meanings and affects. But like
female consumers of soap operas and melodramas, the
audiences of Diana do not only simply identify with her: they
also get caught up in the soap opera of the British Royal Family.
Part of the shock and incredulity many people experienced at the
news of Diana’s death stemmed from dismay at a fairy tale cut
short, like a fan’s resistance to the sudden, unannounced
cessation of a soap opera that they were expecting to go on
indefinitely. (Sofoulis, 1997:15)
In respect of her ethereal life in the media, her premature death had the perfect ending.
She would never have to suffer the pain of love and in particular, unrequited love again
or old age. The notion of knowing someone through media image or identity was
exemplified by Diana, and while women’s magazines lost a large revenue base with her
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death, they have continued the Diana theme. The focus is now on her sons and the
legacy of her charity work that became her epitaph, which was central in her use of the
term, “Queen of Hearts.” But as Kennedy argues,
while Diana undoubtedly undertook her charity work with
compassion and inspiration, charity is one of the few public
roles for upper-class women in Britain. Millions of people were
grieving for a woman who may have challenged the conventions
of the British royal family, but who in fact reinforced many of
the conventions of conventional femininity. (Kennedy, 1997:51)
The Queen of Hearts was an image that Diana herself, actively promoted, which by
implication, she preferred, and was more relevant than the actual queen or a monarch.
Ultimately, Diana is modern culture’s ultimate pseudo radical figure, and the type of
‘feminist’ role model that is more persuasive to the majority of women than feminist
icons such as Germaine Greer, or Simone Bouvoir.
Like Princess Diana, ‘Elvis’ also became much larger in death than life, as if there
was some public recognition or guilt of the personal sacrifices made by the idol in life.
These post mortems on media stars pays homage to their image as altruistic in their
earthly existence, and Presley, primarily a romantic balladeer in the later stages of his
career, made reflections on love and loss in the narrative of the songs. This saw that
Presley’s personal problems being played out on stage, in a case of life imitating art,
rather than the preferred position of art imitating life. It therefore remains open to
question whether Presley’s audience wanted to be aware, that he was an ‘artist’
embarrassingly living out a tortured and sacrificial life onstage. The death phenomenon
of alienation, that is endemic in work life and permeates into the social, means that the
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individual either performs a suicide ritual upon themselves, or looks for another person
to safely perform it subliminally such as media star. In the post-death Presley narrative,
his legend as a romantic hero negates the circumstances surrounding his death as his
fans realise now his sacrifice for them12.
A more graphic and ostensibly realistic view of love and sex is presented in the 1995
film, Leaving Las Vegas.13 The story centers on a self-destructive prostitute, and an
alcoholic. The alcoholic’s character is a man who comes to Las Vegas to literally drink
himself to death, after losing his job and family through alcohol. They form an unusual
relationship, which is largely non-sexual. The sub-narrative is concerned with the notion
of death and sex as redemption, and death and love as redemption for sex. The prostitute
has already metaphorically died through her lack of regard for herself and her chosen
occupation, whereas the alcoholic seeks masochistic death. It ends where they have sex
for the first time, and he dies through the physical exertion of his alcohol-ravaged body,
and when love, redeems them both. Moreover, the gender subtext reveals her character
appropriating his masculinity, through a combination of love sex and death, and this
ethereally empowers and cleanses her. The pseudo - existentialism lies in the message
that their unconditional love can only operate in the mode as she as the prostitute and he
as the alcoholic. The film attempts to re-invent the notion of romantic love, and states
that the defining feature of a relationship between a man and woman is romantic love,
held against the disposable and purchasable sex. Therefore the narrative does not
reinvent the relationship between love and sex, but re-emphasises it.
In every product of the culture industry, the permanent denial
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The film “The Rose”, loosely based on the life of Janis Joplin, suggested that the audience or fans, were
looking for ‘kicks’ of various kinds, and were often intentionally oblivious to the real suffering of a
performer.
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imposed

by

civilisation

is

once

again

unmistakably

demonstrated and inflicted on its victims. To offer and deprive
them of something is one and the same. This is what happens in
erotic films. Precisely because it must never take place,
everything centres upon copulation. (Horkheimer &Adorno,
1988:141)
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CHAPTER SIX:
MASCULINITY and SEXUALITY under LATE CAPITALISM

This chapter argues that liberal/egalitarianism attempts to ameliorate inequality between
the sexes by altering identities at the expense of other’s, such as the female’s becoming
closer to the male’s. Masculinity then has a tendency to reify themes of opposition such
as extreme masculine sub-cultures, as a product of its hegemony in the gender order.
Sub-cultures that have lumpenproletariat and pseudo lumpenproletariat identities have
grown, partly as an emancipated female identity encroaches on masculine themes of
identity. Significantly, this gender phenomena is underpinned by neo-liberal economic
policies that have polarised and re-emphasised class divisions.
The hegemonic position of masculinity in the gender order dictates the lack of
options for alternative discourses, (hence their tendency to mirror dominant themes
which characterise their oppression, or direct replications which mimic heterosexual
masculinity). The problem then becomes a typically liberal version that produces
tension between notions of ‘freedom’ to one that polices those who do not or cannot
become ‘free’ individuals within a gender dominated paradigm.
The structural issues that defined first-wave feminism were complicated in the
“second wave” by the highly emotive (and arguably atypical) situations that existed
under the marriage veil, such as instances of rape and physical abuse. Alternatively,
women assuming a straddling dominance in heterosexuality, lesbianism and bisexual
choice, could exaggerate tensions amongst men for the remaining women that have
become highly discerning and critical. Moreover, sexual harassment legislation that acts
to impede on men’s “natural urges”, is problematic.
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Analyses of sexual harassment raise a number of paradoxical
questions for men and men’s sexualities. On the one hand,
sexual harassment is usually an instance or a commentary on
men’s sexualities; on the other, sexual harassment is often
understandable as about violence, power, authority, labourpower, protection of space and wage levels, economic
discrimination, rather than just sexuality in any kind of isolation.
(Collinson & Hearn, 1996:64)

Men and families

The institution of the nuclear family has felt the strain as high rates of divorce and the
alleged bias against men in the Family Court has left men disengaged from their role as
father, as well as husband. Men are now questioning the role of women at the centre of
the nurturing role, as this is the main justification used by the Court in deciding who
should have the principal custody of children. Men participating in pre-natal
‘workshops’ viewing the birth and changing of ‘nappies’, inevitably draws men closer
to the female experience of children, as the attempt to blend various gender discourses
across a broad spectrum has attempted to ‘feminise’ heterosexual men, (with no
improvement in divorce rates). This also opens debate on whether fathers really wanted
their children, or were ‘tricked’ into servicing or satisfying the mythical maternal
instinct. Subsequently the assertion that women then have no further need for men
becomes popular in a post-welfare culture, because they are exploiting the safety net of
the supporting parents pension, with “over 80 per cent of one-parent families are headed
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by mothers in virtually all countries” (Bryson, 1992:193).
Moreover, and consistent with the surveillance function of the post-welfare state,
scrutiny of the “single mother”, extends to monitoring of the recipient’s living
arrangements. The state takes the view “that if a pensioner lives with an employed
person of the opposite sex, this person is deemed to be supporting them” (Bryson,
1992:32). Prior to the advent of the supporting parent’s pension by the Whitlam
government, the shame associated with illegitimate births was compounded by a lack of
financial independence available to single parents. This helped justify forced adoptions,
with this other “stolen generation”1 hardly discussed. Ultimately however, the only way
to remedy the inequalities produced by the supporting parent’s pension that is mostly
accessed by women would be to grant simultaneous access to both parents – a move
unlikely in the current welfare climate.
In contrast, separations are now dominated by forced contributions paid by working
husbands, with a commensurate adjustment to the rate of pension paid to the mother. A
separated or divorced man with two children is required by the Family Law Court to
pay twenty seven per cent of his income as child support. The Court also has the
authority to force a father to live on as little as two hundred and forty dollars a week to
maintain this support2. This also reasserts the capitalist dynamic in family structure,
(and by implication, patriarchy), that links men’s ownership and responsibility for the
reproductive ‘seed’. However it is the pragmatic money-saving function of the shifting
of the financial responsibility from government to individuals that is preventing the
1

A change in the Adoption Act in 1991 meant that adopted children could access original birth
certificates. As long as the birth parents (often the mother was the only parent named) left no express
wish for the child to contact them, the adult child could seek to find the mother. In the period before the
supporting parent’s pension and more conservative attitudes towards “illegitimacy”, many adoptions were
discovered to be forced, usually by family or church representatives. A.Marshall & M.McDonald, 2001.
“The many-sided triangle: adoption in Australia”.
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consistent devolution of Whitlam’s welfare state. Rather than coercing men into
paternity, contributions could be made voluntary – and perhaps the father may then feel
less burdened by ‘responsibility’, producing more generous financial and emotional
support. This re-emphasis on patriarchal values attempts to suggest that the nuclear
family receives its inspiration from Biblical concepts. However the ‘family’ is a unique
creation of the industrial/capitalist society, and in Hitler’s Germany, single women who
availed of them-selves to be impregnated by officers of the elite army corps,3 were
valourised for performing an important function for German society. According to
Connell,
in gender terms, fascism was a naked reassertion of male
supremacy in societies that had been moving towards equality
for women. To accomplish this, fascism promoted new images
of hegemonic masculinity, glorifying irrationality (the ‘triumph
of the will’, thinking with ‘the blood’) and the unrestrained
violence of the frontier soldier. Its dynamics soon led to a new
and even more devastating global war” (Connell, 1995:193)
The dynamics of these historical tensions exposed by economic rationalism have
unleashed volatile separations and bitter family court hearings, as the focus is thrown
upon the foibles of the nuclear family. That custody is usually awarded pragmatically to
the mother has created anger amongst separated and divorced men in recent decades,
with the “maternal instinct” emphasised to reject the ‘unsuitable’ father. Generally
however, the children are no longer wanted. The narrow and tenuous experience of
‘love’, results in the children becoming burdens when the romance that produced them,
2

www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/payments/child_supp_scheme.htm
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dissipates becoming more apparent when one or both partners begin new relationships,
and have more children with a new partner. Therefore the original children become a
bone of contention between a warring-couple, and ultimately the children can be used as
pawns and as a vehicle to cause disruption and distress in the life of a former partner. In
some cases, men have sexually molested their own children (or been accused of it) as
revenge against a former partner. More commonly, children have uncomfortable
relationships with their new stepparents.
With the growth of female rights under liberal/egalitarianism, men have needed to
seek new ‘markets’, to satisfy traditional gender expectations. Men who no longer feel
that women are “not like they used to be” have been ‘recruiting’ wives from the
Philippines, or elsewhere. The phenomenon such as “mail order brides” fills the void
created by Australian women who have become thoroughly ‘Westernised’ by feminism
and access to commodities. The breakup of the Soviet Union4 and the often difficult
gestation of capitalism, has also seen a growth of women coming from the former
Soviet states to the West looking for men, marriage and financial security.

Liberal/Egalitarianism and masculinity

The growth of population created by the industrial capitalist society also produces
expendable life. Its central promise of the integrity of the ‘individual’ becomes highly
conditional and based in class dynamics and realities. The inability of governments,
3

D.F Crew, editor, 1994, “Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945”.
The commercialisation of love and sex has been exploited by Russian crime groups and individuals who
offer love and loyalty to Western men. www.womenrussia.com/blacklist.htm, details a litany of
introduction agencies and individuals who dupe Western men out of relatively large sums of money.
Accessed 5.4.02. After gaining the victim’s confidence, the woman usually asks for financial assistance
for a visa and airfares to visit/reside with the man with no actual intention of contact.
217

4

bureaucracies, and liberal/egalitarianism to adequately represent “the masses” also
meant callousness towards individual life. In its overt form it is represented by the
protection and advancement of the nation and empire through war. These aspects have
been interspersed by the effect of humanitarian discourse based in the social sciences,
which often allude to an ethos of inclusion, compassion, and non-violent forms of
dissent.
The failure of a communist theory to be realised has seen a partial adoption of
socialist ideals in most countries in the West. The influence of masculinity has confused
however the role of the working class in Marx’s schema. The appearance of working
class masculinity is often seen as more important than the substance of redressing
working class inequality, with the most prominent figure in twentieth century
Communism, Josef Stalin, exhibiting the rhetoric of masculine display, which evolved
into the “cult of the personality”. The Bolshevik party as the vanguard movement under
Stalin increasingly resembled a caricature of working class ideas, and the characteristics
that identified a ‘worker’. Anti-intellectualism has a strong resonance in working class
culture that results from a marginalisation from the intellectual and social capital, and
the reverse elitism inherent in aspects of working class identity. However this reverse
elitism concealed elements of elitism in the running of the Communist State5, as
bureaucratic representatives of the workers. As Fromm indicates,
Indeed, while the Soviet Communists, as well as the reformist
socialists, believed they were the enemies of capitalism, they
conceived of communism – or socialism – in the spirit of
capitalism. For them, socialism is not a society humanly

5

1974, Tucker, R. “Stalin as revolutionary, 1879-1929: a study in history and personality”.
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different from capitalism, but rather, a form of capitalism in
which the working class has achieved a higher status; it is, as
Engels once remarked ironically, “the present-day society
without its defects”. (Fromm, 1961:6)
The working class, were defined as little more as slaves in Stalin’s pursuit of
building Russia. In this model, the rights of individual workers were temporarily
sublimated and ignored. Ostensibly they were delayed until the revolution had matured
and that the principles of liberalism inherent in Marx’s writings, could dominate. There
is no evidence to suggest however, that this would have ever occurred in the Soviet
context due to the reification of the subjugated worker, and his heroic masculine status
in the building of the communist economy. This model of communism and its
relationship to the working class increased its caricature of workers inversely to the
ignorance of the worker in capitalist societies, suggesting that in part, this version of
Marxism was as narrow as the West had forced them to be. The purity inherent in the
descriptions of the working class ultimately transcended elements of social diversity in
the immediate post-revolutionary period. The description of masculine elements of the
working class as ‘pure’ appeared to be an unconscious appropriation of Protestant
sexually ascetic models for women in the Western democracies. For in postrevolutionary Russia,
As early as nineteen eighteen, women were accorded full equal
rights with men in all social and private areas, including
marriage and family relations. Women had the right to choose
their surname, place of residence, and social status. Their
involvement in productive labour was supposed to ensure them
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economic independence from men. If they became pregnant,
they were entitled to paid holidays. To relieve women of
onerous “domestic servitude”, the state began to set up a system
of crèches, nurseries and communal food supplies. Medical
service for mothers and children was expanded and improved
and became entirely free. (Kon, 1995:55)
Most post-Stalinist critiques subsequently fail to acknowledge the enormity of the
original Bolshevik party’s task – which consisted in part of the ‘de-commodification’ of
the economy and the continual reproduction of alienation that had grown expediently
under capitalism. As Marx had argued,
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in
it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an
objective character stamped upon the product of that labour;
because of the relation of the producers to the sum total of their
own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not
between themselves, but between the products of their labour.
(Marx, 1867: “The fetishism of commodities and the secret
thereof”)
Communism that was not fully grounded in a materialist reality that acknowledged
alienation has seen it operate as an alternate “opiate of the masses”, and morality as
capitalism was frequently referred to as ‘evil’. It replaces the notion of an idealised
existence in heaven by suggesting that ‘heaven’ can be created on earth. Good deeds to
your fellow man may not only get you to heaven, but perhaps more importantly create
the utopian industrial society, where the reward may be the love of your fellow man, or
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more directly, one’s workmates. The English socialist publication, The Ragged
Trousered Philantropists6, also idealised the role of the workers in the narrative,
(unemployed painters), against the duplicity of the bosses who were portrayed as
“Sunday Christians”, while exploiting their workers. Sporadically employed before the
institution of state welfare, they were “family men”, struggling to survive, showing
‘true’ Christian love to each other and society. For Weber, this morality was a reflection
of a particular Protestant ethos that produced capitalism.
Irregular work, which the ordinary labourer is often forced to
accept, is often unavoidable, but always an unwelcome state of
transition. A man without a calling thus lacks the systematic,
methodical character which is, as we have seen, demanded by
worldly asceticism. (Weber, 1930:161)
In some respects it could be argued that as communists attempted to exceed the
Christian democratic countries morally, their subsequent defeat has increased the
Christian democratic countries sense of righteousness and superiority. This helps
conceal the fact that when capitalist and Christian morality is intertwined it is inherently
duplicitous, as Weber implies. For Benjamin Franklin, “Honesty is useful, because it
assures credit; so are punctuality, industry, frugality, and that is the reason they are
virtues” (Weber, 1930:52). Working class culture in both communism and capitalism
has followed bourgeois and hence Protestant values of asceticism. According to Weber,
the influence of bourgeoisie rationality was found only in the Occident because “the
proletariat as a class could not exist, because there was no rational organisation of free
labour under regular discipline” (Weber, 1930:23). In areas such as coalmining, worker

6

1914 R. Tressall.
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and union activity suggested that they were less interested in revolution, and more
involved in securing a protected culture for coalminers that included safer work
conditions and increased levels of pay. Metcalfe claims that, “rather than being the
passive consumers of bourgeois values, then, respectable miners were actively
consenting to them, seizing them as ideological weapons in a political struggle which
they could not then win outright” (Metcalfe, 1988:136).
Consequently the workers were not against being identified as coal-miners in terms
of alienation and the overt specialisation endemic in the industrial capitalist society; but
the obverse occurred. The streak of Puritanism in communism and working class culture
that had ascetic and religious overtones, defined the way men wished to see the coal
mining industry - as beacons of hope in an unequal world. They wore the appropriation
of the surplus value of their labour by the capitalist class as a badge of honour. Union
semantics presented the working class as noble and honourable supporters of inequality,
while the capitalist class, knew of, and exploited their ‘honour’.
Moreover, their attempts to maintain this reified ‘workers’ culture, via the White
Australia policy, meant that they were not in competition with capital, but covertly and
implicitly united. In this way workers could appropriate elements of bourgeois
nationalism, and feel they were part of the nationalist discourse. The emphasis on
egalitarianism, notes Metcalfe, in the “insistence that people are as good as their masters
acknowledges the difference between people and masters at the same time as it denies
the significance of the difference.” (Metcalfe, 1988:48) Unionism therefore became
enmeshed in the “trade union consciousness” that became more interested in assisting
workers in their own sphere of influence, along with the nations’.
Unions are ineffective when the economy is under real strain, as they do not value
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labour in the sense that Marx’s labour theory of value does, but vaguely promotes the
idea that workers are continually “ripped off”. Appropriation of surplus labour theory is
reduced to making profit from the “sweat off our (the workers) brow”, and the longer
the revolution is delayed, the more entrenched these reified cultures were likely to
become. Reified working class traits and identifiers can easily dismissed by the ruling
class as irrelevant, a secular belief system that cannot compete with another more
powerful secular system such as the modern capitalist economy. Class identifiers are
reflected back onto the working class through elements such as advertising, but have
little other cultural or economic efficacy.
The appropriation of labour like that of coal miners is rewarded by the reification of
its masculine codes, as it operates as a reverse elitism that entrenches inequality by
virtue of cultural identity. It suggests that along with attempts to negotiate with the
capitalist status quo, it is masochistic and either at an individual or collective level it can
cope with dangerous and physically demanding work. The industrial society’s sheer
physicality, and the size and grandeur of its cities, is evident of the worship of inanimate
structures that required toiled and sweated labour. In neo-liberalism however,
heterosexuality masculinity is now ‘passe,’ and except for examples of “boutique
masculinity”, it remains a salient victim of de-industrialisation and globalisation.
Masculinity defined through industrial labour argues Donaldson, is created by the fact
that,
Work made meaningless by capitalist social relations is given
significance by patriarchy. The necessity to do boring,
repetitive, dirty, unhealthy, poorly paid, demeaning, selfdestructive, mind-numbing, soul-destroying work is turned into
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a virtue. (Donaldson, 1991:10)

Male sports

Australians like to think of themselves ultimately as “good sports” with organised sport
manifesting a desire for contest and a ‘fair’ fight. This focus on fairness is somewhat
related to the English origins of a gentleman’s code of behaviour, but it is also a
projection of a liberal/egalitarian model less ruthless than the dominant frontier culture
of the United States. The desire to be a good sport however, is tempered with the
aggressive manifestation that is partly borne out of the desire to take a gamble, for
gambling is a natural anxiety-producing phenomenon. So while gambling can
knowingly produce failure, in the Australian consciousness it does not diminish the
need to gamble, or the fear of failure that produces an aggressive over-confidence.
The corporatisation of male sport is a feature of the commercial “culture industry”
that parodies its links with community and work-based associations, and even the
nation. Subsequently while labour is not valued as in the Marxist context, its cultural
efficacy as a marketing symbol remains. The National Rugby League and Cricket
Australia (formerly the Australian Cricket Board) are in effect private companies that
administer the game and facilitate sponsorship. Despite holding international sporting
contests, they have no formal links with the state or nation, except for use of the
Australian coat of arms on clothing worn by the participants. This fact was exposed
beyond the traditional bonds of loyalty in 1977 with Kerry Packer’s World Series
Cricket and Rupert Murdoch’s attempted takeover of Rugby League in 1997. Both
alternate competitions had teams that represented ‘Australia’ – the NRL and Cricket
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Australia now have the best players sign loyalty contracts to prevent the rise of rebel
competitions.
Corporate sponsorship is now the lifeblood of organised sport, with the sporting
occasion seemingly re-created as one long piece of corporate advertising, intermingled
with the regular television advertising. Moreover, the notion of “fair play, is diminished
as sport’s relationship to “grass roots” community support, along with gentlemanly
codes of conduct that reflect playing and enjoying the game, is overwhelmed by
commercial imperatives. Even the game of Cricket, with its sedate English origins, now
expresses a ruthless masculinity, to negate homosexual connections or the childishness
of men playing games which have no significant impact on the lives of a people or the
nation. The Australian team in particular is characterised by its use of ‘sledging’, a
technique used on the field of play to unnerve and unsettle a batsman.
Former captain of the Australian cricket team, Steve Waugh, was a well-known
exponent of the ‘sledge’. His ability to deliver this form of abuse, and to absorb verbal
abuse, is construed as a testament to his mental ‘toughness’. Another regular Australian
player has appeared in an advertisement, one of a series related to raising the awareness
of female assault by employing famous male sporting figures. The cricketer states that
to sledge a woman is unfair, yet implicitly, a male, by virtue of his masculinity, should
be able to withstand any verbal assault. This aggression implicitly marks out the male
heterosexual identity. Those who cannot cope with this aggression are described as
homosexual if not in practice, but in ‘nature’. Moreover, despite attempts to make men
more sensitive, the masculine hero remains authentic when compared to manufactured
female pop stars that are a process of marketing and soft pornography. As Connell
argues,
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‘Hegemonic masculinity’ is always constructed in relation to
various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to
women. The interplay between different forms of masculinity is
an important part of how a patriarchal social order works.
(Connell 1987:183)
However “the contradictions associated with being white and male (and therefore
powerful) but also working-class and unemployed are complex and profound” (Willot
& Griffin, 1996:89).
The retirement of Test cricket captain Steve Waugh in January 2004 evoked themes
beyond sport, and indicated how masculinity has been successfully been ‘deconstructed’ in the working class, yet emerged unscathed and re-invigorated in the
middle class. He was portrayed as a successful warrior with legendary mental resilience
that proudly and stubbornly adorned his original Test cricket cap, with allusions to the
sportsman/soldier serving his country. This feature plays upon the emotional character
of nationalism versus the pragmatics of the state that employs the soldier to perform a
job for the nation-state.
Overt masculinity expressed through individual men and team sports particularly, is
based on the mythical power of collective masculinity, a form of ritualised warfare7. A
working class legacy can be seen in the basic structure of Rugby League where the ball
7

Rarely has sport had a direct impact on relationships between nations. An exception would be the
‘Bodyline’ crisis, during the tour of Australia by the English cricket team in nineteen thirty two-three.
Directed principally at restricting the run scoring ability of Don Bradman, it involved pitching fastbowling repeatedly at the body. Australia’s captain Bill Woodfull reflected on the changing dynamics
between the two countries with the comment ‘that there are two teams out there, and only one is playing
cricket’. (The use of the term ‘cricket’ is also a metaphor for English codes of gentlemanly and proper
behaviour).
A more significant break with the “mother country” occurred following the fall of Singapore during
World War Two, with claims of British abandonment of Australia’s protection, with the United States
fulfilling the role of protector. Cultural and military links with America increased dramatically during the
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is passed backward to go forward, so that the team moves forward together as a unit. In
contrast, with sports such as boxing, the emphasis is on individual warriors where the
boxer appropriates the power of several men. A manifestation of (masculine) alienated
labour is in the activities that are non-work in orientation, that mimic the danger and
concentrated physicality of their working lives. However the corporatisation and
professionalism of sport that deleted work-based associations has separated sport from
its Australian link with egalitarianism and work-based ‘mateship’.
In its naked literalness, in the brutish seriousness which hardens
every gesture of play into an automatic reflex, sport becomes the
colourless reflection of a hardened callous life. Sport only
preserves the joy of the moment, the thought of bodily
liberation, the suspension of practical ends in a completely
external distorted form. (Adorno, 1991:78)
Masculinity that was once linked to the pragmatic of the sport or of work is
transformed into a phenomenon that appears not to have any historical origin. Therefore
the post-modern supra-masculine male identity, distanced from any significant social or
historical link, can conceal and subvert actual or unconscious homosexuality. This can
be manifested through ambivalent or abusive heterosexual relationships, career and
other public sphere activity. He can also avoid aspersions of perceived homosexuality as
demonstrated by characteristics, and conduct his homosexuality ‘secretly’. The link with
homosexuality however is mostly symbolic and part of a homoerotic promotion for
female or homosexual audiences. For in reality, it is the commercial success of
corporatised sport that secures the sportsman’s heterosexuality as a substantial salary
subsequent decades.1984 R.Sissons &B.Stoddart. “Cricket and Empire:-the 1932-33 Bodyline tour of
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paid by the sport’s controlling body, plus endorsements, makes him an attractive partner
for women in conventional terms. This enables the option to have several children with
an attractive and ‘devoted’ wife, when many other families are ‘downsizing’ their
families due to financial constraints. Although the level of the intimacy of the
sportsman’s relationships may be significantly limited by the extent of his sporting
commitments, and his continual involvement in a culture that has a limited role for
women.
In the male bonding phenomenon of sport, seminal orgasm experiences can be
expressed through goals, tries and wickets, with overt celebrations, hugging and petting.
This type of affection for other men relates to parodied forms of homosexuality, giving
license to practice other forms without obvious vilification. Whereas in previous
generations of sportsmen a handshake would suffice, displays of same-sex affection
under the guise of sport are now commonplace. Their frequency and intensity is also
ironic in a country where the men usually value distance from each other with minimal
physical contact in social situations. The social orgasm in team sports is hidden by
masculine concepts such as egalitarianism and residual levels of ‘mateship’, with the
popularity of male sports indicating a re-marginalisation of women in the life of men.
The deliberate renouncing of homosexual codes by male sport stars enables them also to
justify male exclusivity; escaping from women and their sphere of home and family,
where too much contact leads to emasculation. They can then refer to homosexual-like
acts without fear of association. Rowe illustrates that,
In September 1997, the Newcastle Knights rugby league team
won an Australian championship for the first time. After their

Australia”.
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dramatic last minute victory – as is now commonplace in
professional, male, team contact sports such as soccer and the
other football codes – the players fell upon each other in a
frenzy of hugging and kissing. One of the Knights’ players,
Matthew Johns, said in a radio interview of the period after the
game: ‘I’ve never kissed so many men in my life. I’ll dead set
get a start in Oxford Street [Sydney’s “gay” strip] tonight. I
kissed all the boys a hundred times over. I’ll kiss them again and
again and again’. (Rowe & McKay, 1998:123)
More broadly, the ‘social’ orgasm is also a manifestation of a dissatisfaction of
sexuality and a sex confused society. However strict moral codes and conventions
required for the orgasm experience, has to be represented through socially acceptable
practices. The concept of success, particularly success that has instant gratification such
as sport, reflects that need for both spectators and participants for social release, which
can add to, or subtract from, private pleasures. Organised sport at the elite level
represents those ‘boys’ who have excelled at heterosexual bonding, and where at the
elite or international level they are also highly paid, it resembles the realisation of a
“boy’s own adventure”. Whereas most children play sport, to continue to play these
games while an adult, is a heterosexual fantasy, (and a corporate reality for a chosen
few), and therein lies the vicarious experience for the adult fan, who can react with
child-like enthusiasm at sporting events where their heroes are present. In the ‘inaction’
of the spectator, argues Adorno, “a crude contemplative curiosity replaces the last traces
of spontaneity. But mass culture is not interested in turning its consumers into
sportsmen as such but only into howling devotees of the stadium” (Adorno, 1991:78).
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While always a ‘professional’ sport, Rugby League has moved a long way from its
origins in the coalfields of Northern England. The game of Rugby League now presents
a ‘boutique’ masculinity that attempts not to move it far from its rugged working class
origins, but eliminate some its more nefarious components that may reduce its
commercial value. Illegal play was a tradition once valourised in Rugby League, but the
incidence of high tackles, fighting and other niggling tactics have been largely
eliminated in this marketing of the boutique version of league masculinity. The
Australian Rugby League has concentrated its marketing in recent years on women,
through the use of the “gay gaze” of muscular and physically fit footballers, with the
added incongruity of attempting to attract the recruitment of children to play Rugby
League. However, the homoerotic themes used to attract women and their children, are
concealed by traditional masculine forms In the 2001 season a player was sacked by his
club for digitally sodomising opposition players, and the League is determined to
legislate against illegal (or homosexual) play that is unattractive to a family audience8.
The South Sydney Rugby League Club that were forced from the National Rugby
League competition at the end of the 1999 season. Their re-admission in 2001 was
indicative of the determination to embrace working class symbolism despite the
evidence of its permanent decline. A foundation club of the original Sydney Rugby
League competition in 1908, ‘South’s’ found itself squeezed by the ‘nationalisation’ of
Australian Rugby League, the attempted takeover of the competition by Rupert
Murdoch’s News Limited, (and hence pay television), changing demographics and
decline in attendance at games. The axing of the club from the 2000 and 2001
competitions produced an outrage amongst the community, and League’s ‘traditional’
8

The group sex/rape allegations that engulfed Sydney team the “Bulldogs” can be seen as a manifestation
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fans. High profile media personalities, Ray Martin and Andrew Denton, neither strongly
identified with ‘masculinity’, led the chorus of outrage along with crusty league type,
former South’s player and current South’s president, George Piggins. In traditional
League lore, the Woody Allen type persona of Andrew Denton, (small, neurotic and
comedic), would previously have had no relationship with League teams, and would not
even make the grade as a ‘reserve orange peeler’ (oranges at half-time are a League
tradition). Wealthy individuals such as Denton and Martin are more representative of
the gentrification of the former working class suburbs of the inner city, where wealth is
now juxtaposed with poverty. This inequality has been hidden by the corporatisation of
Rugby League that has taken on aspects of the American style football ‘fan’. This has
been symbolised by the support of ‘their’ team, through the purchase of team jumpers
with various sponsors emblazoned upon them. Overt team identification through the
purchase of team jumpers that retail for approximately one and hundred fifty dollars,
formed a key strategy in the “that’s my game”, and then “that’s my team” slogans that
the Australian Rugby League used to wrest control from News Limited. In allusions to
the unfair takeover of Rugby League, and the corruption of community ties that became
synonymous with Murdoch’s bid for the game, Murdoch was seen as a heartless (and
foreign) capitalist who opportunistically used the proud and long-standing infrastructure
of the game to his benefit9.
The situation of the South Sydney Rugby League Club is indicative of not just the
permanent changes in class structures and realities, and the reification of marketing
concepts of masculinity, but the Australian tradition to reify class symbolism over

of promoting the footballers as sex symbols.
In 2001, the “National Rugby League” (NRL) became the peak body that incorporated ex-“Super
League” clubs, and also gave News Limited a controlling share in the management of the game.
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action. The Newcastle Knights, coming from a former “steel city” also has confusing
images of the mediaeval and its industrial past with its mascot of a ‘Knight’, using an
everlasting masculine steel culture despite its physical decline. The use of masculine
sports to replace working class communities from where the sport originated, has
reached fanatical levels in England, with the advent of the soccer ‘hooligan’, with sport
is merely the vehicle for the disenfranchised male, and an outlet for political and
nationalist expression. The neo-nazi, National Front, ‘skinhead’ is particularly apparent
when the English soccer team plays abroad, resulting in them being banned in several
countries when the English team is playing. Sport’s function as a corporatised activity
however, ultimately limits participation even as a spectator sport as Canaan suggests.
Thus young unemployed working-class men, for whom present
and future full-time employment could not be guaranteed,
lacked the linchpin of their hegemonic masculinity – waged
labour – and the prestige that went with it. They could no longer
afford to drink heavily in pubs or go to football matches. If
traditional forms of working-class masculinity were bolstered by
both money and prestige of a job, then these men lost both.
Perhaps their lessened interest in fighting, which occurred after
they lost their jobs, signified their feeling that they could no
longer view themselves in and through traditional hegemonic
masculinity, as Connell suggested (1993). (Canaan, 1996:122)
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Suicidal and violent masculinities

The actual decline of masculinity in previously working class communities cannot be
replaced by the vicarious experience of male corporate sport. Exaggerating the problem
identified by Marx, that alienating forms of work are a type of death, comes the
experience of unemployment and underemployment that disassociates the collective
experience of alienation. This builds upon the management practices that had, “in the
setting of antagonistic social relations, of alienated labour, hand and brain become not
just separated, but divided and hostile, and the human unity of hand and brain turns into
its opposite, something less than human” (Braverman, 1974: 125).
In concert with media, the government enlists the support of the working community
to increasingly marginalise the unemployed, facilitating a process of isolation that
further concentrates on diminishing the individual’s self-worth. Similar to the “coming
out” process for the homosexual, the unemployed person can experience losing the
support of family as well as the community. These bonds are quickly tested as no hope
becomes the ‘no-hoper’ and the more pointed American term, ‘loser’. The dichotomous
orientation of American definitions of success and failure is endemic in a popular
culture that suggests a profound subliminal violence based upon usurious values – a
sickly sweet approach coupled with a disposal rationale – violently if need be - once the
individual is perceived to be of no further use. Suicide in this context can be seen as
eliminating the ‘useless’ individual who cannot sell their labour.
In Britain, men’s level of personal failure and aggression have
kept rising after a decade of Thatcherite policies adopting the
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ruthless economic priorities of monetarism associated with US
capitalism, and a dramatic deterioration in the lives of the
poorest sectors of society. The 70% rise in male suicides during
the 1980s, paralleling unemployment has occurred alongside
corresponding leaps in reported levels of men’s violence against
women, drug addiction, crime, incarceration and educational
failure. (Segal, 1994:275)
Unemployment for men has connotations that implicitly relate to their capacity as a
‘breadwinner’. Such men are often considered inappropriate for relationships,
(particularly when their unemployment is linked to gambling or substance abuse
problems). They are more likely to accumulate intense personal problems, have longstanding “issues” with women stemming from failed relationships, and become
increasingly socially isolated. While masculinity is often seen as a destructive element,
it is this very aspect to which men withdraw, and gain some inspiration from, when
under great strain and pressure. This in itself makes it very difficult to eradicate from
the personality structures of men as they regale in its dark and malevolent forces,
attempting to invoke the heroic out of the truly tragic. The reliance on masculinity in the
construction of the physical infrastructure of society, then its relative abandonment, and
the development of nefarious elements within disenfranchised masculinity, can be seen
as an organic response to its marginalisation. As Hedbidge asserts,
When disaffected adolescents from the inner city, more
particularly when disaffected inner city unemployed adolescents
resort to symbolic and actual violence, they are playing with the
only power at their disposal: the power to discomfit. The power,
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that is, to pose – to pose a threat. (Hedbidge, 1988:18)
Despite the earnest attempt within social theory to de-construct aspects of
heterosexual masculinity, displays of violence in the public sphere have increased along
with the overall perception that Australian society has become more violent and
aggressive. In the Australian community, the death of ex-Test cricketer David Hookes
in January 2004 following a ‘pub’ melee focused the public attention on destructive
violence. While the association with men and public bars has dissipated along with
working class culture generally, the competitive neo-liberal culture has created a greater
sense of paranoia and anxiety for jobs, ‘scarce’ welfare resources, sexual partners, and
the formation of sexual and social identities. The ‘mateship’ produced by working men
drinking together in public bars, has been replaced by “yuppies with attitude” and elite
sportsmen who frequent trendy bars and nightclubs, possessing remnants of the national
mythology – their heterosexual masculinity secured by their class position.
The shrinkage of the “natural world” through the growth of cities has increased
man’s desire to mythologise and partake in risk taking behaviour reminiscent of frontier
conquests. Masculinity has been defined by a desire to master the public and natural
worlds and this may require some physical sacrifice, with man’s relationship to the car
revealing his autonomy and dominance in public space. Men’s predominance in motor
sports is promoted through the advertising of “vee-eight” sports cars as the ultimate
masculine machines, where speed and power is emphasised, despite a maximum speed
limit of an hundred and ten kilometres an hour throughout most of Australia. The
making of these cars, by two of Australia’s largest car makers, Holden and Ford,
constitute a marketing exercise, for the companies, because the relatively low sale of
“vee eight” cars (due to higher fuel consumption) would hardly justify their
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manufacture. Therefore attempts to reduce speed limits, and to otherwise drive safely
and conservatively, is limited by the type of marketing which exploits and is aimed at
conventional masculinity10. As Walker notes, profound changes in the economy that has
marginalised men in the public sphere necessitates amongst working class youth in
particular, a desire to recreate symbols of masculine dominance, technical skill, and
sites of male exclusivity. “Car culture functions to satisfy a considerable measure of
their perceived needs. It serves, above all, to reinstate their male honour” (Walker,
2003:49). Despite the significance of the link between high rates of unemployment and
the symbolism of cars in the lives of working class youth, she then goes on to state that
“motor vehicle culture must be de-masculinised” (Walker, 2003: 68). However by
simply deconstructing masculinity without an appropriate regard to its social context,
may in fact increase the sense of marginality and risk-taking behaviour and danger to
others.
Regardless of amendments to road rules, advertising campaigns aimed at reducing
dangerous driving, and the introduction of Random Breath Testing, the road toll remains
high, particularly over the Christmas holiday period. Dangerous drinking, copious
alcohol consumption, and other forms of risk, are closely associated with masculine
cultural norms and typifies the sense of hopelessness that is associated with quasisuicidal behaviours. Moreover, motor accident deaths seemingly exist outside of the
experience of the Australian state and nation, in terms of aligning such deaths as a
“national tragedy”, (although this term is used repeatedly in relation to “road toll”
deaths). When compared to the remembrance rituals relating to war or war-like events

10

Such is the resigned apathy and pragmaticism towards high rates of road deaths, is that the major form
of organ donorship involves all licensed drivers given the option of donorship upon death on their license
renewal forms.
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like the terrorist bombing in Bali, these deaths are often viewed as an inescapable result
of the inevitable progress of capitalism and the personal responsibility and autonomy
involved in owning a vehicle and negotiating danger on the roads. Ultimately for the
young Australian lumpenproletariat, there exists a profound contradiction between the
right-wing appropriation of Anzac mythology and the outlaw reality of their lives that is
evocative of older forms of national identity founded in the bushranger. In Connell’s
analysis of a group young men on the fringes of the labour market he found that,
The outstanding feature of this group’s experience of power
relations is violence. To a sheltered academic observer, there
seems a great deal of violence in these lives. The interviews
mention bullying and outrageous canings at school, assaulting a
teacher, fights with siblings and parents, brawls in playgrounds
and at parties, being arrested, assaults in reform school and gaol,
bashings of women and gay men, individual fist fights and
pulling a knife. Speeding in cars or trucks or on bikes is another
form of intimidation, with at least one police chase and
roadblock and one serious crash as results. (Connell, 1995:9899)
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Masculinity and the state

The diffusion of masculinity11 places at risk the ability for it to operate as a pragmatic
and efficient force either individually or collectively, or at least this is the argument that
would be presented against inclusion. If they are granted acceptance in the armed forces
they then have to face covertly enforced military codes. The prevalence of
bastardisation techniques still operate within the armed forces, and is used to separate
the “men from the boys”, and in this ontology it would unlikely to accept those who do
not see themselves as either men or boys. Sexual identity and practice is seen as a
matter of discipline, and regulation of the individual. The deeply ingrained culture of
bastardisation in the military relates to the preservation of masculine codes, which are
pragmatically adhered to. A person thought of ‘weak’ physically and emotionally, is a
threat to the code, is constructed as an other - a ‘woman’. ‘Bastardisation’ therefore
builds loyalty to the code, humiliation tests loyalty, and is used to corral adherents and
discontents into the code.
The para-military state police, while having a relatively high number of female
members, is dominated by masculine semantics which project a code of keeping in
check ‘civil disobedience’ and the more easily detectable crimes committed by the
working class, underclass, and criminal working class. To maintain the masculine
‘overflows’ which upset civil order, a legitimised masculine force is used to quell the
11

In the United States in 1987, a man was dismissed from the military following accusations that he was
homosexual. For Stychin, this
highlighted not the marginalisation of gays, but the centrality of same-sex
bonds and desires within the boundaries of the military. Steffen’s coming out
publicised and articulated this paradox – that lesbians and gay men have been
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outbreak of episodes. Sexual harassment legislation also operates to quell not only
perceptions of an overly aggressive and persistent male sexuality, but seeks to contain
the omnipresent and pervasive commercialisation of sex that underpins both its
repressive and openness perspectives. Connell also argues,
the broad spectrum of equal rights, does not give any grip on the
sexual division of labour among state personnel, or on the
gender structuring of state violence. On the face of it, the
approach is contradicted by the fact of state oppression of
groups of men, notably homosexual men, and by the heavier
criminalisation of men’s sexuality than women’s. (Connell,
1987:127)
The real divisions between socially progressive men and women, exists in the overtly
sexual discourses of the male ‘minorities’, as the heterosexual male is excluded from the
core thrust of social theory. Academic arguments for social diversity that provide the
theoretical underpinnings of a public service sexual harassment/marginal identities
code, can then produce discourses that are then too confrontational for mainstream
sensibilities. As Jeffreys suggests,
At the same time we were just realising the seriousness of child
sexual abuse, we were being told that paedophilia was a radical,
progressive, socialist, and even a feminist issue. The first
principle of the Gay Youth Movement’s Charter from this
period states that the liberation of lesbians and gay men requires
the liberation of women and all other oppressed groups
erased from the armed forces not because of an otherness, but rather due to
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including sexual minorities such as transsexuals, transvestites
and paedophiles. ( Jeffreys, 1990:188)
The failure of “political correctness” to function within the military is indicative of
the hegemony of masculinity in the industrial society, and its pragmatic role in the
protection of the state, irrespective of what gender politics are employed in other areas
of government bureaucracy. The failure of marginalised masculinities to secure a place
within the military compares conversely with how heterosexual women have dominated
civil public service culture. In particular this also relates to sexual harassment policies
that monitors the behaviour of heterosexual men. The appropriation of the “gay gaze”
largely as a result of the defeat of the “male gaze”, also assists in this environment
where women are more likely to claim sexual harassment As Connell asserts,
The link with the reproductive arena is social. This becomes
clear when it is challenged. An example is the recent struggle
within the state over ‘gays in the military’, i.e., the rules
excluding soldiers and sailors because of the gender of their
sexual object-choice. In the United States, where this struggle
was most severe, critics made the case for change in terms of
civil liberties and military efficiency, arguing in effect that
object-choice has little to do with the capacity to kill. The
admirals and generals defended the status quo on a variety of
spurious grounds. The unadmitted reason was the cultural
importance of a particular definition of masculinity in
maintaining the fragile cohesion of modern armed forces.

the fear that the opposite might well be true. (Stychin, 1995:93)
240

(Connell, 1995:73)
The requirement to reflect overt themes of heterosexuality is focused strongly in the
military and the paramilitary forces that protect the state and the nation, with the denial
of homosexuality through a pronounced heterosexual discourse revealed in Hitler’s
fascist state. Nietzsche’s12 ‘superman’ appealed to the Nazi’s racial theories, but also to
the notion of the overcoming of desires and impulses within. Sado-masochistic
tendencies obliquely reveal a profound sexual stultification that resulted in displays of
extreme authority, control and cruelty, symbolised by the displays of leather and whips.
Despite the official stand on homosexuality, several members of the Nazi’s highest
officers were allegedly homosexual, and Ernst Roehm, leader of the Storm Troopers,
was a recognised homosexual and close colleague and friend of Hitler. For Connell,
From the point of view of hegemonic masculinity, the potential
for homoerotic pleasure was expelled from the masculine and
located in a deviant group, symbolically assimilated to women
or to beasts. There was no mirror-type of '‘the heterosexual'’
Rather, heterosexuality became a required part of manliness.
The contradiction between this purged definition of masculinity,
and the actual conditions of emotional life among men in the
military and paramilitary groups reached crisis level in fascism.
It helped to justify, and possibly to motivate, Hitler’s murder of
Ernst Roehm, the homosexual leader of the Storm-troopers, in
1934. (Connell, 1995:196)

12

1925, Nietzsche, F. translated by Zimmern H. “Beyond Good and Evil”.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
HOMOSEXUALITY and POSTMODERNISM

Post-modernists have generally failed to link neo-liberal social and economic imperatives
and outcomes, hence the post-modern phenomenon of supporting “hyper-liberalism,” that
supports by default, the existence of “hyper capitalism”. These have been based in gender
and sexual differences, with a focus on the manipulation of definitions of the ‘personal’
and personalities. This is indicative of the need to ‘individualise’ those alienated through
work practices or unemployment through the promise of freedom in what a ‘sexuality’ or
sex itself can alleviate in the ‘private’ individual. The role of sex could be considered in a
broader fashion in relation to alienation, but only after the relationship of sex is to work is
discovered. Furthermore a re-conceptualisation of ‘work’ based upon the structural
dynamics of the public/private split needs to be considered, as its material role in the
mode of production is realised. While the articulation of secular morality has often been
an intrinsic rationale and motivation of the social sciences, this chapter draws together
themes from chapter one that discusses the tensions between a religious morality and
definition of identity and the humanist project of understanding and compassionately
comprehending human ‘impulses’. However the Marxist definition of secular morality
that is underpinned by understanding labour as the real sensuous activity that dominates
the “mode of production,” offers the most complete explanation of how “secular
morality” should be constituted as the central unifying theme within labour.
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to

242

distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned
by their physical organisation. By producing their means of
subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.
(Marx & Engels, 1845: “German Ideology Part 1”)

Lesbianism

In connection with the commodification of everything, this chapter explores in detail how
masculinity becomes re-produced as a product of its hegemony. The butch/femme
dichotomy reflects the adherence to the normalisations of the Enlightenment. The
‘mannish’ or unattractive lesbian is seen less in biological terms (in contrast to male
homosexuality) with her choice seen in part because she is perceived to be unattractive to
men. The ‘femme’ remains generally undetected unless in the company of a ‘butch’
partner.
Masculine appearance, especially among working-class women,
figured heavily in the early definitions of the female invert. A
typical description was one by Krafft-Ebing in 1888. “She had
coarse male features, a rough and rather deep voice, and with the
exception of the bosom and female contour of the pelvis, looked
more like a man in women’s clothing than like a woman”.
(Faderman, 1991:45)
In the 1950s Kinsey found that only a very small portion of females had exclusively
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homosexual histories. He reported, “between six and 14% of females (ages 20-35) had
more than incidental homosexual experiences in their histories”. (Kinsey, 1953:488)
Whereas Kinsey estimated that nearly “46% of the male population had engaged in both
heterosexual and homosexual activities, or “reacted to” persons of both sexes, in the
course of their adult lives”. (Kinsey, 1948:656)
Alienated by their respective positions in the masculine hegemonic social order
homosexual men and heterosexual women have formed an unusual alliance as both
appear to lack “masculinity”. Heterosexual women’s reliance on men to dominate, relates
to the fact that women are ultimately as directed by heterosexual doctrines as much as
men. For effete homosexual men, their physical and psychic closeness with heterosexual
women is exemplified through transvestite parody – such as Barry Humphries’ satire on
the Australian housewife, Dame Edna Everidge. Furthermore, this is perhaps indicative
of a hidden resentment towards female ‘friends’ who contribute to homosexual
stigmitisation. This alliance has replaced the unique relationships/friendships women had
shared before discursive Enlightenment practices. As Faderman asserts,
It was still possible in the early twentieth century for some
women to vow great love for each other, sleep together, see
themselves as life mates, perhaps even make love, and yet have
no idea that their relationship was what the sexologists were now
considering “inverted” and “abnormal” (Faderman, 1992:48).
However as lesbianism operates in the shadow of male homosexuality, and not
associated with the same degree of failure, (and operates as a staple of pornography
produced for heterosexual men), there is no overt need for social identification.
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Furthermore ‘lesbians’ can still bear children, and form nuclear families with their female
partners, and lesbianism’s general ambivalence towards penetration suggests that it
would be a more obvious choice for homosexual politics if heterosexuality was not
defined by a hegemonic ‘maleness’. However, “more and more young women in their
teens and twenties are experimenting openly in sexual relationships with other women
(and I think “experimenting” may be the key word here) (Hennessy, 2000:175).
The gestation of the political lesbian in the 1970s has revealed the tenuous grasp that
lesbianism has on an essential identity, and whether it should be maintained as a
biological or social phenomenon. Due to its less defined status when compared to male
homosexuality, bisexual women subsequently pose a threat to monogamous lesbian
relationships. Rust’s study indicates;
That overall, lesbians do prefer to associate with other lesbians
rather than bisexual women, and many feel very strongly about
the issue. For example, 96% said that they would prefer to date a
lesbian, and 74% said that their preference to avoid dating
bisexual women is very strong. Only 13 lesbians said that they
don’t care whether the women they date are bisexual or lesbian.
(Rust, 1995:100)
In direct contrast with early sexological connections between penetration,
reproduction and satisfaction, “the human clitoris, physiological site of female orgasm
and without reproductive purpose, undermines all attempts to link sexual pleasure to
reproductive outcome” (Segal, 1994:218). Segal however fails to make the link between
the late sexological discovery of the clitoris and founding sexology’s focus on orgasm
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that was needed for reproduction. That the clitoris can be an exclusive site for orgasm has
been accepted, although according to Greer, female genitals are defined by the necessity
that “the best thing a cunt can be is small and unobtrusive: the anxiety about the bigness
of the penis is only equaled about the smallness of the cunt” (Greer, 1970:44-45).
Women, now aware that the vaginal orgasm was predicated on male ideas, can turn the
issue back onto men through the discourse of phallus humiliation. Iragaray also evokes
pre-modern and post-clitoral contextual ‘feel’ in the following extract.
Women’s erogenous zones never amount to anything but a
clitoris-sex that is not comparable to the noble phallic organ, or a
hole envelope that serves to massage the penis in intercourse, or a
masculine organ turned back on itself, self-embracing (Irigaray,
1985:23).
The anti-discrimination or ameliorative vision for homosexuality, similar to feminism,
seeks imitative opportunities that reveal their ‘individuality’ and right to exercise
egalitarianism and become coupled worker/consumers. The banality of this approach is
revealed by the fact that homosexual couplings will inevitably face the same pressures
and social characteristics connected to the demands of the dominant mode of production.
Issues such as compulsory monogamy, urbanity and the nuclear family will impact,
underpinned by class and work-based issues. As Hennessy argues,
The gender foundation of heteronormative sexual identities is
directly related to the extraction of surplus value through the
gendered division of labour both in the family’s role in the
reproduction of labour power and in the workplace. To the extent
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that heteronormativity is premised on a gender hierarchy, it has
served to legitimate and naturalise the gender division of labour.
However,

just

because

capitalism

has

made

use

of

heteronormativity does not mean that it is necessary for capitalist
production. Capitalism does not require heteronormative families
or even a gendered division of labour. What it does require is an
unequal division of labour. (Hennessy, 2000:105)
In lieu of a broad realisation that it is the anthropological structure of capitalist social
life rather than men or ‘patriarchy,’ greater access to reproductive technologies could aid
the attraction of lesbianism. This could then allow those women dissatisfied with
heterosexuality and men to follow a sexuality of ‘choice’, and the non-material criticism
of men could be avoided1. The Howard Government in 20002 prevented IVF treatment
for single women, whether the individual had independent means of support and
irrespective of sexuality. The determination to restrict this option for single women with
fertility problems is held despite the knowledge that single fertile women can
indiscriminately select a sexual partner. Moreover, monogamous lesbian relationships
may be preferable for governments to protect coupled family values, and for women that
are accustomed and socialised for monogamy. Pragmatically it could provide women
1

Rust’s question, “Society makes it difficult to be a lesbian, so some women claim to be bisexual when
they are really lesbians who are afraid to admit it”. How strongly do you agree or disagree with this
statement? 26.69% (87) agreed slightly, 32.21% (105) agreed, and 24.23% (79), agreed strongly (Rust,
1995:310).
2
“Leesa Meldrum, a single woman from Melbourne who had gone to a fertility specialist to get pregnant
and had challenged the law” (Summers, 2003:252). Although most State and Territory governments are
opposed to such discrimination,
The Federal government’s proposed amendment (Sex Discrimination Bill,
(No.1, 2000) would allow State and Territory government’s to discriminate
against some women by preventing single women, including lesbians from
accessing assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF, artificial
insemination, sperm screening, and embryo transfer.
(www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/adb.nsf/search) 2002
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with a diversity of relationship choices that avoid the problems associated with agerelated infertility.

Lesbian sadomasochism

An aggressive appropriation of masculinity such as lesbian sadomasochism or a nonphallic lesbianism, are at obverse ends of the same hegemonic scale. It is a simplistic
polemic when Butler asserts that,
The parodic or imitative effect of gay identities works neither to
copy nor to emulate heterosexuality, but rather, to expose
heterosexuality as an incessant and panicked imitation of its own
naturalised idealisation. (Butler, 1990:23)
The inability to overturn established ontological boundaries is compounded in the
following statement on lesbian sado - masochism. “S/M is scary, Pat Califia, one of the
leading spokespeople for lesbian sado - masochism admits. But it is more: ‘it is a
deliberate premeditated erotic blasphemy, a form of sexual extremism and dissent”
(Weeks, 1985:237). The pursuit of a general catharsis or the female adoption of the male
sexual response is explicitly revealed by Portillo.
I was getting fucked by this stud in the black leather jacket who
fucked just like a man. As a matter of fact, it was like I was being
fucked by a man, except this was the first time my cunt ever
responded, which amazed me. It was the most pleasurable orgasm
I have ever had before or since. I was impressed - and hooked.
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(Portillo, 1989:54).
The two main themes of sadomasochism are seemingly contrary - an overt pursuit of
genital/orgastic satisfaction, yet a deliberate divorcing from a culture of physical
limitations – similar to an extreme version of “tantric sex” that is favoured by
heterosexuals. For “it makes the whole body the object of erotic penetration through pain
or bondage” (Connell, 1983:25). The Marquis De Sade from which the term sado
originates, followed the credo of sexual satisfaction through ‘depravity’, as the various
performance manifestations have a tendency to stimulate or deflate each other. “Sade’s
heroes of the libertinage often suffer from failure of erection – one of the few touches of
realism in his fucking scenes–which drives them on to worse and worse atrocities in the
attempt to become hard” (Connell, 1983:24-25). The sexological focus on orgasm,
particularly its mechanical orientation that originated in the need to procreate, drives the
participant to achieve satisfaction regardless of cost. Conversely, masochism has the
capacity to reduce satiation based upon orgasm to one resembling the oral-anal fixation
of Freudian theory, as the need for orgasm becomes equated to food consumption and
defecation - one that the ‘body’ needs to intake and release at various intervals. For
Foucault however, S/M represented a complex interplay between the body as an
instrument of pleasure distinct, yet not excluding the genitals. As Halperin argues,
S/M represented to Foucault “a process of invention”, insofar as it
detaches sexual pleasure from sexuality (in an S/M scene, the
precise gender and sexual orientation of one’s sexual partner may
lose some of their importance as prerequisites of sexual
excitement) and insofar as it frees bodily pleasure from organ

249

specificity, from exclusive localisation in the genitals. S/M
thereby makes possible a new relation between the body and
pleasure, and one effect of continued S/M practice is to alter one’s
relation to one’s own body. (Halperin, 1995:87)
In lesbian sadomasochism practice a continued pathologisation of ‘perversions’
dominates, with the objective of release and drama of display, rather than discursive
practice that is truly revolutionary. It has a relationship to male patterns of abuse and may
also have links with the lives of women who have suffered abuse in family and
heterosexual or homosexual relationships. As Card argues,
Much consensual sadomasochism even among lesbians may be a
playful reenactment of childhood abuse. In an essay in the journal
Lesbian Ethics Ardel Thomas reflects on her experience both as
the masochist in lesbian sadomasochism and as a survivor of
mother-daughter incest, arguing the two are interconnected.
(Card, 1995: 145)
Ultimately it is enslaved to a culture of openness that is highly ritualised and limiting, and
reveals more than other sexological discourses the epistemological limits of ‘sexuality’.
Such ‘extreme’ discourses that operate at the fringes of conventional sexological
discourse, attempt to suggest that masculine symbolism in the possession of women is
transformed into a power for good, rather than the type of erroneous and ruthless
masculinity that exists in the sexual practices of the incarcerated male. Interpreting
Foucault’s and Butler’s concept of power and the body as a transformative site for
discourse, Ebert argues that, power “is “aleatory” (that is, marked by chance and
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arbitrariness); contingent (rather than historically determined); heterogeneous (divided by
difference within), and un-stable – by provoking “resistance” it “undoes” itself” (Ebert,
1995:133).
Consequently a critical perspective reveals that lesbianism sadomasochism reifies
masculinity as it puts it further out of the reach of women. Variance comes with
personalities, and likes and dislikes. Serious injuries, an accidental or ‘snuff’ death from
the rituals, is at the outer fringes of the discourse based on the empowerment of some and
the subservience of others. Themes of exacting revenge over those who may have played
a role in their political and social oppression (using the political maxim that there are no
political innocents) – a ritual sacrifice can occur and be enacted on a man that bears little
relationship to their actual oppressors, initiating a journey of self-actualisation.
Comparisons with ‘structural’ forms of logic for the postmodernist, denotes an inability
to view extreme and unusual sexual behaviours conceptually and or as potentially
transitory.
The following extract is from BBBDomme, whose sexual profile and interests
appeared in an Internet site for alternative lifestyle personals3.
I own my beauty salon in Harlem which is frequented by black
females. I am a widow, mother of two daughters (28&25), trained
nurse, healthy, tall, powerful and attractive. A true dominant and
a real sadist. I employ two black sistas, (19&39), both married,
both secretly Domme. We all enjoy forced prolonged bodyworship, especially anal worship. I am looking for a white male,
to own by permanent contract 24/7/365 after an initial
3

Alt.com, June 2002.
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acquaintance-training, who will then be kept locked in the
basement under my shop, impaled on a large butt plug and cock
padlocked to a ring on the floor during the day, serving me, my
two sistas and a few select discrete clientele exclusively as our
toilet. Sometimes my daughters will visit too. If you did obey
well, there will be rewards, once the shop is closed, and heavy
punishments, if you made a fuss. I am into fierce face slapping,
trampling and whipping cocks and kicking balls. Fisting (by my
sistas) to be expected, as well as more elaborate C&BT and
electro games, as they husbands to be angry about. But they will
play with you only occasionally (but use you daily). We are all
very PMS prone. Your oral servitude will help you ease some of
it, we’ll take it out on you. Sundays will be your resting day,
unless I arrange a show-training and feeding frenzy for/with some
of my clientele, daughters, etc. I will keep you healthy with pills
and some food, so don’t worry. I look after my property, specially
if it is such a useful one. Dare you enter a new world as a toilet
for black women? Write to me now.
Ideal Person- You must be white or asian, preferably under 35
(over 18 and under 5’8”, healthy and not fat, but if you’re
otherwise suitable, I may make exceptions. You must be 100%
independent, free and available, (relocatable if out of town) with
no obligations whatsover! You must be quite determined and
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honest to yourself before contacting me in person, I might make
you sign a contract even during the first training, if I think you are
the one for the job. I won’t respond to oneliners. Tell me why I
should choose you and why you want this life for yourself. There
must be no turning back, ever.
Looking for- A man for active participation
Activities enjoyed- 24/7 (total power exchange), altocalciphilia
(high heels), asphyxiaphilia (breath play), branding, cock and ball
torture, coprophilia (shit play), collar and lead, electro torture,
fisting, handcuffs/shackles, oral fixation, piercings, rimming,
sadism, urolagnia (piss play).
The strong racial overtones, and the systematic stripping of themes of identity, would
make it unlikely that such a man could escape with his life in BBBDomme’s requirement
of a slave4. The desire to humiliate a small un-masculine man has several practical and
desired outcomes, as she would require a small man for her dungeon. Secondly, a large or
strong man would present physical challenges, but also he may represent what Domme
actually admires – male physical strength - hence her reticence to demean him. With a
small man, and (one who has low self esteem the main pre-requisite to sign her contract),
he is almost totally humiliated before his torture begins. The hatred of such men extends
to more than just a dislike of their biological masculinity. In an inversed romantic love
theme, it is “hate at first sight”, for the type of man who seeks out this type of punishment
does not deserve her respect, even though he may crave it. While his masculinity is

4

In 2004, a German man responded to an internet personal that asked for someone who was willing to be
the victim in an act of cannibalism. www.arminm.com Accessed, 5/5/04.
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minimal, her transcendent appropriation of the victim’s masculinity and his inevitable
death, gives the closest experience to being “male”. Reference to her ‘sistas’ being angry
about their husbands, perhaps the most revealing feature, and an indication of the real
source of their anger and modes of personal alienation without legitimate source of
redress.
A female submissive who wants to continue being controlled yet also seeking a path
to appropriated masculinity, writes the following profile. “worthlesscow”, is married, and
interested in intense abuse.
Let me begin by being upfront about my basic needs and
limitations. I am married. I do not anticipate this changing in the
near future. If you are interested in meeting me or exchanging
personal pictures/phone calls….. I am afraid that I am not the one
for you. I am not interested in illegal activities, particularly
anything relating to child abuse or fantasies of my untimely death.
Particularly given my husband’s career, our contact will
necessarily be discrete and anonymous. I am 27, have been
married 5 years, and have not had an overtly masochistic
experience since 1992. I am not what you call a “PC” type submasochist. I am not interested in safe words, respect or kindness
or limited “scenes”. In fact, what excites me the most is intense
physical, mental and emotional abuse, extreme degradation,
humiliation, and training to the point of dehumanisation. While I
crave moderate levels of physical pain and discomfort, I am (at
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least at this point), not a masochist really. In truth I can’t really
say I know what I will be, or what I want to be. I am not very
good at making decisions, and I get very stressed out by even the
simple everyday choices that confront me in life. I am educated
but uncreative. I think that like most people, I tend towards selfdoubt (my husband often criticises me for depending on the
approval of others). I am realistic about myself. I know that I am
not special. Nor am I crazy, neurotic or depressive. I am 5’6, and
135 pounds, with dark brown hair. I graduated from college in
1994 and have one child. My husband works in “public policy”,
while I am a fulltime mom at the moment. He has no interest of
any kind in this type of thing, leaving me pretty much on my own.
People would describe me as quiet and shy with above average
looks, and somewhat yuppie tastes. I had submissive needs even
before I had sexual needs, and would consider myself a natural
submissive. I did not choose this, and often I wish I was not this
way. Except for acquaintances in college and high school, no one
knows this about me. I am not overly experienced. I have been
beaten, and have dabbled in scat, water-sports and various
humiliating activities. Since before I really understood it, I was
very willing, but too shy to find the right person, and then all of
this ended when I met my husband. At that point in my life, I was
still hoping that those thoughts would go away. Now I am certain
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that this is something I need to deal with. My hope is to converse
with someone who is interested in fostering and shaping this part
of my personality. If I cannot give up my body, at least I would
like to give my mind and my sexuality to you, so that when I
close my eyes at night my mind is full of your thoughts, when I
masturbate I think only of the fantasies you shape for me, so that
the first thing in the morning I think of is you. So that I become
accustomed to and expect abuse as a normal part of my life. I
want to repeat your words in my head until I believe they are my
own. This is very hard for me to write, because I am sure that my
words sound foolish to you. I hope you can see past all this and
that I will be of interest to you. I want you to help me see how I
am wrong, to criticise my mistakes, show me my weaknesses, so
that I can see myself as I am, without illusions. I am weak and
afraid and horny. Please write to me while I still have the nerve.
Sincerely----- (I have omitted my name in hope that you will give
me a new name of your choice). I am shit I am a worthless cunt I
am a sow I am an ugly bitch I am stupid I am a slut I am a pussy I
am a whore I am a toilet I am a pathetic cow I am ashtray I am a
pig I am disgusting I am subhuman I am weak I am a farm animal
I deserve to be beaten I am filthy I am wrong. I cannot live on my
own. I need your abuse. I want you to hurt me I deserve what I
get I want to suffer I am boring I am foolish I am shit.
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Ideal Person- I am interested in intense interaction with an
intelligent, controlling person who will abuse me without
scruples, and who would enjoy the opportunity of shaping my
sexuality and possibilities in future life.
Looking for- A man or a woman or a couple or a gay couple, a
lesbian couple or multiple persons for erotic email exchanges.
Activities enjoyed- 24/7 (total power exchange), algolagnia (love
of

pain),

branding,

coprophilia

(shit

play),

discipline,

exhibitionism, electrotorture, masochism, play rape, urolagnia
Unlike ‘Domme’, ‘worthlesscow’, openly concedes that her femaleness is her
greatness weakness, and to her, it is evidently facile to challenge the physical and mental
hegemony of men. Recognising the danger in rituals that mimic death, she hides behind a
bourgeois identity seeking only metaphoric experiences. Using the ‘femme’ lesbian
personality type as a base, she wants to build her superstructure as an example of her lack
of assertiveness and masculinity. However echoing Butler’s thesis of efficacy in
imitation, Sherman, (in Presdee), states,
What do women get from being submissive? The answer is they
get what they want. If you want to be submissive you should be
able to stand up and say ‘Tie me up I love it’. It requires being
very strong to be a submissive. Being submissive does not equal
being weak. (Presdee, 2000:100)
Consistent with the postmodern emphasis on relativism and context, Sherman can
advocate submissive behaviour as long as it an individual choice, although sex as a
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symbol of inverting oppression is also seen to be given sex an efficacy it does not
materially possess.
While the examples are from America, there is a relatively high participation rate in
Australia in the BDSM lifestyle personals5, an internet club that is based in America.
Overall members in the United States total 539,132, compared to 24,759 for Australia.
European countries with significantly larger populations than Australia, such as Great
Britain and Germany, total 61,919 and 10,858 respectively. A further breakdown of
listings sees that Australia has a slightly greater number of lesbian sadomasochists, than
women seeking men, 1,668 and 1,502. The figures overall indicate that men are the group
mostly engaged in homosexual and heterosexual sadomasochism, with heterosexual men
dominating the listings in the United States, with 375,064 seeking to practice
sadomasochism with women. Australian listings also reveal that heterosexual men
dominate in the overall figures, with 18,042 men seeking women, and 3,053 men seeking
men.
Taking a traditional feminist view on lesbian sadomasochism, and a confusing moral
high ground, Jeffreys argues that, “gay men have not produced much theory about s/m.
They have simply practiced it and taken it for granted. Lesbians were impelled to theory
by their uncomfortable feeling that s/m ideology is in contradiction to the most cherished
precepts of feminism” (Jeffreys, 1990:210). From Jeffrey’s perspective lesbian
sadomasochism is an embarrassment to feminism, despite that it could have symbolic
appeal in the inversion of Protestant asceticism, and women’s mediating role in
Protestant capitalism generally. However as Faderman indicates, within lesbian politics
there existed a desire to expand conceptions of feminist politics, and deconstruct
5

www.alt.com 12/8/2002
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“politically correct” paradigms.
The resurgence of butch/femme was also a reaction to the “drab
stylelessness” of the lesbian-feminist community in the 1970s that
was “anaphrodisiac,” as one woman described it. Her friends in
the ‘70s, she recalled, were philosophically appealing, but they
created “the most unerotic environment….No make-up, denim
overalls, flannel shirts. I compared it to Mao’s China. Plain and
sexless.” (Faderman, 1991:268)

Homosexuality

Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it
was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind in
interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite
had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species. (Foucault, 1978:43)
The drive to identify homosexuals can see it defined before an actual technical
definition can be applied, as their ‘homosexuality’, is overwhelmingly assumed. Relating
to the Enlightenment phenomenon towards identification, effete characteristics became a
cruel and pragmatic way or identifying those more likely to become exclusively
homosexual, and it is this identity shaped by the persecutors that is ‘celebrated’. This
feature was exacerbated or originated in the sexological creation of a disinterested female
subject, who become socialised to be pursued by an assertive male subject. Therefore the
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gay personality is an extension of other heterosexual masculine failures such as
impotency. The utilitarian function of the phallus then becomes a key theme in defining
the gay personality, as distinct from ‘homosexuality’, which is then even more difficult to
define, and specifically, why a male anus is preferable to a vagina, or a female anus.
Homosexual sex in gaols without the associate effete symbolism of both partners is
therefore unique, although like male sports, there often is the overt attempt to reflect
heterosexual masculine codes in the final analysis. The various manifestations reflect the
desire for the “double male” experience, a term used to describe a cult of raw and
conjoined masculinity. In the mainstream community and with those men who are
socially perceived as effete, the homosexual experience may be closer to two sublimated
masculinities making one. As Bristow suggests,
We are – to the heterosexual world – walking definitions of sex.
We mean sex. Our lifestyle is defined as a sexual lifestyle, a
lifestyle that says ‘fuck’. It is hardly a coincidence that it is one of
the greatest insults to tell someone to ‘fuck off’. Fucking has a
power that is hard to define. Sex is still bound up for many people
with explosive fears and volatile hatreds. It is also the thing that
western peoples talk interminably about. The fascination of sex is
endless. Gay men provide a convenient target for the
displacement and projection of a widespread social confusion
about heterosexuality on to a small ‘perverse’ group. (Bristow,
1989:74)
There is an inversion of masculine parameters in gaol which suggest an overall shift to
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a lesbian butch /femme dichotomy. Those judged effeminate are not just being defined as
homosexual, but are in danger of rape, and are at risk of being used by several men as a
symbol of sexual servitude. Meanwhile the sexual aggressor appears as the “real man”, as
he aggrandises masculinity through the violence of rape, with its own linguistic sub-text
of, “I’m not gay, but the bloke I fucked was”. This partial confession reveals that their
homosexuality is transient, and largely predicated on the need to have somebody to
‘fuck’.

The

separation

between

sexual

practices

and

‘sexuality’

normalises

heterosexuality as the hegemonic sexuality, and in an unconscious fashion, it is
reminiscent of Greek man - boy initiation rites. However the type of brutality expressed
through much of homosexual sex in gaols, and its emphasis on power and control rather
than sex or affection, reflects broader society’s problem with homosexual sex. The overt
denial of the caricatured homosexual type increases the general level of violence in the
masculine personality, as this ‘freedom’ of the gaol environment, signifies one of the last
remnants of expressive industrial masculinity.
This type of homosexuality suggests if not the fact that a high degree of undetected
‘homosexuality’ activity and orientation exists in the broader community, but that the set
of gender symbols that ruthlessly ‘outs’ the caricatured homosexual is inherently
problematic. Rape and sex in gaol also may reveal more than sex - starved men who have
masturbation as the only outlet while incarcerated. While the lack of women is a factor in
their choices, (it can only be assumed that women would remain first choice if they
shared gaols with men), the male-only environment gives some individuals the chance to
express aspects of masculinity frowned upon in broader society. As Gough argues,
The masculinisation of the homosexual, which began in the
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1970s, has been joined in the 1980s by the increased
masculinisation of the heterosexual man. These two trends have
tended to reinforce each other: a masculinisation of the
heterosexual is a result of the increased freedom of heterosexual
women, at least in the middle class, to choose their sexual partner
(a deepening of the female heterosexual identity itself), with
heterosexual men, like gay men, becoming objects of desire.
(Gough, 1989:130-131)
Somewhat contradictorily, the gaol culture stands as a bulwark against paedophilia,
although the masculine gaol environment ruthlessly attacks those who cannot protect
themselves. The “rock-spider”, becomes akin to the hidden and unrecognised
homosexual, whose concealment contradicts Enlightenment ideology. The rock-spider
ethos is also related to a lumpenproletariat sub-cultural form of masculinity, which
defines itself against the traditional masculinity as represented by the law. The need to
project a heterosexual standard based on the objectification and protection of children, is
based upon legends of unfair treatment at the hands of jurisprudence that creates the need
to project a higher, purer form of moral codification6. Furthermore, as Hearn argues,
Interestingly, the focus on the public domain as against private
domain crime is itself paralleled in legal constructions of men.
For example, Richard Collier (1995) has expertly demonstrated
how the explicit construction of ‘dangerous masculinities’ in law
6

The phenomenon of gaol masculinity and morality gaining broad acceptance, is reflected in the popularity
of underworld figure Mark ‘Chopper’ Read. Read started to write entertaining books while still in gaol,
with titles such as ‘Hits and Memories’. Later the subject of a major Australian film, Read’s popularity was
underpinned by his ability as a raconteur and the legend that he only killed those who also made their living
from crime such as drug dealers.
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is itself premised on the implicit construction of the ‘good father’,
the ‘family man’ and indeed heterosexuality itself. (Hearn,
1998:47)
While homosexuality became overtly associated with the Acquired Immunity
Deficiency virus (AIDS), in the 1980s, masturbation implies Laqueur, has suffered a
more significant and longer-term medical stigmitisation. The muted jokes regarding
masturbation causing hairy palms or blindness, emanates from serious medical discourse
that treated masturbation as a moral and physical aberration.
Charles Dickens’s shifty-eyed, pimply, sallow-complexioned,
untrustworthy Uriah Heep is probably the most famous and easily
recognised culprit in Victorian fiction, but there are many, many
others. (There are also other, and literarily more interesting uses
of masturbation in Dickens: his play on Swift’s old joke in Oliver
Twist – “Charley Bates, Master Charles Bates, Master Bates”, and the long account of Pip’s hiding his “wicked secret”, his
“secret burden down the leg of his trousers” in Great
Expectations.) He was building on a century-long tradition that
believed that the masturbator was an easily recognisable type.
“Pale, desiccated limbs, hollow chest, powerless, sunken
head…dead white face…eyelids falling powerlessly over his
dying fading eyes.” (Laqueur, 2003:64)
In the late twentieth century there has been an attempt reclaim gay stigmitisation
through inversion - the celebration of the ‘gay’ personality, through events such as
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Sydney’s Gay and Lesbian Madri Gras7. This approach tends to have a limited impact
outside of certain areas of Sydney, and becomes a localised phenomenon similar to San
Francisco’s overt gay culture. Regional and country areas still express profound
resentment towards aspects of this new, partially accepted, public space orientated gay
politics. Certainly in these areas, overt displays of gayness are an open invitation to
violence, suggesting what is accepted, tolerated and practiced in Sydney is unique to
Sydney, as local regions are ‘policed’ by angry young ‘heterosexual’ males. For Tomsen,
The majority of assailants in the killings studied are young,
working-class and poor men with a marginal existence in the
labour market and low social status. Much of this violence,
especially the planned gang attacks on homosexual men, suggests
an underlying compensatory search for masculine status among
offenders, and an important cultural paradox which appears to
shape many of these attacks. (Tomsen, 2003:95)
Alternatively gay parodies of heterosexual normalisations such as the ‘worker’ or
‘cowboy’ reveals that “to be sure, gay masculinity is not, in any simple way, ‘real’
masculinity, any more than camp is ‘real’ femininity. It is more self-conscious than the
real thing, more theatrical, and often ironic” (Gough, 1989:121)
For gender theorists using a social psychological perspective, the “post-industrial
society” presents the opportunity to assert the death of male heterosexuality. This
perspective obscures the political relationship between postmodern gender theory and

7

In the “Australian legend” sublimated ‘homosexuality’ amongst ‘mates’ is unconscious and a product of
casual relationships with women. R.Ward, The Australian Legend, pages 99-100
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economic rationalist policies, and as Donaldson illustrates, the articulation of gender
identities in the industrial workforce is defined by its utilitarianism.
Most non-manual work is regarded as effeminate, ‘sissy’, and is
performed

by

‘poofters’

and

‘wankers’.

A

steelworker

commented to me, ‘Social workers? They’re just like fucking
clerks. What would they know about life?’ And as Ken B.
remarked, ‘the egghead brainy guy with good grades, the little
wimpy guy with glasses, you might as well be a girl’. Men who
do office work or nursing are, according to young working-class
women, ‘limp-wristed’, ‘sissy’, ‘faggy and ‘weirdo’. (Donaldson,
1991:10)
The ignorance of the fact that the male heterosexual personality is largely a product of
physical labour, becomes an appropriation of the male worker’s cultural “surplus value,”
by the middle class. This de-construction of masculinity through post-modern social
science discourses has taken advantage of the unemployment malaise to attack the core
identity of industrial masculinity.
All the technological progress, the conquest of nature, the
rationalisation of man and society have not eliminated and cannot
eliminate the necessity of alienated labour, the necessity of
working mechanically, unpleasurably, in a manner that does not
represent individual self-realisation. (Marcuse, 1966:222)
Subsequently heterosexuality has been based in a pragmatic organising principle in the
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revolt against economic oppression. In the Australian film Sunday Too Far Away8, the
harsh reality of itinerant labour and their compulsory heterosexuality needs to be taken in
the context of their oppressive labour conditions. Their overt heterosexuality is exercised
to present a united front, (often with the requirement to express violence), with
homosexuality viewed as divisive, and as a ‘sexuality’. Therefore while it can be
assumed that gay politics wishes to distance itself from the heterosexual foundations of
industrialisation, it also seeks distance from theorists such as Marx, who did not
recognise the dynamic of ‘sexuality’ in his political and social analysis. The
‘feminisation’ of the male can be seen as an evolution in the changing dynamics of
industrialisation that is less unionised, and hence less ‘masculine’.
The less the skill and exertion implied in manual labour, in other
words, the more modern industry becomes developed the more is
the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of
age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the
working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less
expensive to use, according to their age and sex. (Marx & Engels,
1848: “Bourgeois and Proletarians”)
In terms of contemporary social and intellectual debate, “the problem” of
homosexuality occupies the type of “ideological space” that could be filled by substantive
economic and class based analysis. In the neo-liberal context, the desire to feminise men
suggests an alignment of gender identities and capitalist compliance, and furthermore,
may prove useful to ‘push’ as many men into homosexuality. This leaves women to
appropriate the cultural advantages of heterosexuality (in the absence of men), while still
8

1975, director K. Hannam.
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pursuing options in relation to bi-sexuality and lesbianism. This can then solidify their
position in the female dominated neo-liberal labour market. Connell prefers to see the
impact of neo-liberalism dominated by a masculinist theory rather than an economic
tradition that is class aware, but gender blind.
The ‘individual’ of neo-liberal theory has the attributes and
interests of a male entrepreneur. The attack on the welfare state
generally weakens the position of women, while the increasingly
unregulated power of transnational corporations places strategic
power in the hands of particular groups of men. (Connell,
2000:51).
The notion of violence as a legitimate expression by disenfranchised heterosexual men is
also questioned by Connell when he asserts the need for, “new and more democratic
patterns in gender relations, not re-runs of discredited patriarchies” (Connell, 2000:6).

Paedophilia (hebophilia)

To identify as gay is accordingly to take on a stigmitised form of
masculinity. Homosexuality is perceived as a failure to attain
hegemonic masculinity. The prohibition of man/boy sex must be
understood in this context. (Leahy 1992:72) 9

9

Research based in the ‘sexuality’ of children remains one of the most contentious areas in academia. This
is also compounded by the fact that academic studies, in contrast with most ‘folk wisdoms’, seek to locate
examples and possibilities that adult/child sex can be ‘positively experienced’ in the post-Enlightenment
society. Leahy’s doctoral thesis, which dealt with issues relating to “positively experienced man/boy sex”,
follows on from groups seeking legitimacy such as the British Paedophile Information Exchange, (PIE),
and the North American Man/Boy Love Association, (NAMBLA).
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Homosexuality has become a political movement based on civil libertarian beliefs that
homosexuality is an adult activity. This is related to the immersion of homosexuality into
community values, particularly those relating to the nuclear family and the protection of
children. In the Greek context however, Keuls suggests that ‘homosexuality’ was so free
of stigmitisation that it could gravitate to its ‘real’ orientation of pedastry.
The homosexual connection favoured by Greeks was not so much
homoerotic as pederastic; the archetypal relationship was between
a mature man at the height of his sexual power and a young,
erotically undeveloped boy just before puberty. (Keuls, 1993:275)
Leahy and his mentor Foucault, again link homosexuality with paedophilia,
(hebophilia). Foucault also eludes to the suggestion that there existed an Athenian “high
point” of homosexuality, and the general hegemony of homo-erotica, manifested in
man/boy ‘love’. While child sexual abuse is now more widely reported, it has been the
institution of the nuclear family that has traditionally concealed much of the unreported

Indicating that such research is across disciplines is the example of Edinburgh Psychology Professor
Christopher Brand, who was suspended from the University following the publication of his book, the G
Factor. The book, which deals principally with ‘IQ’ (intelligence quotients) suggest that IQ is linked to
racial differences, but also makes an association with the argument that some children can have nonharmful paedophilic experiences. Brand asserts that “Academic studies and my own experience (as a
choirboy occasionally importuned by older men), suggest that non-violent paedophilia with a consenting
partner over the age of twelve, does no harm so long as the paedophiles and their partners are of above
average IQ and educational level” (Holden, 1996) – www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/Brand/holden.html.
In Australia, information was presented to the Wood Royal Commission in 1997, from a Sociology
tutorial handbook containing pro-paedophilia references, and a doctoral thesis that reflected on a nuanced
view of paedophilia. While significant evidence was not found against the two academics, evidence
presented from a range of occupations that involved the care and instruction of children and young adults,
led to the creation New South Wales Child Protection Act of 1998. The Act restricts the involvement of
convicted child sex offenders in occupations directly involving children, with adult teaching institutions
such as universities also covered by the Act.
By the mid 1990s child sexual abuse was still receiving a high level of
publicity, but the focus had broadened to encompass paedophilia, which was
outside the family and thus largely beyond the domain of the child protection
system. In New South Wales the issue became highly politicised with concern
about paedophilia and corruption in high places leading to the Wood Royal
Commission. (Scott&Swain, 2002:172)
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cases. However, the increasing fragmentation of the nuclear family has also been
matched by the fragmentation of capitalism, perhaps precipitating a higher incidence of
abuse. This could re-create the conditions that Foucault argues existed when family
relations were based on kinship alliances before the beginning of the seventeenth century.
This demonstrates his belief that within the alliance system there was a natural
occurrence of incest. (Foucault, 1978:106)
It was a time of direct gestures, shameless discourse, and open
transgressions, when anatomies were shown and intermingled at
will, and knowing children hung about amid the laughter of
adults: it was a period when bodies “made a display of
themselves.” (Foucault, 1978:3)
In this context, as homosexuality implicitly defined as a sexuality it can act as a dialectic
in the promotion and activity of heterosexual child ‘love’. Moreover it could be
interpreted as one of the diverse approaches of gay politics in searching for political
terrain that offends mainstream sensitivities. This subsequently releases the long-held
fear that homosexual discourse, given enough latitude, will inevitably want to engage in
child love discourses, beginning through legal and social argument that the “age of
consent” should be same as it is for heterosexuality. An inversion of its marginalisation,
can become a discursive tactic argues Foucault.
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century
psychiatry, jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of
discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality,
inversion, pederasty, and “psychic hermaphrodism” made
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possible a strong advance of social controls into this area of
“perversity”; but it also made possible the formation of a
“reverse” discourse; homosexuality began to speak in its own
behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or “naturality” be
acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same
categories by which it was medically disqualified. (Foucault,
1978:101)
Underpinning Foucault’s realm of “queer theory” (S/M, fist fucking, gay bath-house
sex paedophilia/hebophilia, drugs to heighten the enjoyment of sex, and the incorporation
of heterosexuality within the scope of ‘queer’), - was the objective to transcend the
restrictions of a conventional gay identity. Broadly, he sees the constitutive framework of
queer theory creating the environment for an emphasis on ‘pleasure’ rather than desire.
As Halperin also argues,
It is not desire but pleasure that, for Foucault, holds out the
promise of such a disaggregating experience. Unlike desire,
which expresses the subject’s individuality, history, and identity
as a subject, pleasure is desubjectivating, impersonal: it shatters
identity, subjectivity, and dissolves the subject, however
fleetingly, into the sensorial continuum of the body, into the
unconscious dreaming of the mind. (Halperin, 1995: 95)
Post-Christian and Enlightenment assertions of the legitimacy of paedophile themes are
also indicative of a ‘fraying’ of traditional heterosexual and homosexual cultures. “Child
love” is a post-modern theory that desires a disconnection from the structural issues in the
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capitalist economy, to one where, optimistically, a privileged middle class can indulge in
a variety of sexual pleasures. As Patton asserts, “the postmodern state proposes lateral
linkages, communities or consumption units held in relation to one another and operating
through the commercial logic of a free market that circulates rather than negotiates
freedoms” (Patton, 1994:172). Subsequently to place the theory within a traditional
revolutionary praxis the children of the bourgeoisie would need to be ‘molested’ to
contest the link between the nuclear family and capitalist social organisation. But the
often unsupervised “latch key kids” from dysfunctional and poverty stricken families are
the most likely victims and recipients of molestation or ‘love’, or seek ‘mentoring’ roles
that may lead into abuse. Arguments that relate to a systematic abuse of children can
attack the capitalist and heterosexual nuclear family, are similar to those that assert that
illegal drugs can invert the work ethic. The ‘heterosexist’ nuclear family becomes a site
for locating and extrapolating “child love” using aloof and condescending treatment by
adults as justification for their ‘interference’. As one proponent of child love argues,
Have you been to a Communion in a Roman Catholic Church
lately? Religion is rammed down kid’s throats every day much
more than sex with adults ever occurs, and nobody says anything!
This is a great parallel. Despite the long-term effects of this and
other rituals, etc, practiced by religions that nearly qualify (like
the Jehovah’s Witnesses) as cults, it goes on indefinitely with the
full blessing of our hypocritical society! (Smith, Chapman,
1999:228-229)
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Foucault made no claims that by attacking the social formations of industrial capitalism,
or more specifically Enlightenment science paradigms and Victorian/Christian morality
that an economic revolution would follow.
If the politics of sex makes little use of the law of the taboo but
brings into play an entire technical machinery, if what is involved
is the production of sexuality rather than the repression of sex,
then our emphasis has to placed elsewhere: we must shift our
analysis away from the problem of “labour capacity” and
doubtless abandon the diffuse energetics that underlies the theme
of a sexuality repressed for economic reasons. (Foucault,
1978:114)
Indicative of post-modern discourse, is the promotion of possibilities over realities
with contrived outcomes, and an adherence to arbitrarily applied moral relativisms.
Moreover, rather than an expression of individual autonomy, ‘positive’ outcomes could
be as a result of a ritualised form of homosexual entrapment. Leahy found with his male
interviewees, following a sexual relationship with a male adult as a child/adolescent that;
In the case of heterosexual interviewees the older partner was
viewed as a mentor or friend and someone who helped the
younger party to break free from parental authority and claim
independence. In the case of the gay interviewees there was a
similar understanding of these events as helping them to establish
adult identity – in this case in the context of an underlying gay
sexuality. (Leahy, 1992:87)
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Furthermore and confusingly the homosexual identity should not really be about ‘sex’ at
all due to its close relationship to productive and scientific values, although how this shift
from these values to a politically neutral identity is not quantified by Foucault. For
Foucault, queer theory produces alternate sexualities that enable the search for identity
itself.
Through the invention of novel, intense, and scattered bodily
pleasures, queer culture brings about a tactical reversal of the
mechanisms of sexuality, making strategic use of power
differentials, physical sensations, and sexual identity-categories in
order to create a queer praxis that ultimately disposes with
“sexuality” and destabilises the very constitution of identity itself.
(Halperin, 1995:96-97)
Foucault clearly then requires a class or status based system for these personal histories to
be played out. His favour for the Greek concept of ascesis (a form of self-stylisation)
reveals an attempt to reconstruct the reign of elites who can fashion themselves according
to their will or desires. This was “intentionally adopted by a few members of a male elite
in order to enhance the beauty of their existences and to increase their mastery over
themselves and others” (Halperin, 1995:109).
By not placing sexuality or “self fashioning” within a materialist context increases the
theoretical and practical problems when the repressive Victorian era is analysed. To
merely build a dichotomous polemic that attempts to artificially strip Victorianism from
its historical and social relevance or context is to ignore significant historical and social
facts. To able to transcend from the sexual at a point in time once “sexual demons” have
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been exorcised on the path to another identity, may prove to be optimistic given some of
the multi-layered manifestations of the Enlightenment and Victorian morality.
Consequently the attempt to de-construct the discursive notion of the paedophile to
literally mean merely a “lover’ of children” still faces considerable social inertia.
Victorians uncovered the special life of childhood they also
revealed childhood sexuality. Children were described as ‘little
angels’ and ‘closer to god’ than other mortals. Like women they
were ‘purer’ than adult males, and the ideas of femininity and
childhood were and are interrelated myths. But children’s
ideologically asexual appearance was threatened with denial by a
barely suppressed acknowledgement of their actual sexuality.
(Smith & Chapman, 1999:204)
The child ‘grooming’ process, (the preparation the child for a sex act, or sex play), is
necessarily elaborate and well planned. It is also reminiscent of the sexological art of
love, where the male (or one) partner is deliberately and purposely dominant. For those
determined to acquire children for ‘love’, and subsequently punished or marginalised, can
then claim in sexological terms that ‘paedophobia’ exists.
Throughout this process; the adult is constantly evaluating the
child for the potential seduction, isolates the child from his or her
peers and other adults, and desensitises the child to overt and
covert physical or sexual stimulus, all the while engaging the
child in a non-sexual relationship. These tactics are considerably
more one-sided than the usual mating rituals adults employ to
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seduce one another. With the age and experience disparity the
child is always at a disadvantage and open to deceit and
exploitation. Some offenders who openly acknowledge the child’s
disadvantaged situation have claimed that they are operating in
the best interests of the child and therefore it is not unhealthy.
(Smith & Chapman, 1999:127)
Freud’s acknowledgement of children’s developmental stage based on sexual themes,
was characteristic of Enlightenment discourse that attempted an ‘openness’, but from
where more dilemmas and misunderstandings arose. The influence of American sexology
in late capitalism and through the liberal theme of psychology, created a confirmation of
Freudian psychoanalytic ideas that defined sexuality and the individual. The unfortunate
undercurrent was the alignment of adult phobias and childhood sexuality that inevitably
focused on the sexuality of actual children.
Ironically, the influence of psychoanalytic ideas actually became
more embedded in western culture as a whole at the very time that
it was declining in mental health professions. By the 1980s and
1990s, the very time at which child sexual abuse was becoming
established as a social problem, such ideas were gaining greater
currency in a society increasingly absorbed with a psychological
world-view. (Scott & Swain, 2002:153)
The reification of children which was partly designed to protect them from the adult
world, created an environment for their abuse and exploitation in advertising like
McDonald’s. By directing advertising at children and exploiting child-like pleasures, it
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shifts the focus from childhood from a transitory state preceding adolescence and
adulthood, to the celebration of the permanence of childhood, and child-like desires. A
conventional representation of adults wanting to be children is created in an
advertisement for Holden cars10. Using a ‘sports’ model of the Commodore sedan, a man
is shown driving home after a day at the ‘office’ (the ubiquitous middle class white-collar
worker, usually portrayed in advertising). Upon entering the driveway of the large house,
he finds his young child’s toys scattered across the driveway. Initially exasperated, he
rearranges the toys to construct a slalom course between his driveway and garage. This
time his child looks out of a window exasperated as he sees his father become a boy once
more. In essence, the boy feels that the father is now occupying his social space, and is
uncomfortable and vulnerable, and becomes an immediate threat rather an aloof adult.
Overtly, the treatment of adults as children through a pernicious and punishing postwelfare state bureaucracy, with its themes of domination of humiliation, may push the
adult to replicate the same effect on those they can assume superiority. Alternatively,
those that re-invent traditional hierarchical nuclear family values, such as Adventists,
contribute to the theme of “eroticism of the denied”, by arguing for fixed concepts of
morality, inverting the postmodern concept of moral relativism.

Heterosexual paedophilia

The 1953 book Lolita, by Vladimir Nabokov, (the subject of two subsequent films), was
about a middle age man’s unusual sexual passion and obsession, for a precocious thirteen
year old girl. Reflective of the postmodern interest in the Athenian practice of man/boy
10

Viewed in a national television advertising campaign, January 2003.
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love, men’s interest in pubescent and pre-pubescent girls indicates an insecurity towards
adult women - and/or an attempt to recapture what has been lost through feminist
polemics. The appropriation of Playboy morality by heterosexual women has been met
with a commensurate denouement of many men socially and economically. Similar to the
practice of rape, paedophilia in relation to young girls, attempts to invert the themes of
love routinisation and the delayed gratification inherent in female heterosexual culture.
The child’s ‘sexuality’, alternatively, is there for the taking, or is easily manipulated or
moulded to form an appropriate response to stimuli.
The late twentieth century concept of paedophilia also owes it origins to heterosexual
dominated rock and roll, which has been marketed principally at pre-pubescent girls. In a
heterosexual manifestation of “queer theory”, the use of drugs, and hedonistic sexual
experiences were a feature of this lifestyle for the performers, and a site for contesting the
feminist critique of patriarchy. Whereas Playboy morality was aimed at the bourgeois
mentality of a business executive, with a projected demographic of thirties and upwards,
“Rock and Roll” became an extension of Playboy morality, where men in their early
twenties, were marketed to appeal to teenage, (and younger), girls. The moral outrage
that greeted the suggestive rhythms and the gyrations of early rock and roll’s greatest
symbol, Elvis Presley, was confirmed when singer Jerry Lee Lewis his married thirteen
year old cousin. ‘Elvis’, aware that Lewis’ foray restricted his career as a pop idol,
concealed the fact that his future wife was fourteen when she moved to his home,
‘Graceland’11.
Elvis’ induction into the army in 1958 ushered in the end of “Rock and Roll’s” first

11

According to the autobiography on her life with Presley, “Elvis and Me”, Priscilla Presley claimed that
she was a virgin until their marriage when he was thirty two, and she was nineteen.
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brief era. Sanitised and structured versions of rock’s earlier rebellion occurred until the
Beatles phenomenon of 1964. While the early Beatles where highly stage-managed by
manager Brian Epstein, “Rock and Roll” was rejuvenated. As an artistic and social force
its peak was the late 1960s until mid-1970s, where “bad boy” groups such as the Rolling
Stones,12 and the rock/psychedelic movement dominated. Consequently “Rock and
Roll’s” appeal has been largely represented by male performers and groups personified
by the shrieking and hysteria of young female fans. In Australia, during the late 1970s
Cold Chisel had a song called, “You’re beautiful, you’re thirteen, and your mine”, while
Dragon, asked rhetorically in a song “are you old enough for love”. This continued the
Australian tradition in late capitalist sexology of re-asserting heterosexual values, values
that are distinctively exhibited in frontier societies. The concept of the female Lolita
“rock star”, and pop singers such as Britney Spears, traverses the distinction for the desire
for underage Lolita’s, and Rock music’s masculine bias.
An internet search for ‘Lolita’ displays girls between the ages of seven to seventeen.
The majority of the sites purportedly conform to a United States judgment that states that
such nudity is tolerated, as long as there is no lewd or graphic focus or emphasis on the
genitals. One such site Lolita Paradise, states that they “vehemently oppose what is
commonly called “child pornography”, as legally defined by United States Code Title 18,
Part 1 Chapter 110 Section 2256 as images containing “sexually explicit conduct”…..”
They further state, that: “Lolita Paradise is simply offering you the same opportunity to
view aesthetically pleasing images as the major bookstores do, just at a lower cost. As
with all art, the question of the work’s artistic value is left solely to the viewer, and as
12

Compared with Elvis’ toilet roll phallic prosthesis, the cover of the Rolling Stone’s 1970 album “Sticky
Fingers”, with its close up picture of a large male appendage in tight jeans, brought the concept of so-called
“cock rock” (male dominated popular music), to its obvious conclusion.
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such, Lolita Paradise does not expect all viewers to like or even approve of nude images
of minors”. (www.lolita-paradise.com/)
Lolita’s Paradise is an older site reflecting child nudity as art emanating from some
Continental European and naturalism movements. The naturalism movement that had its
genesis in sunny California, encouraged people to “let it all hang out”, and with the deemphasising of sex in this environment, people could learn perhaps to eventually accept
the sexual connotations of their bodies as well. As the environment was ostensibly
unthreatening, men women and children frolicked naked on large and interactive nudist
‘colonies’. Nudity in the colony parried the line between returning man to ‘nature’, in his
‘natural’ nude state, and the “eroticism of the denied”, where upon viewing nudity, an
individual is given to sexual thoughts and impulses. Consequently the nakedness of the
children was being interpreted and sometimes depicted photographically as erotic. This
period was the genesis of an underground movement in the eroticisation of nude children
magazines that has now spread to the internet.
Current photographic and video images are contained within sites such as the “world’s
biggest Lolita Portal”13. This reveals the ongoing nature of child erotic art, and is
substantially more than photos that originated in nudist colonies, but a business that is
constantly recruiting “new talent”. Most sites use children from Russia and countries of
the old Soviet Republic, where legend of the “Russian mafia” permeates in all types of
commodity transaction. While some might conform to Section 2256 of United States law
in relation to pornography, there are numerous sites that offer indicate a flagrant
disregard to Section 2256 while still stating their sites are legal. Membership prices
average around US forty dollars.
13

www.bd-forum.com/popups/index.html
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Such sites came from a cursory search on the internet – with up to ninety per cent of
web sites unknown and unlisted on the known search engines, the potential for child
sexual abuse is practically limitless. These sites operate as secret societies where children
can be abused in “real time” via a web-cam, where members can view the activity. The
problem in the existence of these extreme sites is that it blurs the distinction between the
individual who has an interest in perhaps gently and persuasively ‘grooming’ a child, (or
simply viewing child nudity) and the aggressive and ‘selfish’, child molester who will
eventually act upon impulses. The sexological concept of the “art of love” is promising to
be as problematic in the adult interaction with children as it is for heterosexual adults.
However for Weeks, the average member of the Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE),
was “his chief distinguishing characteristic is an intense, but often highly affectionate and
even excessively sentimental, regard for young people” (Weeks, 1985:227).
While child nudity sites perhaps conveniently uses art as a justification (particularly in
the softer versions) it follows the Playboy tradition of mass-produced nudity that parades
as art. This attempts to suggest that the viewer is consuming the images in a detached,
remote form, rather than an intense masturbatory experience. The type of morality
originally promoted by Playboy, (young girls commodified for men), sets the paradigm
for of using of even younger models. Subsequently it takes Playboy’s economic and
social philosophy onto the global market, as the sexual use of children in poor countries
is considered a delicacy to powerful Western men. (More vigilance in prosecuting
paedophiles has also seen a sharp rise in the number of dedicated pederasts pursuing their
activities overseas, rather than risk conviction in the Western countries, with Australia’s
proximity to the Asian child sex trade thereby significant).

280

There is also the suggestion that as a result of feminist campaigns against the “male
gaze”, and the ironic appropriation of the “gay gaze” by heterosexual women, has forced
the male gaze onto a younger subject.14 Moreover, similar to the feminist campaigns
against pornography, oppositional campaigns against child sexual abuse, (usually headed
by women), tends to increase the attraction to the illicit efficacy of the form. Marked by
manifestations of phallus ridicule that can then result in rejected or humiliated men
seeking phallus efficacy elsewhere, its ascendancy as a ‘sexuality’ may be difficult to
prevent. This compounds the original placement of women in Protestantism that tends to
make women child abusers by proxy, with moral asceticism making them less available
as sexual partners. Women’s association with paedophila is likely to be covert,
developing from a sexually ascetic tradition that was exacerbated by Protestant
capitalism. The construction of penetrative sex that focused on re-production, but with
obtuse “pleasure principles” that favoured men results in men’s orgasm focused sex,
often being denied. This has traditionally been fulfilled by pornography such as Playboy,
Hustler and their variants, or through adult prostitution. Child pornography or
molestation becomes a “new frontier,” to sate men’s sexual appetites that cannot be
reversed by ‘moral’ crusades led by women.
A psychoanalytical analysis suggests that by displacing men from a perceived form of
dominance, in the public sphere of work and sexuality by a group (women) who have
been traditionally associated with hysteria in the Athenian and Enlightenment contexts,
14

Continual appropriation of the ‘gay gaze’ by heterosexual women will also result in ‘toy boys’ getting
younger. Feminist icon Germaine Greer reflecting on a book of pictures she compiled of teenage boys
titled ‘The Boy’, argued that,
I know that the only people who are supposed to like looking at pictures of
boys are a subgroup of gay men, she wrote last year in London’s Daily
Telegraph. Well, I’d like to reclaim for women the right to appreciate the shortlived beauty of boys, real boys, not simpering 30 year olds with shaved chests.
(Devine, 2003)
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simply re-directs its elements in a disparate fashion. The reproduction of historical
phenomena such as the high-point of Athenian masculine culture – the sexual abuse of
children, by ‘falsely’ placing women in a position in society is “ahistorical materialistic”.
Moreover such a ‘sexual’ placement of men is tragic rather privileged due to the
marginalisation of the male citizen in late capitalism rather than the centrality in the
Greek polis.
Overt molestation by women of children is therefore either extremely rare or
significantly unreported, as it is assumed that women form an altruistic bond with that is
apparently non-sexual. However, by including the notion of “domestic work” within the
capitalist economy and the function of women as the prime-care giver gives the
relationship a commodity value. Perhaps it is not surprising that cases of reported
molestation are connected to women’s maternal role, for the Anglo-Saxon breast is
unique in its presentation and operation as form over function. As Healy reports,
When the American Academy of Pediatrics urged in December
1997 that all babies be breast-fed for at least the first year of life,
a 29 year old mother in Champaign Illinois, cheered: The
woman’s son, then two and a half, was still nursing at least once a
day, and seemed a rosy-cheeked testimonial to the health benefits
of breast milk. He recovered quickly from stomach flus and colds,
and seemed a bright, happy, and well-adjusted. The little boy was
hitting developmental milestones and climbing the growth chart
right on track. But in July, the applause suddenly stopped. The
woman’s son, by then 5 years old, was removed from her home
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after caseworkers responded to a babysitter’s complaint. Judge
Ann Einhorn approved the separation that the woman’s continued
breast-feeding had created a situation with “enormous potential
harm to this child” (Healy, 2001:1)
Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, where the child forms a sexual bond to the
mother, therefore owes more to the prevailing Enlightenment culture than Greek
manifestations, although in itself, implies a subliminal sexual attraction for their child.
In cases of lesbian child abuse and of women generally, its detection is hidden and
compounded by the fact that “lesbian love-making is not well described as
“sexual.”(Card, 1995:135). The sexual abuse of children can then also be concealed by a
multitude of ‘care’ issues directed at the child.
Spanking (ostensibly as punishment) and enemas (ostensibly for
reasons of health) can be sexually arousing and can be carried out
with varying degrees of publicity and ritual, which, in turn, can be
become part of the arousal. Both activities are common in
consensual lesbian sadomasochism. Punishment is an easy outlet
for sadistic sexuality; it can easy become a domestic ritual. But,
also, rituals as ordinary as dressing, undressing, bathing and
health monitoring can become sexualised occasions for abuse.
(Card, 1995: 135)
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CONCLUSION

The thesis seeks to link arguments concerning dissatisfaction with sexuality and work,
and how the pursuit of satisfaction results in a continuing sense of alienation. This
subsequently questions the overall merit of the separation of the ‘personal’, from
economic issues, particularly as they relate to the neo-liberal economy. Definitions of
‘structuralism’ in the contemporary sociological literature, now dominate class-based
issues with the identity of gender-based groups, suggesting fundamental differences
between men and women, gay and ‘straights’. The ability for micro social groups to
achieve equality is questioned as the capitalist social order begins to resemble the
increasing chaos of the economic. As Wiseman suggests that under Paul Keating’s
government, we should;
Perhaps revel in the collapse of universal truths and values.
After all it was Paul Keating’s speechwriter Don Watson who
has suggested that Australians should begin to imagine a
‘postmodern republic’ – a nation which is ‘aleatory [dependant
on chance], impressionistic, figurative, behop’. (Wiseman,
1996:107)
Consequently these groups compete for recognition amongst the ‘mainstream’, and
those most vulnerable in the neo-liberal economic culture. The amelioration of social
groups over the importance of ‘society’ suggests a victory of the inclusion ethos of
liberal egalitarianism, rather than the broader impact of “social science” and - a general
theme of duplication where women become more like men and men more feminine.
This is particularly evident in the assumptions of unquestioning epistemologies of how
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social groups are defined and their key features – their rationale and “plan for action”.
As Larrain points out,
The supposed de-centering of the subject corresponds with the
supposed triumph of objectivity, the supposed victory of
unconscious and chaotic forces which totally destroy the
individual’s sense of unity. To accept the total de-centering of
the subject is to accept the final loss of agency of purpose, the
inability of the subject to attempt to change the circumstances,
its inability to posit any rational alternative future. It is the end
of all political practice of transformation. (Larrain, 1995:287)
The de-centering of the individual, acts a liberal dialectic in destroying the potential
unity of social groups – perhaps even in the groups they claim to represent. While
Marxist political thought had been inevitably held responsible for many of the excesses
of twentieth century communism post-modernism has escaped such scrutiny. Compared
to the notions of inclusiveness expressed in Marx’s teleology, postmodern interventions
into the social organisational aspects of capitalism have produced a mixture of failures
and divisive outcomes. As Hennessy argues,
While they may disrupt norms and challenge state practices that
are indeed oppressive, they do not necessarily challenge neoliberalism or disrupt capitalism. To the extent that they de-link
sexuality from its historical connection to the human
relationships of exploitation capitalism relies on, and to the
extent that they reify desire, postmodern sexualities participate
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in the logic of the commodity and help support neo-liberalism’s
mystifications. (Hennessy, 2000:109)
The assertion is that the marginalisation of Marxist worker based polemics in
postmodernism indicates that this is connected to the hyper-liberalism found in
sexuality discourses such as paedophilia. As Meszaros asserts, “Labour produces not
only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity – and does so in the
proportion in which it produces commodities generally” (Meszaros, 1970:125). The
chaotic individual or groups of inchoate individuals will permeate their influence rather
than challenge society’s structures and prejudices overtly, or with any sense of urgency.
In contrast to the “ideologists” and the individual, Marx recognises the continuing
process of exploitation within a mode of production that contains unequal social
relations.
For the proletarians, on the other hand, the condition of their
existence, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence
governing modern society, have become something accidental,
something over which they, as separate individuals, have no
control, and over which no social organisation can give them
control. The contradiction between the individuality of each
separate proletarian and labour, the condition of life, forced
upon him, becomes evident to him himself, for he is sacrificed
from youth upwards and, within his own class, has no chance of
arriving at the conditions which would place him in the other
class. (Marx & Engels, 1845: “Proletarians and Communists”)
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With paedophilia at the theoretical end of post-welfare state social democracy, it
reveals that significant ‘conspiratorial’ forces now exist on the left, as well as on the
traditional ‘right’. Heterosexual masculinity, on which capitalist economic relations are
based, has become the key problematic discourse and generalised theme of sacrifice in
the definition of all social groups and sexuality. This identity that was originally
attained through work activities now is viewed as an illegitimate form of generalised
patriarchy. This is subsequently justified through the alleged foibles of heterosexual
masculinity that range from spousal abuse to homophobia. However Protestant
asceticism, and the long-held belief that women can civilise capitalism, again dominate
post-welfare state cultures that exploits female social conservatism. The type of work
offered by the new economy, particularly in service industries, also fits with the
tendency for women to be less unionised than men, accepting part-time work, and the
‘over-tasking’ capability of the maternal urban heroine. Kernot asserts that,
A stark example of the extent of this change in the makeup of
the workforce is the fact that in 1966 women’s participation in
the workforce was 36.3 per cent but by the year 2000 it was 54.5
per cent. Over the same period the number of workers employed
full time has declined from over 90 per cent of all employees to
74 per cent. Only 35 per cent of those employed today work
between 35 and 44 hours per week. (Kernot, 2001:1).
A pivotal adjunct to the ‘motor’ of the spirit of late capitalism is the relationship
women have had to Protestantism that created a non-hierarchal but significant
proselytizing role within Church and social structures. With few exceptions, women’s
supportive role in the home and family has been extrapolated into public sphere
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functions. The displacement of masculine-based unionism has also reflected the
inability for middle class feminists to assist those women who have joined men in the
underclass, such as “single mothers” who are taken off the supporting parents pension
and put on the ‘dole’, once their children reach teenage. The inability of the welfare
state and the labour market to cover the needs of the most marginalised women invokes
the hegemony of a “cupboard love”, where men are still expected to provide the
necessities of life. The left wing of the Labor Party the Hawke/Keating ‘hijack’ argues
Jaensch, “is the culmination of a process during which Labor abandoned its
commitment to the people who are its true base – the workers, the disposed, the
underclass of a capitalist society” (Jaensch, 1989:173). In relation to women’s
employment, Donaldson argues that;
The rise in levels of female employment has not transformed the
class structure, but reinforced it. The increased opportunities for
dual salaries in the family-households of the privileged may well
be intensifying rather than moderating inequality between
individual women and between family-households. Nor do
women escape by marrying out of their class. In terms of the
British Registrar-General’s scheme of six social classes, more
than two-thirds of marriages involve intra-class marriages or
partnerships with an immediately adjacent class member.
(Donaldson, 1991:31)
Post-welfare state social democracy fitted an economic imperative, and filled the
political void. Incremental in style, it introduced themes that shocked mainstream
Australia, such as Aboriginal land-rights. The various manifestations of a “liberal left”
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implicitly, and by omission has worked within capitalist frameworks rather than
confrontationally. The social democratic ethos that attempts to manage capitalist foibles
is therefore best revealed in its position on Marxism. The secular concept of morality
attempts to articulate a modern capitalist society that can operate in harmony with those
it has traditionally oppressed, such as women and indigenous groupings. As Latham
asserts, “Unlike other forms of socialism such as Marxism, with a focus on equality
through ownership of the means of production – social democracy has pursued a moral
code relying on equal rights and obligations, especially an obligation on citizens to cater
for the interests of others” Latham, 1998:153).
The tendency to allude to expectations that cannot be met by conservative economic
paradigms creates perceptions of a “reverse discrimination”, that was also fanned by
socially and economically political forces such as Hansonism and the conservatism of
the Coalition led by John Howard. The popularity of this perspective was due to the fact
that post-welfare state welfarism became highly selective in identifying affordable and
meritorious groups. The ability of the Hawke/Keating government’s to capture the
economic rationalist “middle ground” during the 1980s and 1990s has left the Labor
Party little room for maneuver, even if in the Australia tradition, they could secure
victory by the government “falling over”. In this context the Labor Party’s continual
electoral losses since 1998 has arguably placed in it a worse position that the Coalition
during the Hawke/Keating government’s. This relates to the ability for traditionally
conservative political movements to continue an orientation to the right – moving back
towards the left appears insurmountable in comparison. As Jaensch argues,
In theory, former cadre parties such as the Liberal Party have to
make the fewest adjustments to become catch-all: relatively

289

unconcerned

with

ideology,

cohesion,

programmes

and

representation of sectional interests, transformation should be
relatively simple. For a mass party such as Labor the change, in
theory, should be traumatic and potentially fissive. (Jaensch,
1989:22)
During the Keating government (1993-96), many people became tired of social
democratic rhetoric, particularly in the context of the difficult economic period of the
early 1990s. Ultimately the three extra years the ‘labour’ movement secured by their
surprise victory in 1993, as a result of the fear of the GST, (Goods and Services Tax),
built an intense loathing for Keating’s “big pictures”, and Keating personally. His
personal remoteness from the electorate was only equaled by the remoteness of his
social ideas, personified by his emphasis on the need for an Australian republic. As
Little argues,
he was a patriot in the vernacular but, in a dinner jacket and
playing for higher stakes, he was also a card-carrying
cosmopolitan. Frustrated by the delay in assuming Party
leadership, he exploded to Hawke that Australia was the arse
end of the world anyway; why should I waste my time? (Little,
1997:19)
Keating’s republican push inevitably contained elements of various ‘elites’. This
group consisted of entrepreneurs, entertainers and social democrats, with visions of
Republican France. However the French republic was built upon a more inclusive role
and identity for the French working class, not its exclusion in favour of other marginal
groups as in the Australian social democratic model. He was correct, however, in the
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unconscious appropriation of the French revolution that inspired the bourgeois tradition
of nationalism. That Keating did not see capitalism as the greatest threat to his social
democratic vision belied his efforts to encourage capitalist endeavour, and the occasions
he de-emphasised its importance, for arguments based on “social equity”. As Johnson
argues,
Numerous marginalised identities were being created in such
discourse; for example, to mention just a few, environmentalists
who believed that high economic growth was too damaging to
the environment to be sustainable and wished to live a more
green lifestyle; male workers who wanted to reconstruct
masculinity by spending more time with their families through
reducing work hours, productivity and the centrality of the
workplace in their lives; people who saw themselves primarily
as a transsexual or a lesbian rather than someone whose identity
was centered around job identity. While Labor’s emphasis on
economic identity might have been fine for those gays or
(perhaps

less

frequently)

lesbians

who

privileged

the

consumption element of the gay lifestyle, there were only so
many issues in gay or lesbian identity that the narrowly
economic could address. What if you were a cultural worker
who wanted to produce art or film that wasn’t commercially
successful or easily exportable? What if you were an Italian
migrant who had lost their job in the (increasingly unprotected)
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manufacturing sector? The list of potentially marginalised
(multiple) identities is endless. (Johnson, 2000:33)
The three extra years of an unpopular leader and policies, also affected those groups
who had attached careerist imperatives to post-welfare state social democracy, such as
liberal left academics. The academic involvement in the propagation of “social
democratic” values suggested that the creation of equal citizenry would result in those
who still failed to adhere, only had themselves to blame. The displacement of religion
by scientific discourses, created the environment for a humanist secularism to become
the last great religion, with humanities academics now fulfilling the roles once taken by
religious orders. Dibble suggests that,
Since contemporary intellectuals or artists live in more loosely
structured environments, the social constraints which bind them
to particular outlooks are weaker. Their receptivity to other
outlooks are therefore greater. They can act as catalysts, picking
up outlooks present in other groups, formalising or reshaping
them, adding rationales of their own, and presenting them in turn
to whoever will pay heed. (Dibble, 1970:447)
Moreover, disciplines such as Sociology have become dominated by post-modernity,
promoting ideology through new intellectual paradigms. Trading on Cold War
symbolism, post-modernistic social democracy works by promoting individual agency
in the face of structural impossibilities and attitudinal bulwarks. While social democracy
has flourished, (at least up until a conservative reaction following the defeat of the
Keating government), unemployment has been ignored, and seen in relation to the death
of Marxism, socialism, labourism and communism generally. That it has been mostly
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men affected as a result of de-industrialisation in the West, is indicative of how working
class men were forced to embody all that is wrong with heterosexual masculinity by
post-welfare state social democracy. At the other end of the spectrum, older male
workers that were ‘de-masculinised’ by retrenchment during the 1980s and 90s were
made prematurely invalid, to keep unemployment rates down and to save them the
indignity of belonging to official unemployment statistics. O’Brien’s study of
retrenched BHP workers in Newcastle during those decades found that 48% of the men
in the 55-59 age group were in receipt of the Disability Support Pension, compared with
only 8% of other Social Security payments (O’Brien, 2001:147).
Postmodern areas of emphasis, subsequently becomes the key intellectual exercise as it is likely to suffer the same fate as the Parliamentary form of post-welfare state
social democracy. In the context of the social sciences in universities, it could result in
budget cuts from successive terms of a non-politically correct government as their
conservative social agenda filters through to all areas of social life. It could argued, that
the only way to ‘defeat’ the mainstream - is to include them. As Larrain argues,
The postmodern discourse does not act like the old liberalism
telling people that there is freedom, equality and property for all.
It rather tells people that there is chaos in reality (carefully
concealing the fact that this is brought about by the same market
forces) and dislocation in themselves and that there is nothing
they could do about it. (Larrain, 1995:288)
Consequently a hyper-liberalism that focus on lifestyle issues avoids those that occur
in the politics of class and work, and assists in continuing Cold War stereotypes
associated with Marxism and structuralism. Moreover wide-scale transvestitism or the
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open molestation of children by adults is as utopian (and impossible to achieve) as any
Marxist vision for economic equality. While Foucault promoted the notion that his
approach lacked a normative position, his “history of discourses” conceals and
appropriates Marx’s vision for a utopian society with Foucault’s utopian vision
culminating in the practice of varied and ‘free’, sexual practices. Sexuality, then, can be
seen in issues that relate to ‘death’ of the labourer, where a culture of self/other abuse
dominates and is commensurate with legal and illegal drug users and gambling addicts.
Therefore while sexual hedonists are ostensibly seeking pleasure, the real motivation is
to escape the alienation experienced from the pressures and characteristics of the mode.
Wiseman sees “moral relativism quite consistent with a reduction of all social
relationships to the narrowly contractual and commercial relations of the market place”
(Wiseman, 1996:108).
To become a real threat to the dominance of liberal theory Marxism had to be
incorporated slowly into the middle classes of established European countries. This is
where optimistically the middle classes could see the benefits of socialist thought not
just for themselves or the working class, but for the ‘nation’. As Wagner implies,
European nation-states were philosophically capable of handling socialist thought that
originated from liberalism, and defined by a greater future potential, for further
‘revolutions’.
Americans regarded their own revolution, unlike the French, as
a success. This entailed that no further revolutions were
necessary; it was a revolution to end all revolutions. True, there
could well be further conflicts of interests. But those conflicts
could be handled and solved in a limited discursive space that
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was marked by a broad consensus moving only between
individualist liberalism and civic republicanism, and in the open
social space of a society that was only just building itself, with
plenty of resources to distribute and few rules that were already
set. In continental European societies, in contrast, the social
space in which conflicts could be handled was comparatively
limited, whereas the discursive space opened by the French
Revolution–in which the ideologies of the nineteenth century
were to unfold-was wide (Wagner, 1994:177).
‘Incomplete’ revolutions such as the Russian version are seen therefore as existential
manifestations of European peculiarities, which promote freedom through liberal
revolutions, which ultimately produce totalitarian outcomes. The American Cold War
victory over the Soviet Union is seen as a purposeful ideological commitment to failed
European liberal ‘experiments’. The global phenomenon of late capitalism reducing
culture and nationalism to reflect one commercial imperative, also ‘imperialises’ the
micro sphere of urbanity, aspirational lifestyles, and hence sexuality, love and the
labour practices that produces and sustains them.
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising
the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of
production, and with them the whole relations of society.
Conservation of the old modes of production in unadulterated
form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all
individual classes. Constant revolutionising of production,
uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
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uncertainity and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from
all earlier ones. All fixed fast frozen relations, with their train of
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away,
all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify.
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and
man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real
condition of life and his relations to his kind. (Marx & Engels,
1848: “Bourgeois and Proletarians”)
The Weberian perspective on the capitalist society indicates that the pursuit of liberal
ideals of personal freedom, even for the dominant groups, is restricted by a Protestant
ontology that asserts that an individual is restricted by the ‘omnipresence’ of God. The
sublimation of the ‘individual’ under God has blunted both the spread of secular ideals,
as seen in a consistently inequitable capitalist social order. As Weber asserts in the
context of Calvinism and predestination,
God does not exist for men, but men for the sake of God. All
creation, including of course the fact, as it undoubtedly was for
Calvin, that only a small amount of men are chosen for eternal
grace, can have any meaning only as means to the glory and
majesty of God. To apply earthly standards of justice to His
sovereign decrees is meaningless and an insult to His Majesty,
since He and He alone is free, ie, is subject to no law. His
decrees can only be understood by or ever known to us in so far
as it has been His pleasure to reveal them. We can only hold to
these fragments of eternal truth. Everything else, including the
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meaning of our individual identity, is hidden in dark mystery
which it would it be both impossible to pierce and presumptuous
to question. (Weber, 1930:102-103)
The Adventist religions that are closely linked to the American frontier and ‘new
world’ democracy, exhibit the profound worldly asceticism Weber first identified with
the Protestant sects of Methodism and Baptists. As Brubaker asserts, “the logical and
psychological pressures generated by the ideas of Luther and Calvin led to the
development of what Weber calls ‘worldly asceticism-at once a new ethical attitude and
a new personality structure.’”. Their profound disappointment over the continual
delaying of Armageddon will see a more active asceticism emerge, as a manifestation of
this disappointment. Their religious fundamentalism also suggests that the industrial
capitalist role of the nuclear family belongs to a biblical rather social orientation. Their
dominance in missionary work in the South Pacific was also significant in perpetuating
American religious imperialism with indigenous cultures inculcating Christian and
Western traditions.
Through symbolic forms of Protestantism, such as ‘laws’ relating to the legitimate
consumption of beer, a largely secular country such as Australia, can have a distinctive
work ethic. This can be advantageous in an economy that produces high levels of
alienating work and unemployment. Therefore those who use this legal drug
indiscriminately are verging on the perception that is wrought by illegal drugs such as
heroin. The foreign connotations of the drug war can be interpreted as being based in
the protection of work-based racial values. Consequently, it has become obvious that
both political parties have little idea of how to manage the problem of unemployment,
as men and women are almost equally affected, as Jamrozik illustrates.
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In August 1999 unemployment in Australia was recorded at 7.0
per cent (men 7.2%, women 6.7% and married women 4.1%.
The mean duration of unemployment per person was 52.8
weeks, but in the age group of 35-54 years it was 70.2 weeks
(men 76.5 weeks, women 62.3 weeks). Of the 771,100
unemployed persons 58.7 per cent were men and 41.3 per cent
were women (married women accounted for 15.0%. These
numbers included 113,300 persons who had been unemployed
for over two years. (Jamrozik, 2001:142)
The advent of Keynesian economics and its extension into the welfare state, sought
to save and ameliorate the considerable flaws and inequalities of the capitalist order.
The post-welfare state attacks the assumptions of social inclusion, by exaggerating the
existence of wide-scale welfare abuse, and at the very least gross inefficiency. The
initial Keynesian concepts bred the universal idea of a comprehensive guidance of the
economic process, but,
The monetarist explanation of inflation was so general and
simple compared to the complexities of the Keynesian analysis
that it gained popularity and credence. The KeynesianMonetarist debate appeared to become one of extreme views:
The naïve Keynesian view where unemployment was solely due
to deficient demand, and the monetarist “natural rate”
hypothesis which treated all unemployment as voluntary.
(Mitchell, 1998:4)
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The ideological decline of the welfare state and its pernicious welfare culture plays a
central role in the disciplining of not just the unemployed, but those who may consider
the neo-liberal work culture unfair and alienating. The growing acceptance of work
based inequities and alienation, results in a shift to private sexual pleasures as a means
to compensate for the marginalised public sphere. However the apparent complexity of
Victorianism/openness and Protestant values of thrift and asceticism/sexual hedonism,
suits the requirements of a social democratic discourse that thrives on solving the ‘unsolveable’. This also ignores the fact that sexuality can never be ‘free’ when it is
constrained and defined by the demands of the mode of production. The stratifications
that are involved in sexuality and the nuclear family in the industrial society, is
characteristic of the overt specialisation, and routinisation of tasks both in and outside of
the home which form the basis, and foster the asceticism necessary to function in the
capitalist society. Historical materialism in contrast;
It has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to
look for a category but remains constantly on the real ground of
history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains
the formation of ideas from material practice; and accordingly it
comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of
consciousness cannot be desolved by mental criticism, by
resolution in to self consciousness, or transformation into
“apparitions” “spectres” “fancies’ etc but only by the practical
overthrow of the actual social relations which give rise to this
idealistic humbug, that not criticism but revolution is the driving
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force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all types of
theory. (Marx, 1845: “Socialist and Communist Literature”)
For the capitalist social order to function effectively, it needs to be presented as
generally unproblematic, (evident in popular culture), which uses unifying and
solidifying themes based upon family and generalised visions of the past. This is
particularly evident in advertising, which uses a mix of messages based in traditional
values, to symbolise evocative social codifications that reflect commercial imperatives.
Advertising therefore can reveal social dynamics as they are, rather than how they
should or could be. “Television’s relentless representational realism” (Kellner,
1995:235), sees advertising as popular culture’s most persistent and subliminal form.
This is where “the artifacts of the culture industries exhibited the same features as other
products of mass production: commodification, standardisation, and massification”
(Kellner, 1995:29). Therefore the type of social fascism that underpins populism
therefore cannot be altered until the nexus between the commercial culture and social
organisation is broken. Or as Horkheimer and Adorno assert,
One could certainly live without the culture industry, therefore it
necessarily creates too much satiation and apathy. It itself, it has
few resources itself to correct this. Advertising is its elixir of
live. But as its product never fails to reduce to a mere promise
the enjoyment which promises as a commodity, it eventually
coincides with publicity, which it needs because it cannot be
enjoyed. (Horkheimer&Adorno,1988:161-162)
Billie Jean King, a tennis player from the 1960s and 70s, was one who combined her
social radicalism (lesbianism), with her economic conservatism. Her link with the
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company that produced the Virginia Slims cigarette, (whose advertising persona was
aimed directly at women), was justified by its support of the new women’s tennis circuit
begun by King. The cigarette’s slogan of “you’ve come a long way baby” (Kellner,
1995:249), reflected the struggle of women’s tennis gaining the equivalent recognition
of men’s, and the struggle of feminism generally.
However, lesbian relationships can be fraught with dynamics such as “domestic
violence”, compounded by the belief that in comparison to heterosexual domestic
violence victims, lesbians “fight back”. The notion of “mutual battering,” is borne from
the belief that due to consciousness raising and self-defence training against sexual
assault, and a lesser power differential between partners that lesbians are less docile
victims. But, “many who have worked in shelters or as counselors argue that “mutual
battering” is a myth” (Card, 1995:110)
The fact that most male writers, particularly within academia, are not in the
machismo tradition of Hemmingway or Mailer, also fundamentally assists the alienation
of heterosexual masculinity that has traditionally contested broad forms of economic
equality. Moreover, with feminism based in heterosexuality, and male gender studies
dominated by a male homosexual perspective, it is not uncommon to find feminists and
‘queer’ theorists aligned in university departments.
The attempt to marginalise male heterosexual discourse has seen a banal form of
‘feminism’ to occur in the post-feminist society. Based in extreme phallus critiques, the
delicate and personal issue of penis size is discussed without any direct reference to the
sexual efficacy, but alternatively was used to launch an incoherent attack on
masculinity. The allegiance to masculine symbolism gives credence to Freud’s,
assertion that women suffer from “penis envy”. The link with sexuality and the
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industrial society, and the mechanical requirement for procreative sex that isolates the
function of the penis, relates to the fact as Marcuse argues,
The organisation of sexuality reflects the basic features of the
performance principle and its organisation of society. Freud
emphasises the aspect of centralisation. It is especially operative
in the “unification” of the various objects of the partial instincts
into one libidinal object of the opposite sex, and in the
establishment of genital supremacy. In both cases, the unifying
process is repressive – that is to say, the partial instincts do not
develop freely into a “higher” stage of gratification which
preserves their objectives, but are cut off and reduced to
subservient functions. This process achieves the socially
necessary desexualisation of the body, leaving most of the rest
free for use as the instrument of labour. (Marcuse, 1966:48)
The growth in an illusory female sexual ascendancy obviates the implication that
women present the key problem in sexological discourse. While the “eroticism of
denied”, and maternal focuses has ensured female allure, women are bound by codes
defined by Christianity and romantic love that limits their actual sexual behaviour. Their
overt asceticism relates inchoately to both the incidence of homosexuality and
paedophilia, while also being engaged in the crusade against paedophilia, mimicking the
anti-pornography feminist crusades of the early 1980s. Male child love proponents have
attempted to align themselves with the socialist left, by asserting that that sanctifying
child sexuality attacks the institution of the nuclear family, the principal social
formation of the capitalist society. These movements were at a peak in the 1970s and
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1980s.
Keith Hose, a former chairperson of the main paedophile
organisation, Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) was
interviewed in the Leveller, a radical left journal. He was asked
to explain the links between socialism and paedophilia. He
asserts that, ‘In Britain before capitalism one gets the impression
that things were more free for paedophiles’ and suggests that
paedophilia is only condemned because it ‘threatens some of the
basic institutions of the nuclear family……(Jeffreys, 1990:189)
While feminism had a significant impact on adult pornography, the ‘art’ of “prickteasing” is confirmed in popular music. Performers such as Kylie Minogue, Britney
Spears and Holly Vallance, personify the gulf between “what men want and what most
men can get”, as well as the commercial realities in the promotion of barely legal
‘Lolita’s’. The rejection of the physical objectification of women, is a key discourse in
second wave feminism, but is obscured by the perception that feminists were physically
unattractive women. Baptist raised Spears, has evolved her image around her alleged
virginity status, and her overtly sexual stage and video performances. That someone
could appear so comfortable and knowledgeable about sexuality while even remotely a
‘virgin’, is also indicative of the feigned essence of female heterosexuality, and hence,
its entrenched commercial value. While liberal/egalitarianism tends to promote banal
imitations, women, (as yet), have not precipitated a market-driven need for heterosexual
prostitutes that in any way competes with female heterosexual prostitution. In that
sense, little has changed since the 1969 depiction in the film Midnight Cowboy1 of a
naive “country boy”, convinced that good looks and a long “hard on” will attract him to
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the wealthy married women of New York.
One of the “last gasps” of industrial masculinity was portrayed in the post-World
War Two youth movements, headed by cultural icon Marlon Brando. One of Brando’s
most distinctive early roles was in Streetcar Named Desire2, where the “art of love”
which implies a gentlemanly code of conduct, is stripped bare to reveal subliminal
heterosexual desires based around violence and control. While Brando’s masculinity is
‘bad’, and extreme as his wife attests, she cannot control her innate desires for him,
even after he rapes her visiting sister who is in nervous and emotional decline. In this
context, the ‘bad’ and excessive masculinity mirrors the bad femininity, which has
manifested itself in neurosis with the narrative suggesting that masculinity has a Pyrrhic
but necessary victory over the ‘diseased’ femininity. Therefore while both forms are
equal in nature, the masculine exercises its moral and physical authority over the weaker
form.
In contrast, Princess Diana satisfied society’s admiration of virginity that was
assisted by royalty’s medieval link, where the Prince was charming and the virgin
cherished, that was ultimately sacrificed to the power and authority of the masculine.
The Dublin feminist academic, Ailbhe Smyth described Diana
as the ‘virgin of the century’, and saw the picture the
photographers produced, (the famous ‘see through dress’
picture), of Diana holding the two toddlers on her hip, as an
ideal constellation of virginity. This was no old spinster, but an
image of a virgin whose identity would soon metamorphose into
motherhood, whose sexuality had been reserved for a man with
1
2

1969, director J. Schlesinger.
1951, Director E. Kazan. From the play by T. Williams.
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whom she could have babies. Here was virtual womanhood, ‘she
had to be a bit of a baby herself’. She appeared as a woman with
the touch, a woman who could touch babies, and in that
kindergarten photograph she was portrayed already as a
maternal virgin, a woman who could care. So, her virginity was
not perceived as a lack, but as a prized prelude to maternity.
(Campbell, 1998:122-123)
The stud versus slut dichotomy has also been used sex symbols such as Madonna
and Pamela Anderson who could suggest an all out aggressive sexuality that was
becoming similar to the males. However the 1950s female sex symbol had to equally
rely on coquetry. Slave prostitutes in Rome (meretrices), were forced to wear garish
blonde wigs, later popularised by stars such as Marilyn Monroe and others. Dyed white
blonde hair is therefore linked with overt sexuality and accessibility as it is of Nordic
myths of fair-haired maidens with blue eyes. Monroe’s decline and death, marked by
alcohol and drug abuse, and the realisation that personal tragedy underpinned her
superstardom, cast a shadow of the role and construct of the sex symbol, and a quixotic
attitude towards media stars.
The modern Playmate is now portrayed as considerably less child-like in her
demeanour, but still maintains integrally, elements of the fresh and naive charm of the
original girl’s next door. Blonde, buxom Cyber-Playmate3 of 1998, Christi Taylor
exhibits these charms - and more - which reflect Playboy’s attempt to modernise and
compete with magazines that show more graphic nudity, and deal with the criticism that
it exploits female naiveté. In a question and answer format in Playboy’s cyber-club,
Taylor admits to “loving to make the first move on a guy she likes”, and using “sex
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toys”. “Anything to do with the clit area is just fine with me (laughs) guys aren’t down
there that much during sex.” As an allusion to her traditional femininity she states, “And
I like oils and powder – you put on with a feather.” Generally her narrative is suggestive
of her overt ‘feminine’ sexuality and her availability if a Playboy reader sees the “girl
next door” while she is out socialising. She concedes to being, “very sexual. I’ll do
anything to spice things up, even if that means sitting in front of a porno for ten-fifteen
minutes. You can’t be a prude if you’re gonna take your clothes off for Playboy.
(laughs).”
Taylor’s attitude towards monogamy relates directly to the increased sexual pleasure
that comes from familiarity, as appears to be giving potential lovers advice on how to
please her if they happen to meet and have sex with a Playmate. The pragmatic aspect
for Playboy is the greater intimacy that such disclosure brings, thereby heightening the
masturbatory experience, as the owner of gaze has vicarious sex with his Playmate.
Playboy asks, “is it hard for a guy to get to know your body?” Taylor responds, “it takes
practice. You can’t learn that on a one-night stand. What your last lover liked, the next
may not like at all. I like to kiss a lot, even when I’m having sex. And I have natural
breasts. So they’re very, very sensitive. A guy’s got to realise that they’re not just there
to look at. You definitely have to give them attention. (Hefner, ed. 2001)
The American dominance of twentieth century liberalism, particularly in the post
World War Two era reveals America’s robust concept of individualism, capitalism and
religiosity. This in turn has defined late capitalist sexology, with the “eroticism of the
denied” becoming exemplified in a society that equally values sexual freedom and
religious moral asceticism. While the advent of what is called soft porn began with
Playboy in the 1950s, it was able to circumvent some the moral outrage by cloaking its
3

http://cyber.playboy.com
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depiction of women behind a civilised, and fundamentally middle class facade.
Publications such as Hustler magazine begun in the 1970s, pitched at an obverse model
- revealing the real reason why men purchase any type of pornography - to look at nude
women and masturbate. Its unabashed proletarian approached tapped into a needy
market, yet the stripping away of bourgeoisie sensitivities also offended America's
deeply religious origins.
Playboy morality embodied briefly and sporadically, heterosexual men’s economic
and social dominance in the post-war period. The isolation of industrial masculinity by
traditional gender discourses, argue that its previous ‘dominance’ negates the need for a
class perspective on masculinity. This has seen it weakened or manifested through
repackaging via the “gay gaze” such as in Rugby League, and by the incidence of
masculinities that regale in risk and masochism.
Publisher of Hustler magazine Larry Flynt, took on the incongruity evident between
America’s strident liberal and religious codes through the courts. During the protracted
battle his magazine, perhaps unintentionally, highlighted the key issue that both
attracted and horrified America to publications such as Hustler. A satirical piece
produced in the magazine suggested that prominent religious leader, Jerry Falwell4, had
had sex with his mother. Arguing that the ‘truth’, represented by an open sexuality, will
be perverted made it analogous to the prohibition on alcohol in the 1920s and 30s. Like
the war on drugs, the moral crusade against pornography in the commercial world also
appears ‘lost’, as ‘family’ newspapers hide advertised sexual services in the rear of their
papers. This obliquely acknowledges both the commercial reality and the incongruity of
a ‘respectable’ newspaper profiting out of a market usually associated with sleaze and
degradation. The growth area in liberal capitalism of child pornography is also satisfied
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according to the rationale of market need. Subsequently where to demarcate on ‘liberal’
issues that relate to capitalism as well as individuality, becomes more complex.
In the context of issues such as the defeat of Marxism and labourism, the end of the
Cold War and the mediating force of post-welfare state social democracy, the question
remains: are sexual or gender freedoms real freedoms? The placement of the Californian
nudism cult, which indirectly led to a modern definition of paedophilia, becomes pivotal
when compared to the cold and grime of Russia’s industrial city fortresses. Lifestyle
issues that promotes freedom from clothes, relates to an exaggerated liberal framework
that contrasts the alienated work associated with totalitarian communism, and the partial
incorporation of Marxist principles. The cultural hegemony of capitalism in sexuality is
reflected by the fact that while ‘possessing’ someone through heterosexual sexuality and
love is going through transformation, (shorter periods of ‘ownership’) the notion of
owing someone through sex is intensified in pedophilia/hebophilia. The organised
function of Marxist thought is seemingly contrasted continually with the chaos of queer
theory, as Morton also suggests,
Ultimately, the queer subject is also not a specifically sexed,
raced, gendered…subject but the subject of sensation. Post-al
theory represents the queer subject’s fluidity not simply as
something that “happens to” the subject but in which the subject
“actively” engages: eager to find a sense of “agency” when
some fundamental premises of post-al theory seem to rob the
individual of agency, queer theorists encourage the subject to
“affirm” and celebrate its own “shiftingness” as a form of “selfdeconstruction” which is a form of performative “self4

1996, The People Vs Larry Flynt, director M. Forman.
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intervention.” (Morton, 1995:196)
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